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ABSTRACT
Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) has not yet commenced its first 
trial, it has been the subject of much controversy. There is in particular much debate as to 
the Court’s effect on state sovereignty.
This thesis attempts to move understanding of these issues beyond the 
unsatisfactory state of the existing debate. Instead of comparing the powers of the ICC 
with the remaining powers of states or asking what state of affairs ‘really’ corresponds to 
sovereignty, it considers those contested spaces where the ICC and states may conflict 
and the potential for “complementarity.” The effect of the Court on the exclusive 
authority of states in the area of international criminal justice thus becomes the focus. In 
the process, this thesis examines whether the ICC really represents a transformation from 
state governance to a non-state-centered pattern of governance.
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Chapter One: Introduction^
It has been said that, “[a]ny international criminal jurisdiction capable of vindicating 
the interests of the international community necessarily will involve some compromise of 
state sovereignty” ' and that, “ ...[wjhen an international institution exercises authority over 
events within a state’s territory, the result is often a perception of diminished state 
sovereignty. When the international institution concerned is a criminal court, the issue is 
especially sensitive.”^
The recent creation of the International Criminal Court (hereafter, the ICC) has 
highlighted the tension between international criminal justice and the notion of sovereignty. 
Much of the abundant literature on the ICC discusses the relationship between this new 
permanent institution and states and, in the course of doing so, refers to the notion of 
sovereignty. While the term “sovereignty” is used with ease by many, it is also often used 
with imprecision and, although there is certainly no agreement as to its meaning, the notion is 
almost always associated with the state. Embedded in that literature are assumptions that are 
not always explicitly acknowledged, about the world in which we live and, in particular, 
about the role of states and the role of international organizations.
Since the emergence of the state, there have been various attempts to prosecute the 
perpetrators of war crimes and other atrocities in civilian or military courts. The 
prosecutions were handled by applying domestic law in the form of codes, statutes and/or 
regulations within the territory of the particular state.^ States had the final say in deciding to 
or not to investigate and prosecute and had, therefore, a monopoly in the area of international
' The author wishes to emphasize this thesis represents the opinions of the author and not the 
United Nations or to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo( UNMIK).
2criminal justice. Accordingly, the theoretical and practical ability to exercise (or not) that 
exclusive authority was also seen as an integral aspect of state sovereignty."
State efforts at investigation and prosecution, however, were sporadic at best. Some 
states did better than others. Although there were precedents of temporary ‘international’ or 
‘internationalized’ tribunals, such tribunals were crisis-specific, limited in time and limited in 
territorial scope. It was only when the ICC was created in 2002 that states lost that absolute 
monopoly on the prosecution of those who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide.
The founding document that led to the creation of the ICC, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (hereafter, the Statute or the Rome Statute), was adopted less 
than four years after the diplomatic conference for its establishment.^ Before the Statute was 
adopted, the states involved in the negotiations had to vote on it as a package. While the vote 
was not formally recorded, most reports indicate that 120 states voted in support of the 
multilateral treaty, 7 states voted against and 21 states abstained.
Over one hundred countries have ratified the Statute. While three of the five 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (hereafter. Security Council) 
ratified the Statute, two others have refused to do so: the United States of America (hereafter. 
United States) and the Peoples’ Republic of China.^ The United States initially signed the 
Statute and then later ‘unsigned’ it arguing that the ICC was too independent and that it 
violated the sovereignty of the United States. India, on the other hand, abstained in the vote 
because it did not think that the ICC was independent enough.^ Therefore, while a 
remarkable number of states have signed and ratified the Statute or are in the course of doing 
so, states representing a majority of the world’s population have not. Accordingly, some
3have refused to ratify it and other states (including the United States) have been overtly 
hostile to it. In general the dispute seems to be the result of the perceived inevitable clash 
between the domestic and the international realms and a deep disagreement as to the effects 
of the creation of the ICC.
The clear opposition to the Court has not, however, prevented it from commencing its 
task. Within its first year of operation, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (hereafter, the 
OTP) received almost five hundred communications from individuals and non-governmental 
organizations (hereafter, NGOs) in relation to potential investigations.^ In 2004, the OTP 
received three referrals of situations from states parties that respectively involve alleged 
atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter, DRC), Uganda and the Central 
African Republic and commenced investigations in two of those c a s e s . M o s t  recently, in 
March 2005, pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (hereafter, the Charter), 
the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the OTP and the OTP has 
commenced its third investigation.'* As well, the OTP is analyzing other “situations of 
concern” in other parts of the wo r l d . Ac c o r d i n g l y ,  the ICC, if effective, is destined to 
become a major new actor in the international community and, for that reason, has been 
chosen as the focus of this thesis.
Literature Review -  The “State” of the Discourse on the ICC
Despite the fact that the ICC has not even had its first trial, there is an enormous 
amount of literature on the ICC including a number of excellent texts outlining the pros and 
cons of an international criminal c o u r t . T h e  bulk of the literature more often than not 
simply summarizes the Statute and either supports or opposes the ICC in its current form.
4The literature is also full of repeated references to sovereignty that are rarely analyzed in 
depth. Further, the literature is far from consistent as to the potential effect of the ICC on 
sovereignty and differences of opinion even exist amongst those who are either for or against 
a permanent international criminal court. Before reviewing two of the more sophisticated 
works, namely those of Bruce Broomhall and Eric Leonard, a quick literature review will 
clearly show the reader the incoherence in the discourse.
First, simple reference to four proponents of the ICC quickly illustrates the variations 
in their opinions. Yves Beigbeder^'* saw the vote in Rome as “introducing radically 
important innovations into relations between [sjtates, eroding their sovereign prerogatives 
and establishing a new relationship between national courts and institutional justice”.'^ 
Monroe Leigh, on the other hand, viewed the ICC’s jurisdiction as “rather modest, residual, 
[and] ... treaty-based.” To Leigh, the exercise of its jurisdiction is severely restricted by the 
Statute and the Statute took nothing from the jurisdiction of the state where the crime is 
committed or where the accused is a national.'^ Michael Mysak opined that “[sjtate 
sovereignty is not challenged by this system, beyond the fact that it provides a strong reason 
for states to conduct their own internal investigations” '^ and he instead felt that the American 
objections to the Statute likely masked another position: “control of an International Criminal 
Court without the risk of being subject to its jurisdiction -  a position propelled by the 
somewhat outdated doctrine of state sovereignty.” '*
Second, in relation to those scholars who are clearly opposed to the ICC, different 
opinions of the effect of the ICC on sovereignty also abound. For example, William Lietzau 
opined that, “[fjrom a macro perspective, U.S. jurisdictional proposals [for the ICC] reflect 
an attempt to balance necessary judicial authority on one side, and preservation of state
5sovereignty and current structures that promote international peace and security on the
other.” '^ Lietzau further stated that “responsibility for the exercise of jurisdiction has rested
on the states” and that responsibility and accountability cannot be delegated away from the
s t a t e . G a r y  Dempsey and Guy Roberts describe the ICC as a “jurisdictional leviathan.” '^
Roberts claimed that the ICC “will ... rob nations of their sovereignty, impose new standards
of law based on the whim of activist judges, and eliminate other more viable options for
achieving peace and social justice. Nations ... are, in effect, agreeing to cede their
sovereignty over their own court systems and notions of justice to a supra-national tribunal”
-  something that Roberts considers to be an unacceptable cost.^^ Roberts considered the
creation of the ICC as “the beginning of the end of state sovereignty”^^  and “a clear and
present danger to national sovereignty.” '^^
Further, Kristafer Ailsleiger used similarly evocative language and described the ICC
as “a Pandora’s Box that poses too many threats to U.S. sovereignty and the Constitution to
be a c c e p t a b l e . W h i l e  Ailsleiger acknowledged other views of sovereignty, he used the
traditional absolutist notion. In other words he considered sovereignty to be exclusive,
supreme and independent authority within one’s own territory and independent from outside
authority. According to Ailsleiger the ICC “will sound the death knell for national
sovereignty.” To him, the ICC is “a supranational court with near-universal jurisdiction.” *^’
David Nill argued that that personal jurisdiction raises sovereignty concerns and that
the ICC involves a ceding of sovereignty:^^ “the state where the crimes are committed must
cede its sovereignty in order for the court to operate t h e r e . M i l l ’s analysis of the notion of
sovereignty is found in the following quotation: -
It is presumptuous to believe that all members of the world community accept 
the same definition of sovereignty as the United States. Sovereignty for an
American ... devolves from the people, not the state. Other nations perceive 
sovereignty as a national right belonging to the government. For nations that 
accept the latter definition of sovereignty, ceding it to an international entity is 
less troublesome. However, for individuals and nations that accept the 
definition of sovereignty as a power and right emanating from the people, 
cession to international entities is very troublesome.^^
Henry A. Kissinger has also commented on the ICC whilst addressing the issue of 
universal jurisdiction. Kissinger stated that “an unprecedented concept has emerged to 
submit international politics to judicial procedures” which leads to “substituting the tyranny 
of judges for that of governments.” Oddly, he later did not describe it as unprecedented but 
as the trend whereby domestic criminal justice is applied to violations of universal standards 
through the use of United Nations conventions and the creation of the ICC.^ *^
Third, additional opinions can be found as to the effect of the ICC on notions of 
sovereignty amongst those who do not immediately fall into the category of being a 
proponent or an opponent of the ICC. For example, Patricia McKeon (in an article written 
before the Rome Conference) noted that one of the main obstacles to an international 
criminal court is the principle of sovereignty.^' Further, she stated that, “[wjhile no longer 
considered an absolute right, the principle of sovereignty still thrives in international law and 
appears to be incompatible with the aspirations of a permanent court” and she argued for “a 
shift in balance between the sovereign rights of the states and the authority of the larger 
international c o m m u n i t y . A l t h o u g h  McKeon acknowledged, “the meaning of sovereignty 
depends upon its c o n t e x t , s h e  went on to use traditional thinking when she noted that 
sovereignty “forbids the exercise of jurisdiction by one state over matters and parties within 
the territorial limits of another independent s t a t e . For McKeon an international criminal 
court could potentially erode sovereignty.^^
7Some authors have stated that the ICC does not affect sovereignty as it was 
established with the consent of states participating in its establishment and agreeing to be 
bound by it through ratification, while others have asserted that the ICC is “an extension of a 
state’s own domestic jurisdiction.’’^ *’
Antonio Cassese stated, “the framers of the Rome Statute were not sufficiently bold 
to jettison the sovereignty-oriented approach to state cooperation with the Court and opt for a 
‘supra-national’ approach. Instead of granting the Court greater authority over states, the 
[sic] draughtsmen have left too many loopholes permitting states to delay or even thwart the 
Court’s proceedings.’’^ ^
Gerry Simpson concluded that the Rome Statute proposes to buttress state 
sovereignty through its content, state consent requirements and the notion of 
complementarity. While Simpson did not arrive at a definitive conclusion as to the Statute's 
effect on sovereignty, he argued that a series of tensions intersect in international criminal 
law including sovereignty and international law and politics. Simpson noted the tension 
between state sovereignty and international law is “more acute” in international criminal law 
and asked, “to what extent is an international system based on state consent hospitable to an 
international criminal order founded on centralised coercion?” *^
Michael A. Newton, in reviewing the notion of complementarity, stated that 
“[ajlthough the delegates to the Rome Conference unanimously agreed that national 
jurisdictions have primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting the crimes 
enumerated in ... the Rome Statute, they strove to establish an international judicial 
institution that would allow supranational justice -and accountability to pierce the shield of 
unconstrained sovereignty.”^^  More particularly, he noted that the Statute allowed state
8sovereignty to be subordinated and that “[t]he complex blend of civil law, common law, 
customary international law, and sui generis that combine in the Rome Statute is held 
together by the notion that the sovereign nations of the world are joined, not as competitors 
in the pursuit of sovereign self interest, but as interdependent components of a larger global 
civil society."'"^
On the issue of jurisdiction, Newton noted that the threshold before the ICC can 
assert jurisdiction “is an up-front textual device that restricts the reach of the ICC, which in 
turn preserves the de facto latitude of sovereign criminal forums” and “also establishes the 
ICC as a supranational institution working within a system of sovereign states...The Rome 
Statute envisions an enforcement regime based on overlapping power between territorial 
sovereigns (states) and non-territorial sovereigns (the international community as a whole), 
represented by the ICC prosecutor.”'^ ' Newton viewed sovereignty as “unrestrained state 
discretion”'*^  and noted that the Statute has the potential for eroding the principles of state 
sovereignty.'*^
Assessment of the Literature
' A number of important themes can be discerned from this general review of the 
literature. First, one finds a heavy reliance upon the traditional notion of absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty permeates the literature. That notion of sovereignty is often explicitly 
asserted whilst commenting upon the American opposition to the ICC with what is at times 
particularly emotive language. Unfortunately, however, most of this literature uses 
sovereignty (as per the prescient words of Antonio Cassese) as a catchword or a “substitute 
for thinking and precision.”'*'* In addition to failing to address carefully the issue of
9sovereignty, this literature is usually not accompanied by a detailed analysis of the 
complicated legal framework surrounding the ICC. Second, in the literature there is 
disagreement as to the nature of the ICC itself. To some, the ICC is supranational and to 
others it is not. As well, there is disagreement as to the nature of the ICC's jurisdiction. 
Some see it as very limited, whilst others consider its jurisdictional reach to be universal or 
nearly so. Thirdly, not surprisingly in light of the first two points, there is no consensus as to 
the Court’s effect on the notion and practice of sovereignty. Agreement does not even lie 
amongst either the ICC proponents or those opposed to the ICC. Some authors argue that 
sovereignty is neither challenged nor infringed, whilst others argue that it is weakened or 
eroded. In fact, to some the ICC is “too obsequious to state sovereignty”"^  ^ while to others it 
is, as noted, its’ “wrecking ball”."^ ^
The divergence of opinions as to the potential effect of the ICC on sovereignty in the 
literature may be explained by the fact that some of the authors have not used the term 
sovereignty with care. As well, some of the authors either have wrongly interpreted the legal 
framework accompanying the ICC or have used too broad an analysis so that they missed 
some of the critical nuances associated with this unique institution. For one author, one 
provision in isolation may lead to one conclusion, and to another author that same provision 
together with other provisions may lead in the opposite direction. All the same, the 
provisions of the Statute are heavily interrelated with one another. Another explanation for 
the varied opinions may be the embedded assumptions linked to each author’s own 
theoretical stance and, in some cases, own agenda. A lot of the literature focuses on the 
American opposition to the Statute by either taking that side or responding to it. 
Accordingly, realist theoretical assumptions necessarily abound. Lastly, a difference of
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opinion is also not unexpected given the limited record upon which the ICC can be currently 
assessed.
Approach: Evaluating Sovereignty and Authority
It may be that the use of the highly contested term sovereignty in the literature has 
ensured that the effect of the ICC on sovereignty remains irresolvable. The proponents and 
the opponents equally point to provisions that support their view and, in doing so, invoke the 
term sovereignty. Too much reliance upon the notion of sovereignty in the debate has 
allowed the participants to avoid careful consideration of what exactly it meant. As a result, 
discussions about the transfer of exclusive authority or autonomy associated with the creation 
of the ICC were often overlooked. Instead of focusing on what may or may not be a 
measurable rise or decline in state sovereignty due to the court’s creation, this thesis will look 
for areas where it is likely that there will be a claim to sovereignty.
Notwithstanding the general state of the literature as noted above, this thesis will take 
two of the more sophisticated academic works (the work of Bruce Broomhall and Eric 
Leonard) and consider the ICC-sovereignty debate as part of the larger discourse of power. 
Both authors have assessed the ICC in a way that differs from most of the literature and, in 
particular, refrained from choosing specific provisions to the exclusion of others for a 
particular conclusion.
Sovereignty has been the subject of debate in many different contexts for decades'*^ 
and this thesis will not resolve that debate. Arriving at a definition of sovereignty is difficult. 
According to Fowler and Bunck, “the concept of sovereignty has been used not only in 
different senses by different people, or in different senses at different times by the same
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people, but in different senses by the same person in rapid succession.”"^* Its meaning quite 
often depends upon the context and the objectives of those using the word."^^
In an effort to move beyond the unsatisfactory state of the ICC literature noted above, 
however, it may be helpful to note the common suggestion that discussions about sovereignty 
form part of a broader discourse of power. As a result, this thesis will also focus on the work 
of three authors who grapple with how to measure sovereignty whilst considering power, 
Karen Litfin, Wouter W emer and Jaap De Wilde.
In a non-ICC related study Karen Litfin assessed the impact of international 
environmental agreements on the notion of sovereignty. Litfin considered sovereignty to be 
“an aggregated concept that varies according to historical and social circumstances.”^^  
Interestingly, she tried to disaggregate the under-theorized concept by separating it into three 
components: (I) autonomy, (2) control, and (3) legitimacy, with each of them operating upon 
“the tangible dimensions of territory and population.” '^ She defined control as “the ability to 
produce an effect,” autonomy as “independence” and legitimacy as “the recognized right to 
make rules.” Litfin noted that, while the three concepts are interrelated, the theoretical 
incoherence in discussions about sovereignty results from mixing these three concepts.
Others have tried to separate out the elements of sovereignty and use a 
multidimensional approach to sovereignty^^ but I prefer Litfin’s analysis because it clearly 
differentiates between autonomy and control. In addition, Litfin claimed her analysis de­
centered or shifted the focal point away from -  or maybe diffuses the locus of power from - 
the state. In that regard, Litfin stated that she deliberately declined to consider the state and 
territoriality as additional variables because both were essential to the modem notion of state 
sovereignty. Litfin, however, did not, in my opinion, completely remove them from her
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analysis in light of her comments that “the pivotal issue is the impact ... on state autonomy, 
control and legitimacy” and the comments earlier in her article that each of her three criteria 
“operates upon the tangible dimensions of territory and population.
The best way to determine how the ICC might affect autonomy and control is through 
a detailed assessment of the jurisdictional provisions of the ICC and the nature of the ICC 
itself. While legitimacy (another dimension in Litfin’s approach) is critical to the 
effectiveness of any court, it cannot be included as a variable in this thesis because the court 
has not yet completed a case. As well, the American government’s decisions to sign the 
Statute and later to “unsign” it indicate that counting the number of signatories to the Statute 
is not necessarily an indicator of legitimacy.
According to Wemer and De Wilde, sovereignty is not needed if states really “were 
isolated and autarkic.”'^ Accordingly, to them, there is a “descriptive fallacy” associated 
with the notion. There is an “erroneous assumption that there must be something in reality 
corresponding to the meaning of the term ‘sovereignty’.”^^
Very simply, Wemer and De Wilde see sovereignty not as a state of affairs, but as the 
exercise of power. As a result, ingeniously, Wemer and De Wilde suggest that, “[ijnstead of 
asking what state of affairs ‘really’ corresponds to the idea of sovereignty, one should ask in 
what context a claim to sovereignty is likely to occur, to whom a sovereignty claim is 
addressed, what -  if any - normative framework is used to determine the legitimacy of a 
sovereignty claim and what consequences generally follow from the acceptance of a 
sovereignty c l a i m . F u r t h e r ,  W emer and De Wilde held that claims to sovereignty “are 
more likely to occur in contexts that are beyond-the traditional concept of sovereignty” -  in
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other words a situation that does not involve “complete control internally and impermeability 
vis â vis other sovereigns.” *^
They then used this approach to assess the European Union and its effect on 
sovereignty. The authors correctly considered the fact that member states handed over their 
powers at an unprecedented rate in areas “considered essential for the sovereignty of the 
state” and that European Community law now has a direct and binding effect on the law of 
the member states. W emer and De Wilde held that instead of trying to measure the amount 
of powers left with member states, a better approach was to ask “whether the member states 
still rely on their sovereign status and whether relevant audiences accept their claims to 
sovereignty.
The approaches used by Litfin and W emer and De Wilde allow for the research 
question in this thesis to be asked in a way that differs from the unsatisfactory ICC- 
sovereignty discourse noted above. Most authors seek to measure the powers of the ICC and 
compare them with the powers left with states. Even assuming that those changes are so 
easily measured, such an examination is not helpful because the provisions of the Statute are 
so interrelated. Counting one section to the exclusion of another can very easily lead to an 
incomplete and/or inaccurate conclusion and such an analysis is not able to assess whether 
there has been a net ehange in the location of authority or, to use the words of Litfin, a 
“sovereignty bargain.” Therefore, it is not intended that this thesis analyze each section of 
the ICC framework in order to determine what amounts to an increase or a decrease in the 
authority of states. Instead, this thesis will consider areas of potential sovereignty claims.
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Sovereignty, Authority and Governance
Although Bruce Broomhall was of the view that the Statute balanced “the needs for a 
credible system of justice and the desire to induce wide [sjtate support for the ICC,” he 
opined that “the real strengths” of the Statute (as reflected in the definitions, general 
principles, and some of the mechanisms of the Statute) were “tempered by the fact that the 
ultimate effectiveness of the Court remains in the hands of [sjtates, individually and 
collectively.” *^^ As a result, to him, “the institution of sovereignty, at least in areas relevant to 
international criminal law, is in no danger either of being replaced or of its importance being 
radically diminished in the foreseeable future.” '^
Broomhall’s work went beyond most of the literature in that it focused on the 
“tension between international criminal law and the international system” and the gulf 
between “the sovereignty-limiting rationale of the Nuremberg legacy and the sovereignty- 
based control over enforcement.”*"^ As well, he carefully considered the issue of sovereignty 
and the distinction between sovereignty and autonomy.
Broomhall opined that sovereignty is “constituted by the recognition of the 
international community, which makes its recognition conditional on certain standards” and 
that such conditions have “become increasingly accepted in the fields of international law 
and international relations.”*"^ As a result, sovereignty, which is much more diffused in this 
era of globalization, is contingent.^'* Second, in relation to autonomy, Broomhall astutely 
noted, “it is sometimes assumed that sovereignty is synonymous with control or autonomy.” 
He stated, however, that “authority to rule over a territory is different from behavioural
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autonomy inside or outside that territory” and authority may be delegated without eroding
sovereignty as such.^^
At the end of his work, Broomhall considers all three terms as follows:
...the forseeable future does not hold the realistic prospect of a significant 
replacement or realignment of the institution of sovereignty, at least in any 
sense relevant to the establishment of the preconditions for regular, impartial 
enforcement of international criminal law. Bearing in mind the distinction 
between sovereignty and autonomy ... it is much easier to assert a reduction 
in the latter than it is a decline in the former. A decline in sovereignty, in the 
sense of a loss of exclusive authority within [sjtate jurisdiction, would imply a 
corresponding increase in authority at some other level of the system. Of 
course, no cosmopolitan or supra-state institutional order can be said to be 
emergent at present even if institutional obligations increasingly condition 
sovereignty.^
This thesis will focus on the ICC framework and its affects upon states with a 
consideration of the location of exclusive authority or autonomy. Broomhall’s work is also 
valuable in that it reminds us that state actions (especially enforcement-related actions) will 
be critical to the ICC’s success. It should be noted, however, that this thesis will only deal 
with the issue of state enforcement in a general way because of the quality of Broomhall’s 
work and because of space limitations associated with this thesis.
In one of the few detailed theoretical analyses of the ICC, Eric Leonard concluded 
that the formation of the ICC is an example of a transformation from “the old pattern of 
governance” to a “non-state centered p a t t e r n . L e o n a r d  also opined that, “ ...although much 
of the power ... still resides with states parties,” “states have ceded some of their authority to 
new spheres of aut hor i t y . Spec i f i ca l l y ,  Leonard portrays the ICC as an example of a shift 
“from the Westphalian state to multiple spheres of authority (SOAs), both at the subnational 
and supranational level.”^^  .
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According to Leonard, governance is “an accepted set of rules that guide actors in 
their endeavor to solve collective problems” which did not require a hierarchical command 
structure. To him, governance was not government but something outside of formal 
government institutions. Leonard defined authority as “the right to command and 
correlatively, the right to be obeyed.” Authority, to Leonard, requires a hierarchical 
structure.
In an effort to arrive at a complete understanding of the effects of the formation of the 
Statute, Leonard assessed the ICC from three different (and sometimes overlapping) 
theoretical perspectives namely, neoliberal institutionalism, regime theory and global 
g o v e r n a n c e . W h i l e  all three theories allow for the possibility of cooperation at the 
international level, they focus on different actors, causal factors and authority structures. 
Accordingly, each perspective answered some questions that the other perspectives could 
not. In addition to referring to the jurisdiction provisions of the Statute, Leonard’s study 
focused primarily on the events that led up to the creation of the Statute including the 
negotiations leading up to and at the Rome conference.^' As well, Leonard considered 
governance, authority, conflict management (or what he also called international 
cooperation) and the primary actors in such.^^
In his work, Leonard argued that, while states still have an important or critical role, 
they will not control the actions of the Court as “the [sjtate is no longer the final arbitrator in 
questions of a u t h o r i t y . A c c o r d i n g  to him, the ICC “appears to be an example of 
transnational authority, or authority that exists beyond the borders of the Westphalian 
s t a t e . F u r t h e r ,  Leonard viewed the creation of the ICC as “a new form of governance” 
which allowed for the input of multiple actors, even those beyond the state.
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According to Leonard, the “emergence of the ICC encapsulates the tension that 
currently exists between state sovereignty and global governance,” challenges state 
sovereignty and such an analysis is relevant to broader questions of governance post-Cold 
War. As well, Leonard stated that increased governance beyond the nation state is partly 
attributable to the decline in rigid adherence to the norm of state sovereignty.^*’
By focusing on the negotiation history of the Rome Statute, Leonard correctly 
minimized the possibility of drawing erroneous conclusions that the Statute was more of an 
extreme step than it was. For example, previous draft versions of the Statute had very 
different powers for the ICC and its organs, some of which were watered down in the final 
version.
In a more recent article, Leonard revisited the issue of the effect of the creation of the 
ICC on sovereignty by looking at where claims to supreme rule may lie within the authority 
structure of the ICC. In the course of doing so, he emphasized sovereignty’s socially 
constructed nature (due to the interaction between agents, structures and the rules between 
them) and non-static n a tu re .A stu te ly , Leonard noted that the classic F.H. Hinsley definition 
of sovereignty does not necessarily include the state^* and reminded the reader that the 
Westphalian state is a rather recent phenomenon. Like Liftin, Leonard tried to disaggregate 
sovereignty from the state. Specifically, to Leonard “[sjovereignty embodies the notion of 
authority and the recognition of other actors of that authority” or “a claim to supreme rule” 
and the agents possessing such authority can change/^
As conclusions, Leonard first opined that the jurisdiction of the ICC is quite broad. 
Then he noted that, however, except for a Security Council referral, the trigger mechanisms 
limit the jurisdiction of the court and its ability to use its power.**  ^ Second, by virtue of the
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notion of complementarity, the ICC will only assert jurisdiction “when the state failed to act 
according to the principles of international justice.*' Third, the ICC is an example of a trend 
towards non-state authority*^ wherein the state, while still a crucial agent, is no longer is the 
privileged one. The state “no longer holds supreme authority in the area of humanitarian 
kw".»3
In the course of his analysis, Leonard also asked the following three questions:
1. Does the ICC undermine the principles of state sovereignty?
2. What are the implications of this institution on sovereignty?
3. Can we consider the authority structure of the ICC a new form of sovereignty? 
Leonard answered these questions in short order. First he felt that the ICC does undermine 
the principles of state sovereignty but not sovereignty in general. Second, he opined that 
sovereignty has changed and evolved so as to involve non-state authority. Third, Leonard 
opined that complementarity is a new form of sovereignty in a limited way. Specifically, he 
stated, “[t]he ICC clearly maintains the primary attributes of sovereignty -  supreme authority 
with no higher authority and a clear set of spatial boundaries. However, this supreme 
authority only exists within the realm of humanitarian law".*"
Leonard’s newer research is in some ways more sophisticated but it none the less 
looked only at the Statute and only then answered the above three questions with a minimum 
of analysis.
Focus of Thesis
This thesis will involve a case study of the ICC framework in an effort to understand 
the effect of the creation of the ICC on the exclusive authority of states. In the course of
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doing so, this thesis will re-examine the ultimate conclusion of Leonard that the creation of 
the ICC is really an example of a transformation from state governance to one of non-state 
centered governance. As a consequence, this thesis will also consider whether exclusive 
authority has been ceded to the ICC, its type and its extent. Whether the authority is shared 
between the ICC and a state, or was given to the ICC exclusively will also be assessed. If it 
is found that such authority has been given to the ICC, consideration will also be made as to 
whether that transfer is temporary or permanent.
Chapter Two briefly summarizes the circumstances surrounding the negotiations that 
led to the Statute, and past efforts to create an international criminal court, to refresh or 
acquaint the reader but these efforts are not intended to be the focus of this thesis. These 
areas were covered by Leonard in his work.
Instead, this thesis will consider the effect of the ICC legal framework that was 
established after Leonard completed his work and will consider the ICC with other 
international or internationalized criminal tribunals -  something Leonard did not really 
consider in his analysis. As there may also be a difference between a written legal framework 
and practice, consideration will also be made of the limited practice of the ICC to date.^^
Leonard’s work primarily focused only on the ICC in conjunction with the state. 
Although Leonard briefly mentioned the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter, 
ICTR) in the course of his dissertation, he simply considered them as examples of the 
transformation from the Westphalian state-centered thinking to that of the post-Westphalian 
order and as one of the circumstances that set the stage for the political will to create the 
Statute. Leonard, however, made no detailed comparison of the ICC with the ICTY, the
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ICTR or any other international or internationalized criminal tribunal. As a result, Leonard’s 
study could not assess whether the ICC involved a greater or lesser transfer of state authority 
than that involved in the case of any international or internationalized tribunal.
Because he asserted the ICC represents an example of a transformation in global 
governance, it is submitted that, in addition to states, the ICC should also be compared with 
other international or internationalized criminal tribunals. Not to do so leaves one with the 
impression that international criminal justice will only be handled by states or by the ICC. In 
fact, the ICC will not be the only available mechanism when states are unwilling or unable to 
investigate or prosecute persons accused of the most serious of crimes. Other possible 
mechanisms include other states by way of universal and/or extraterritorial jurisdiction; 
mixed composition tribunals; and ad hoc tribunals created under Chapter VII of the Charter 
with the assistance of the Security Council. These international or internationalized criminal 
tribunals will be compared to the ICC with specific reference to their source, status 
(including whether they are truly international), expected life span, jurisdiction (including 
subject-matter jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction and temporal jurisdiction), and relationship 
to domestic courts.
Further, although the ICC is involved in three investigations, it has yet to undertake 
its first trial. Nonetheless a complicated legal framework has been set up around the ICC 
since Leonard’s first work with the creation of various agreements and rules. The creation of 
this complicated legal framework in addition to the Statute may alter the conclusions of 
Leonard’s work. As a result, Leonard’s work should be reconsidered with this additional 
information that was not available to him in 2001-so as to minimize the risk of an incomplete 
analysis. Lastly, as principle and practice often do not coincide in life, some consideration of
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the limited practical experience with the ICC as stated in official documents is also 
warranted.
A reader with a cursory knowledge of the ICC will, of course, know that the ICC 
framework gives some specific authority to the ICC. As noted above, however, for some 
governments and some authors the powers given to the ICC are too sweeping whilst, for 
others, the powers are too heavily circumscribed. Notwithstanding the fact that the ICC may 
concurrently share some jurisdiction with a state, except for a limited number of situations, 
preference will be given to state investigation and prosecutions. If a state is in this 
preferential position (termed “complementarity”), a sovereignty claim between the state and 
the ICC is not likely. If, however, the ICC acquires or takes over jurisdiction in one of those 
exceptional situations, a sovereignty claim may be quite likely.
The question that may then be asked is how one is to assess the Statute and the 
accompanying legal framework. In relation to the ICC legal framework, the focus of this 
thesis will be on the issue of the jurisdiction and admissibility provisions of the ICC that give 
the court the ability to investigate and prosecute criminal cases with specific reference as to 
when exclusive authority rests with the ICC. Special mention will also be made of the 
underlying notion of “complementarity.”
In that regard, this thesis will look at cooperative situations between the ICC and 
states and situations of possible conflict. Such contested spaces are more interesting because 
it is there that we will see the true effects of the ICC on states and are more likely to see a 
sovereignty claim. While I agree with Leonard’s overall conclusion that states still retain 
extensive authority post-Rome, it is in the areas of conflict that they lose at least some or all 
of that control.
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Because of the previously noted concerns about the quality of the literature, this 
author has specifically chosen to rely upon original sources wherever possible, including the 
constitutive documents that make up the ICC framework. The framework around the ICC is 
developing at a quick pace and occasional reference will be made to draft primary sources 
still awaiting the approval of the Assembly of States Parties (hereafter, ASP). The analysis 
of the jurisdictional ICC framework will include heavy emphasis upon the Statute and 
occasional reference to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereafter, RPE)*^, the Elements 
of C r i m e s , t h e  Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations (hereafter. Relationship Agreement)*^ and the Agreement on 
Privileges and Immunities of the Court (hereafter, Privileges/Immunity A g r e e m e n t ) . I  also 
consider the OTP policy paper and limited actions to date as part of the legal framework.
Justifying the Topic
One may ask why, when the ICC has not yet completed its first case, these questions 
should be considered important. First, although sovereignty is a highly contested concept, it 
is a fundamental concept in the fields of international relations and international law. A lot 
of the literature written about the creation of the ICC often uses sovereignty as a catch word 
without precision. That same literature fails to analyze the ICC framework in detail before 
coming to a conclusion as to the effect of the ICC. Any response that can remedy the 
imprecision and that can address the inconsistent opinions that the ICC both attacks and 
protects the notion of sovereignty will certainly be a constructive addition to the literature. 
Second, Eric Leonard considered the court’s formation an example of a transfer away from 
state-centered governance to non-state centered governance. The literature, despite its
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limitations, does not always agree with Leonard’s conclusion. If, however, Leonard’s 
assessment is correct, it will have relevance to the broader issue of the contemporary 
relationship between states and international organizations and the redistribution of exclusive 
authority or power. This thesis will re-examine that conclusion with a detailed examination 
of the current ICC legal framework whilst appreciating the existence of other international or 
internationalized tribunals. To date, this author finds minimal substantive analysis of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction considered in context with such legal m e c h a n i s m s . T h e  failure to 
consider those tribunals may result in an incomplete picture that then leads to erroneous 
conclusions about the effect of the ICC. Third the ICC, a new actor on the international 
scene, has now commenced two investigations at the request of the states involved and has 
commenced a third investigation without the involved state’s consent. Accordingly, a 
sovereignty claim is very likely on the horizon.
Before commencing with the heart of this thesis, it is recommended that the reader at 
least briefly review the next chapter - a chapter that is meant to stand-alone. Chapter Two 
contains background information for those without a detailed knowledge of the ICC. It first 
summarizes the complicated ICC framework and the negotiation process that led to its 
creation. Further, as the bulk of the secondary ICC literature uses the American opposition 
to the ICC as an analytical starting point, the second chapter will then summarize the actions 
of the United States at Rome and its reasons for refusing to ratify the Statute. To ensure that 
the reader is left with an up-to-date knowledge of this area, references will also be made as to 
the current American position on the ICC in both the domestic and international realms, 
including the infamous “unsigning” of the Statute-, efforts to get Security Council deferrals 
and efforts to negotiate agreements that purport to eliminate the ability of the ICC to assert
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jurisdiction. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with a brief overview of other international or 
internationalized criminal courts and tribunals before and after 1998 to lay the groundwork 
for a comprehensive comparison with the ICC in the following chapter.
Chapter Three will analyze the ICC framework in detail with specific consideration of 
the notions of complementarity and jurisdiction. The aim of the analysis is to find out the 
effect of the Court’s jurisdiction and where exclusive authority now resides. Before coming 
to any conclusions, this third chapter will also review the ICC from a broader or more global 
perspective. In particular, it will compare certain aspects of the ICC’s jurisdictional regime 
and status to the other international or internationalized criminal tribunals before and after 
the Rome Conference.
Chapter four, the concluding chapter of this thesis, will then take the results of that 
analysis and re-examine Leonard’s conclusions and discuss possibilities for future research 
as this Court goes about doing its work.
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Chapter Two: The International Criminal Court and Others
In order to assist the reader, this chapter will provide a brief overview of the 
International Criminal Court (hereafter, ICC) framework, the American position on the ICC 
and the recent proliferation of other courts in addition to the ICC.
General Background
It is this author’s opinion that a detailed summary of the events leading up to the 
creation of the ICC is not necessary because numerous summaries are readily available in the 
literature.^' A general summary will remind the reader that the ICC was not created out of 
thin air and that it is not a recent concept. In fact, a combination of circumstances including 
the end of the Cold War, globalization, the increased pervasiveness and strength of 
international humanitarian law, and a rising human rights discourse turned previous efforts 
and failures into success. The risk with such a general summary, however, is that important 
details will be left out.
The Rome Statute was not the result of the first call for a permanent international 
criminal court. Trials for war crimes and crimes against the peace occurred as early as the 
thirteenth century^^ and were generally conducted by the victors upon the losers.
After the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 an international penal tribunal was 
specifically contemplated in the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism and an annexed P r o t o c o l t h e  1948 Genocide Convention,^'^ and the 1973 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.^^ 
Although the last two Conventions came into force, no such tribunal was created.
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War crime trials were seriously considered after the end of World War I, but the 
United States opposed the concept. The United States argued that such trials were “a direct 
attack on the concept of state sovereignty"^ and that subjecting heads of state to criminal 
prosecution “was unprecedented in national or international law and contrary to the principle 
of national sovereignty.”^^  Kaiser Wilhelm II, the former German Emperor, was to be tried 
before a special tribunal for a “supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties.”^^  The Netherlands, however, refused to make him available for trial 
noting that the above offence was unknown in Dutch law either domestically or in its treaties 
and that it appeared to be political rather than criminal in nature. Ultimately, no international 
trials occurred after World War I and Germany was permitted to conduct its own 
prosecutions (known as the Leipzig trials).^^ According to Antonio Cassese, it was a “period 
which placed an exceptionally high premium upon considerations of national sovereignty.” '*’*^ 
After World War II tribunals were set up first in Nuremberg and then in Tokyo 
(discussed in detail below).'*" The results at Nuremberg led to codification of the Nuremberg 
principles by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946'*’^  and the creation of the 
International Law Commission (hereafter, the ILC). In 1948 the United Nations invited the 
ILC to study the “desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ 
for the trial of persons charged with genocide and other crimes over which jurisdiction will 
be conferred upon that organ by international conventions.” '**^ Various specific proposals 
were then introduced over the years.'**^
The impetus for an international judicial organ post-Nuremberg and post-Tokyo, 
however, was short-lived despite further atrociti-es around the world. Most scholars seem to 
attribute its short life to the lack of cooperation associated with the Cold War.'**  ^ Sharon A.
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Williams offers a number of other reasons: “a reluctance to yield up any element of 
sovereignty to an international tribunal, nationalistic pride in the superiority of domestic 
criminal law, reticence to participate in establishing another international institution, 
problems of obtaining consensus on subject matter jurisdiction, applicable substantive and 
procedural criminal law rules, issues relating to recognition and enforcement of judgments 
and the cost.” '®*’
Calls for a permanent international court, however, did not cease. In 1992, the 
General Assembly asked the ILC to draft a treaty for an ICC.'°^ There was also renewed 
interest in the concept of an international criminal court after the creation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter, ICTR) in 1993 and 1994. “Tribunal fatigue” and 
high costs led to consideration of a permanent international criminal court as an alternative to 
ad /loc arrangements. Further, it has also been asserted that a number of states wanted to 
“remove the Security Council's monopoly on international tribunals, which the states saw as 
being too selective in distributing justice.
In 1993, the ILC unveiled its draft international criminal court statute and finalized 
the draft statute in 1994. That same year, the General Assembly established an ad hoc 
committee to review the ILC final draft statute and to consider arrangements for convening 
an international c o n f e r e n c e . T h e  draft statute contemplated an international criminal court 
where jurisdiction could only be exercised with explicit state consent along the lines of the 
jurisdictional provisions of the International Court of Justice (hereafter, ICJ). In 1995 the 
General Assembly established the Preparatory Committee (hereafter, PrepCom) with 
authority to draft a text to be submitted to the diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries"'*
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and in 1997 the General Assembly authorized the Rome Conference."’ Six PrepCom 
sessions were then held between March 16 and April 3, 1998 and a number of other informal 
meetings occurred before the Rome Conference."^
Brief Overview of the Rome Statute and the ICC Framework^"^
The founding multilateral treaty that led to the creation of the ICC (hereafter, the 
Rome Statute or the Statute) came into force much faster than anyone anticipated and it has 
been repeatedly described as one of the most complicated international legal documents ever. 
The Statute contains 128 articles, most with numerous subsections. In the course of 
establishing the ICC and its structure, the Statute also codifies the specific offences for which 
the ICC can try individuals and the various steps in a criminal proceeding before it. A 
combination of attributes from both common law and civil law systems is found in the 
Statute. Specific sections of the Statute outline the court’s jurisdiction and applicable law 
and its basic legal procedures. The issues of international cooperation and judicial assistance 
and enforcement are also covered.
The Court has four organs; the Judiciary, the Presidency (to administer the Court), the 
Office of the Prosecutor (hereafter, the OTP), and the Registry (the organ responsible for the 
non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court)."'’ The Registry also 
includes a Victims and Witnesses Unit."^ The Court has eighteen qualified Judges"*’ 
representing the principal legal systems of the world, geographical location and gender.’"  
Judicial appointments and the appointments of the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors 
vary in duration."*
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The Court will only have jurisdiction over crimes committed on or after July 1, 2002, 
the day that the Statute entered into force. The ICC will have jurisdiction over “the most 
serious crimes of the international community as a whole” as set out in the Statute namely, 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of a g g r e s s i o n . D e s p i t e  
extensive efforts since 1998, there is still no agreement as to definition of the crime of 
aggression or the circumstances under which the ICC will have jurisdiction to prosecute that 
c r i me . Ac c o r d i n g l y ,  at present, the ICC only has three offences over which it can assert 
jurisdiction.
The Court’s jurisdiction may be invoked through one of three different routes. First, 
a state party may refer a situation to the OTP.'^^ Second, the ICC Prosecutor may initiate his 
or her own investigation.'^^ Third, the Security Council may refer a situation under Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter to the OTP.'^"' With respect to the first two routes, the 
crime must have occurred on the territory of a state party or the accused must be a national of 
a state party or a state must have declared its acceptance that the court exercise 
jurisdiction.'^^ It appears, however, that a Security Council referral does not have the same 
jurisdictional requirements and, in fact, it may be the only scenario where the ICC effectively 
exercises universal jurisdiction.
The Statute has set up a very complicated framework that deals with admissibility and 
jurisdiction.'^*^ First, the ICC is meant to deal with the “most serious crimes of international 
concern.” While an alleged crime may fit within one of more of the three enumerated crimes 
that can be handled by the ICC, the alleged crime that is the subject of prosecution must also 
be placed into the category of “most serious crimes of international concern.” Second, the 
ICC is to be “complementary” to national criminal jurisdictions -  in other words, except in
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limited situations, there is a presumption in favour of state jurisdiction.'^^ Third, cases will 
not be admissible before the Court in a number of specific situations. For example, if the 
first requirement has been met and the state with jurisdiction to investigate refuses to do so, 
the ICC may take over the case if the state is “unwilling or unable to genuinely” carry out the 
investigation or prosecution and the case is not of “sufficient gravity to justify” ICC 
involvement.'^^ The ultimate decision on inability and/or unwillingness is up to the ICC. 
Notwithstanding the fact that a state (with jurisdiction to do so) decided not to investigate 
and/or prosecute a case (or alternatively a state prosecuted a person and they were acquitted 
or lightly sentenced), the ICC may still investigate or prosecute the case if the proceedings 
were in effect a sham (that is not independent, not impartial and contrary to justice) so as to 
shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility.'^^
Additional checks and balances are built into the complicated procedural system. For 
example, if the Prosecutor commences or initiates an investigation (a formal step), all states 
parties and those which would normally exercise jurisdiction are notified by the Prosecutor 
and given a limited period of time to advise the Prosecutor if the state will investigate or has 
investigated.'^" There is also a power whereby the state can ask the ICC to defer to a state 
investigation.'^' Further, the Court must not commence or must suspend proceedings for 
twelve months if the Security Council asks it to do so via a Chapter VII r e s o l u t i o n . T h a t  
request may be renewed.
The ICC will be an independent permanent court with, unlike most international 
organizations, explicit recognition that it has an international legal personality.'^^ As a result, 
the ICC’s status as a subject in international law will permit it to enter into negotiations and 
arrangements not within the authority of a domestic court.
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The Court will be funded through assessed contributions made by states parties, funds 
provided by the United Nations (subject to United Nations General Assembly [hereafter, 
General Assembly] approval) and through voluntary contributions from other governments, 
organizations, corporations and individuals.
The ICC will be independent of the United Nations and it will also have a relationship 
with the United Nations. The specific terms of that relationship are defined in the Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations 
(hereafter. Relationship Agreement ) . Spec i f i ca l l y ,  the Relationship Agreement envisages 
close cooperation and consultation between the United Nations and the ICC in areas of 
mutual interest including the exchange of information (subject to certain exceptions 
including national security information) and judicial assistance to the ICC. In other words, a 
close but distinct relationship between both international institutions is foreseen. It is a 
relationship of mutual respect and cooperation subject to their respective mandates.'^'' 
Whether, however, mutual respect will always be possible because of their differing roles 
remains to be seen.
Since the adoption of the Statute, ten separate Preparatory Commissions tried to iron 
out the Court's finer details before the Statute entered into force. Once the Statute came into 
force, the Assembly of States Parties (hereafter, the ASP)’^^  adopted the recommendations of 
the Preparatory Commissions. At the first ASP meeting in September 2002 other items 
adopted by consensus included the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereafter, the RPE), the 
Elements of Crime, the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International 
Criminal Court (hereafter, the Privileges/Immunity Agreement) and the Relationship 
A g r e e m e n t . A s  well, the ASP also established a special working group on the crime of
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aggression to continue the work started by the earlier Preparatory Commissions on this issue. 
The ultimate goal is to submit proposals for inclusion in the Statute at a review conference. 
The First Session resumed in February and April 2003 and members of the ASP elected the 
ICC’s eighteen judges and the P r o s e c u t o r . A  second session was held in September 2003 
and a third session occurred in September 2004.''''
Lastly, the Statute includes two different amendment procedures depending upon 
whether the proposed amendment is of an exclusively administrative nature or the proposed 
amendment is substantive in n a t u r e . I n  the case of substantive amendments, the 
amendment process will be cumbersome and difficult. As a result, unless there is a strong 
unified international will, such amendments will likely be few and far between. 
Amendments will take place in the ASP. All states parties have a vote and decisions are 
made by a majority, although consensus is preferred.
Rome Statute Negotiations
The proceedings leading up to, at and since Rome have not been recorded verbatim. 
To the extent that there are travaux préparatoires, they tend to be based on the published 
recollections of the participants.''^'^ Those recollections are both positive and negative in 
nature. Perhaps that is not surprising in light of the circumstances under which the Statute 
was negotiated -  that is, a short time-frame, simultaneous meetings at which delegates could 
not all be present, fatigue by the delegates, differing views as to the role of the state and the 
role of the international community and the strong exception taken by some delegations to 
the nature of the process.''*^
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The negotiations in Rome were marked with strong divisions between various 
groupings or coalitions such as the permanent five members of the Security Council, states 
suspicious or distrustful of them, the Like-Minded Group (a group of countries who wanted a 
strong, independent effective court) and regional groupings. The groupings, however, did 
not always fall along traditional lines - for example, the United Kingdom, one of the 
permanent members of the Security Council, decided to join the Like-Minded Group and “to 
oppose the provision in the draft statute that would require prior approval by the Security 
Council before the court could proceed with investigations and trials.
The negotiations also involved significant participation from well-organized and 
well-prepared non-governmental organizations (hereafter, NGOs) at the Rome Conference 
(including the Coalition for an International Criminal Court [hereafter, CICC]) which grew to 
include approximately 800 NGOs and which became allied with the Like-Minded Group. 
The NGOs wielded a significant amount of influence in the negotiations with a number of 
NGO arguments being adopted by countries.*'**
Sovereignty was a dominant theme throughout the negotiations leading up to the 
creation of the Statute. Many states (especially the United States) argued that their 
sovereignty would be eroded.*'*^
Further, according to Duffy, a number of states initially "sought a statute that would 
specifically accommodate their own particular domestic constitutions” but changed their 
mind when it became apparent that approach would not result in a t r e a t y . A s  a result, 
compromises occurred between the states parties before the final text was ultimately voted 
upon as a “package” and adopted.'^'
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American Opposition
Despite active American involvement with the International Military Tribunal 
(hereafter, IMT), the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereafter, IMTFE), the 
ICTY and the ICTR'^^ (all discussed below), and repeated strong American statements in 
support of an international criminal court prior to the Rome Conference by both the United 
States Congress and the Clinton Administration, the United States voted against the 
Statute.'”  American opposition to the Statute has since continued and has, in fact, grown.
Immediately after the Rome Conference, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
held hearings on what had happened in Rome. David Scheffer, the then Ambassador-at- 
Large for War Crimes Issues, and others made statements to the Committee outlining the 
areas upon which the United States was successful and explaining the reasons for the 
American opposition. The word “sovereignty” came up both directly and indirectly in 
official comments made by American government officials.'”
John Bolton, an official in the George W. Bush administration, reflects the nature of 
the opposition when he described the ICC as “not a court of limited jurisdiction” and 
described its authority as “vague and excessively elastic” with unclear definitions and a wide 
interpretive a u t h o r i t y . W i t h  specific image provoking language, Bolton noted that “[i]f the 
American citadel can be breached, advocates of binding international law will be well on the 
way toward the ultimate elimination of the ‘nation state' .” In other words, Bolton 
considered sovereignty to be the equivalent of state supremacy.
Bolton also took issue with the concept of complementarity. To him, deference in the 
Statute to national judicial systems was nothing more than lip service and “like so much else 
connected with the ICC, complementarity is simply an assertion, utterly unproven and
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untested. In fact, if complementarity has any real substance, it argued against creating the 
ICC in the first place, or, at most, creating ad hoc international t r i b u n a l s . N o t  
surprisingly, Bolton considered the ICC to be harmful to American i n t e r e s t s . I n  what has 
been an often cited phrase, Bolton argued that the United States should use “Three Noes" - 
no financial support, directly or indirectly; no cooperation; and no further negotiations with 
other governments to “improve” the ICC.'^^
Marc Grossman, then United States Under Secretary for Political Affairs, stated that 
the flaws in the Statute included: that the ICC takes power away from the Security Council; 
that it has a prosecutorial and judicial system with unchecked power that could result in 
politically motivated prosecutions; and that it undermines the democratic rights of 
Americans. Moreover, he argued, any treaty to which the United States is not a party cannot 
bind it.’*’®
While the United States government has consistently maintained its opposition to the 
Statute since 1998, its rationale for such appears to have shifted."’’
President Clinton signed the treaty on the last date possible,’®^ but made clear that he 
would not recommend ratification."’^  Not surprisingly, the Statute was never ratified by the 
government of the United States. Accordingly, the United States is not a state party. The 
United States, however, did participate in some of the Preparatory Commission hearings as 
an observer"’'* and it was later accused of trying to amend the Statute with some of its 
recommendations. Ambassador Scheffer saw discussions on the Elements of Crime as “an 
important opportunity to correct” the Statute and the United States consequently successfully 
lobbied for more clearly defined crimes."’^  Monroe Leigh noted that, post-Rome, “the 
American negotiating team ... made extraordinary efforts to secure modifications in the
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statute that would ‘enable it to sign the treaty’.” In response, David Scheffer acknowledged
the American proposals, but disputed Leigh's characterization.’^ *’
The George W. Bush administration has maintained its opposition to the Rome
Statute in four major ways. First, in May 2002, President Bush withdrew President Clinton’s
signature from the Statute.’*’^  Second, the United States actively started to seek agreements
with states parties and non-states parties pursuant to Article 98(2) of the Statute. These
agreements prohibit the surrender, transfer or re-transfer of American nationals to the ICC
without the consent of the United S t a t e s . W h i l e  the United States calls these agreements
“bilateral immunity agreements,” various states parties, the European Union and NGOs, have
heavily criticized them. Some NGOs have, in fact, called these agreements “bilateral
impunity agreements.” ’^^  To date, more than 92 states have signed bilateral agreements -  at
least 50 of which are parties to the Rome Statute.’™ Third, the United States also repeatedly
tried to get immunity from the ICC via Security Council resolutions. First, in June 2002 the
United States threatened to stop supporting United Nations peacekeeping missions unless the
Americans taking part received immunity from investigation and prosecution by the ICC.’^ ’
A crisis involving the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter,
UNMB'iH) was avoided when the Security Council issued Resolution 1422 (2002) under its
Chapter VII powers. That Resolution, in addition to referring to the concept of
complementarity, stated:
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, 
that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel 
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or 
omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, 
shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed 
with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council 
decides otherwise.
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Further to the express intention of the Security Council to renew the request “for 
further 12-month periods for as long as may be necessary” if the same conditions applied, the 
United States received a new resolution to the same effect in 2003.'^^ A third request, 
however, was withdrawn in 2004 by the United States. Ambassador James B. Cunningham, 
Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations, stated that the United States 
“decided not to proceed with further consideration and action on the draft at this time to 
avoid a prolonged and divisive debate” whilst noting that not all Security Council members 
agreed with the proposed draft resolution. He further stated that the United States would 
“take into account the risk of ICC review when determining contributions to UN authorized 
or established operations” and that the US would continue to negotiate Article 98 
agreements. A week earlier, Kofi Annan had announced his opposition to the third request 
and alluded to the now infamous allegations of prisoner abuse in Iraq.'^^ On July 2, 2004, 
the United States government informed the United Nations that some of its personnel will be 
withdrawn from peacekeeping missions.
Fourth, in August 2002, President George W. Bush signed the American 
Servicemember’s Protection Act (ASPA).’’  ^ The Act prohibits American authorities from 
cooperating with the ICC, direct and indirect transfers of information to the ICC, support for 
the ICC, various types of mutual legal assistance with the ICC, and American military 
assistance to states parties (except North Atlantic Treaty Organization [hereafter, NATO] 
members, defined major non-NATO allies and Taiwan). The President, however, has the 
right to waive repeatedly the prohibitions as long as certain preconditions are met. Two of 
the conditions are that (I) the person’s actions leading to the investigation or prosecution 
were not done in an official capacity and that (2) the ICC investigation or prosecution is in
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the United States’ “national interest.” The Act also authorizes the President to “use all means 
necessary and appropriate” to free members of the American armed forces and certain other 
persons detained or imprisoned by the ICC. Further, in light of recent events, § 2015 of the 
Act was added as follows: “[n]othing in this title shall prohibit the United States from 
rendering assistance to international efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan 
Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, other members of A1 Qaeda, leaders of Islamic Jihad, and other 
foreign nationals accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.” President 
Bush has also since signed other legislation that denies economic aid to states that support 
the ICC.
In conclusion, Zappalà identifies a weakness in the American government’s position
in the following quote:
There is an underlying notion, in the US position, that a State has the 
absolute and exclusive power to investigate and prosecute crimes committed 
by its nationals. This is a misconception. Holding criminal proceedings is a 
right belonging not only to the State of active nationality (that is the accused’s 
own State), but also to the territorial State, that is the State on whose territory 
the crimes were committed (also known as the locus commissi delicti State), 
since these crimes are also (or, in some instances, even primarily) violations 
of the legal order of that State
One should note that while States have a general obligation to protect 
their citizens, there are no provisions allowing for indiscriminate immunity 
from the jurisdiction of foreign States. Normally, every individual abroad is 
under the jurisdiction of the territorial State.”
Overview of Other International and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals
An examination of the ICC alone may give a misleading impression as to its potential 
effects on sovereignty as such an investigation ignores the context within which the ICC has 
been created and in which it will operate. In order to minimize the limitations of such a 
narrow approach, consideration will also be made to the recent proliferation of international
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criminal tribunals and other ‘internationalized” criminal tribunals created before and after the 
signing of the Rome S t a t u t e . B r i e f  reference will first be made to the ‘international’ 
military tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo for two reasons. First, both are often touted as 
the model from which current international courts derived. Second, any discussion and 
comparison of the ICC with the IMT and the IMTFE is especially timely because an 
interesting debate has started in the literature as a result of the American decision in 2001 to 
use military commissions and tribunals as part of its ‘war on terrorism
Once the reader has been refreshed on the circumstances surrounding the IMT and the 
IMTFE, the discussion will then move to more current examples namely, the ICTY, the 
ICTR, the situations involving the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(hereafter, UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(hereafter, UNTAET), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereafter, SCSL) and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. The recent creation of the War Crimes 
Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be separately addressed 
because of limited space. Instead it will be briefly referred to in the discussion on the ICTY.
While there have been analyses of these other international or internationalized 
criminal tribunals, this author is not aware of any detailed comparison between all of these 
courts and the ICC**° with special consideration of their source, status (including whether 
they are truly international), duration, jurisdiction (including subject-matter jurisdiction, 
territorial jurisdiction and temporal jurisdiction), and their relationship to domestic courts.
Cesare Romano, Associate Head of the ongoing Project on International Courts and 
Tribunals (PICT) (a joint undertaking by the Center on International Cooperation, New York 
University and the Centre for International Courts and Tribunals at University College,
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London) astutely observes that there are a number of terms used in discussing this area: 
‘international tribunals’, ‘international courts’ and ‘international judicial institutions’. In that 
regard, he laments the absence of a “universally accepted definition of what is an 
“international court, tribunal, or judicial body.” '*' Despite this “terminological jumble” and 
Romano’s attempt to define the criteria for an ‘international judicial body’, Romano 
introduces us to yet another term -  the “internationalized criminal court.” This thesis will 
not explore the subtleties of that terminological confusion, but will use the term 
“internationalized tribunal” when the legal mechanism being studied combines elements of 
local and international law or uses both local and international staff.'*'’ As well, this thesis 
will use the term “international tribunal” when the tribunal sits outside the domestic court 
system.
Pre-Rome International Military Tribunals
As a result of the events of World War II, two ‘international’ military tribunals or 
IMTs were established -  one in Nuremberg and one in Tokyo. Both tribunals were 
established by state action but not by a multilateral treaty per se.
After the unconditional surrender of Germany, the IMT was established in August 
1945 by four countries (the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom) 
“acting in the interests of all the United Nations” with the signing of the London 
Agreement.'*'^ The IMT’s constitution, jurisdiction and functions were set out in a Charter 
annexed to the London Agreement.'*^ (This “Charter” should not be confused with the 
United Nations Charter.)
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Whereas the phrase ‘international military tribunal’ purports to indicate that the 
tribunal was international, it was in reality the creation of only the above four countries. 
While other countries were able to adhere to the London Agreement after the fact,’**" the four 
judges were appointed from the four signatory c o u n t r i e s . T h e  IMT prosecutors were also 
nationals of the same four countries. Although it purported to be acting on behalf of the 
international community, the tribunal was not representative of it. Further, the IM T’s 
mandate was limited only to the prosecution of the major war criminals of the European Axis 
countries.'** As a result, it had no ability to prosecute those who fought for the Allies.
The tribunal was not meant to be permanent. It was an ad hoc arrangement that was 
created in response to the events of World War II. In fact. Article 7 of the London 
Agreement contemplated a limited temporal existence.
The IMT, which could try and punish persons as individuals or as members of 
organizations, had subject-matter jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.'*^ The IMT’s jurisdiction was limited in that it applied only to 
those offences that could not be tied to a particular geographical location ostensibly because 
of what was considered to be the global nature of the Second World War.'^° In that regard, 
the Preamble of the London Agreement contemplated that, where the offences were 
committed within a particular territory, that territorial state would conduct the trials. The 
IM T’s seat was to be in Berlin. Its first trial was to be held at Nuremberg and its subsequent 
trials were to be held “as such places as the Tribunal may decide.” ’^' As well, if a session of 
the IMT took place on the territory of one of the signatories, the tribunal’s president would 
be the representative of that signatory.
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In referring to the official positions of defendants, Ward noted that the Charter 
“specifically rejected defenses based on state sovereignty which domestic courts had used in 
the trials following World War I. This opened up the possibility of prosecuting leaders who 
claimed immunity under the acts of state doctrine as well as lower officials who claimed 
defenses based upon superior orders.” While neither the London Agreement nor the IMT 
Charter refer to the word “sovereignty,” it appears W ard’s phraseology was based on the 
inability of a defendant to assert that he was following a government order and the inability 
of a defendant to rely upon his official position as a defence.'^'*
On July 26, 1945, three countries (China, the United Kingdom and the United States) 
announced their intention to prosecute high-level Japanese officials for the same crimes 
committed by the Germans in World War 11.'"^  ^ On September 2, 1945, Japan accepted the 
terms of the Potsdam Declaration by the Instrument of Surrender at Tokyo Bay which 
included that the Emperor and the Japanese government were subject to the authority of the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. On September 21, 1945, the United States 
issued a directive ordering the investigation of suspected war criminals. The Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers, General Mac Arthur, was to create special international 
courts and prescribe their rules of procedure. General Mac Arthur proclaimed the 
establishment of the IMTFE on January 19, 1946. The IMTFE Charter was created on April 
26, 1946.'**
The United States was the main proponent of this t r i b u n a l . A c c o r d i n g  to 
Beigbeder, the United States acted unilaterally in issuing the directive mentioned above and 
the Charter of the IMTFE was drafted by Americans, and approved by the Supreme
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Commander for the Allied Powers (another American) by way of an executive order. The 
Allies were consulted only after it was already in existence.
Like the IMT, the IMTFE was an ad hoc tribunal with a limited mandate. It was 
directed at the prosecution of a limited group of Japanese and the tribunal was not meant to 
be permanent. The IMTFE had an unlimited territorial jurisdiction and it had the same 
subject-matter jurisdiction as the IMT. The tribunal, however, was in some ways even less 
“international” than the IMT. General Mac Arthur as the Supreme Commander appointed the 
judges of the IMTFE, including the President. As well, the tribunal had one Chief Prosecutor 
(an American) and ten less powerful associate counsel.
The primary importance of both ad hoc tribunals was that they marked the first time 
that individuals had been held to be criminally responsible at the international level 
irrespective of their official s t a t u s . B o t h  the IMT and the IMTFE, however, were accused 
of being ex post facto  and of being biased. They are often described in the literature as 
examples of “victors’ justice.” On the issue of sovereignty, some authors opine that the 
Germans and the Japanese had voluntarily relinquished their sovereignty with their 
unconditional surrenders and, as a result, there was no weakening of sovereignty with the 
creation of either tribunal. Dissenting judgements of the IMTFE and some authors have 
questioned the legality of the IMTFE’s trials and expressed concern about the American 
decision not to try Emperor Hirohito.
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
On February 22, 1993, by Security Council Resolution 808, the United Nations 
Security Council established the ICTY and on May 25, 1993, by a different resolution.
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created the tribunal’s s t a t u t e . O n  March 14, 1994, the iCTY’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence came into force. Both the ICTY’s statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
have been amended numerous times since.
Subject, time and territory limit the ICTY’s jurisdiction. First, it has the power to 
prosecute individuals for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of 
the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity.^^^ The tribunal, however, 
only has the power to prosecute persons for “serious violations of international humanitarian 
law."^°^ Second, from a temporal point of view, the ICTY can only prosecute the above 
crimes if they occurred on or after January 1, 1991.^°^ As well, while the ICTY's Statute does 
not refer to an end date for its mandate, it could conceivably be terminated with a decision of 
its creator, the Security C o u n c i l . T h i r d ,  the ICTY's jurisdiction is limited to the territory of 
the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia^*^^ and it does not sit in that country. 
The ICTY can only sit at The Hague unless, with the authorization of the President of the 
Chamber, it is in the “interests of justice” to sit elsewhere.
Although the ICTY shares concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, it has 
“primacy” of jurisdiction over national courts. In fact the ICTY has the power to request 
states to defer a trial to the ICTY at any stage of the proceedings, as was done in the Tadic 
case.^°^ Further, the ICTY can try a person who had been tried by a national court if the act 
was characterized as an ordinary crime or if the national proceedings were not impartial or 
independent, or were meant to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility 
or were not characterized by diligent prosecution.^"^ It appears that the notion of primacy as 
contemplated in the original ICTY Statute was, however, diluted with the creation of a later
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rule which allows the ICTY, in certain circumstances, to suspend its indictment pending a 
national court c a se /"
The judges sitting in both the trial and appeal chambers are international judges with 
no two being nationals of the same state. The judges are elected via a specific procedure in 
the ICTY Statute with input from the members of the United Nations, non-member states 
maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations headquarters, the Secretary- 
General and the Security Council.
The Prosecutor is a separate organ of the ICTY and is appointed by the Security 
Council after having been nominated by the Secretary-General.^'^ The powers of the 
Prosecutor are quite broad.^'"' For example, the Prosecutor is required to initiate 
investigations ex-ojficio or as a result of information received from any source. While there 
is a check on the powers of the Prosecutor by the requirement that a judge of the Trial 
Chamber confirm the indi ctment , ^the Prosecutor need only have a “sufficient evidence to 
provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”^"’ Further, the Prosecutor has the power to “question suspects, 
victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations.”^'^ Further, 
while there is a requirement under the Statute for cooperation and judicial assistance,^'* 
practice has shown that state cooperation has been far from complete.
While the ICTY Statute does not give the ICTY international legal personality, it does 
allow for certain privileges and immunities to be attributed to its judges, the Prosecutor, the 
Registrar and their personnel in the course of their work.^'^
In fact, Carla Del Ponte, the Prosecutor of the ICTY, has announced that cases 
involving those not most responsible will be transferred to competent national jurisdictions
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for prosecution in an effort to finalize matters at the tribunal by 2010.^^° In that regard, 
further to the ICTY transition strategy, a War Crimes Chamber (WCC) with local and 
international judges was created within the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a 
Specialized War Crimes Department (Special Department) was created in the Prosecutor’s 
Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The War Crimes Chamber will try lower or intermediate 
level accused referred to it by the ICTY until the Court has the requisite capacity to handle 
such c a s e s . D u e  to space limitations, a review of the institutional framework associated 
with this project is beyond the scope of this thesis.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
At the initial request of Rwanda a Security Council resolution created the ICTR on 
November 8, 1994.^^ It should be noted however that the Rwandan delegation to the United 
Nations sitting on the Security Council voted against its creation despite Rwanda’s original 
request for such.^^^ Attached to that Resolution was the Statute of the ICTR. The ICTR's 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (which is the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
with some variation^^"^) were adopted on June 29, 1995. Both the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence have since been a m e n d e d . T h e  ICTR is in many ways similar to 
the ICTY, but there are some differences between them.
Like the ICTY, the ICTR's jurisdiction is also limited. First, the ICTR has the power 
to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol 11.^ *^" Second, the ICTR is limited to 
violations that occurred between January I and December 31, 1994.^^^ As well, while the 
ICTR does not have an end date, it is not considered to be a permanent international tribunal.
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It is also reliant upon the Security Council for its mandate. Third, the tribunal only has the 
power to prosecute "serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the 
territory of neighbouring States.”^^ * Accordingly, the territorial jurisdiction of the ICTR is 
not necessarily limited to Rwanda. It should also be noted that the ICTR does not sit in 
Rwanda, but in Arusha, Tanzania.
Like the ICTY, the ICTR shares concurrent jurisdiction with the applicable national 
courts, but has primacy over them and can request that a national court defer a trial to the 
ICTR at any stage of the p r o c e e d i n g s . De s p i t e  primacy, the Security Council, however, 
issued a resolution encouraging domestic p r o s e c u t i o n s . T h e  ICTR also has non bis in idem 
clauses as explained above.
The organization of the ICTR is identical to that of the ICTY except that the ICTY 
Prosecutor and the Judges of the ICTY Appeals Chamber initially held the same posts in the 
ICTR.^’^  The Prosecutor's powers as noted in the Statute are identical to those in the ICTY 
S t a t u t e . T h e  Statute also requires cooperation and judicial assistance from states. 
Lastly, like the ICTY, while there is no international legal personality given to the ICTY, its 
staff is accorded certain privileges and immunities.^^^
Consideration should also be made of the international administrations in Kosovo and 
East Timor - the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and 
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)^^^ - respectively in 
light of their creation and use of “internationalized” tribunals.
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United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo^^^
After the NATO bombing of Kosovo, the Security Council determined that the 
situation in the region constituted a “threat to international peace and security. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorized 
United Nation member states and relevant international organizations to establish an 
international security presence (led by NATO and known as KFOR) and authorized the 
United Nations Secretary-General to establish an international civilian presence. In that 
regard, the Security Council also authorized the creation of an interim administration in 
Kosovo where both the international security presence and the international civil presence 
would closely work together.^^^
While Security Council Resolution 1244, among other things, reiterated “the 
commitment of all [m]ember [s]tates to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other [sjtates of the region,” it also supported substantial 
autonomy for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and authorized the interim 
administration to establish provisional democratic self-governing institutions to which then 
ultimate authority would be transferred subject to the resolution of negotiations on its final 
status.
In that regard, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (hereafter, the SRSG) “to control the 
implementation of the international civil presence.” "^*' The responsibilities of the 
international civil presence included the protection and promotion of human rights and the 
maintenance of civil law and order including the establishment of a local police force. 
“Public safety and order” is an included responsibility of the international security’s
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p r e s e n c e . I n  practice, the responsibilities affiliated with each presence may overlap and, 
on occasion, conflict with each other.
The situation in Kosovo in 1999 was marked by an incapacitated legal system. It was 
largely due to the fact that “[t]he pre-existing system, including personnel, court equipment, 
files, and records, was largely withdrawn to Serbia” and due to the fact that, of the remaining 
Albanian lawyers and judges, very few had been permitted to practice their profession for the 
previous ten y e a r s . In the course of its work, UNMIK has made extensive efforts to 
revamp or rebuild the court system, eliminate corruption and intimidation and to try fairly 
persons accused of crimes^"^  ^ with the assistance of both local and international Judges and 
prosecutors.
Initially, an emergency Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments 
was created in order to nominate temporary members of the judiciary. Nine national judges 
and prosecutors were chosen to hear cases throughout Kosovo. Thereafter a commission to 
advise the SRSG on the structure and administration of the judiciary and the prosecution 
service in Kosovo was also c r e a t e d . T h e n  an Advisory Judicial Commission was 
established to recommend the permanent appointment of judges and prosecutors and from 
January 2000 new judges and prosecutors were sworn into the new regular judicial system.
Officials within UNMIK initially considered establishing a specialized court to deal 
with war crimes and inter-ethnic crimes that was to be known as the Kosovo War and Ethnic 
Crimes Court (hereafter, the KWECC). It would have dealt with set offences since 1 January 
1998 and “would have operated as an intermediary between local courts and ICTY” with 
both local and international judges. The proposed KWECC, however, would have been 
concurrent to but separate from the existing courts with jurisdiction over war crimes and
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other serious violations of international humanitarian law and serious ethnically motivated 
c r i m e s . I n  the late summer of 2000, however, the idea was abandoned mainly because of 
the anticipated cost (“a mini-ICTY”) and the prior appointment of international judges and 
prosecutors because of a crisis on the ground.
In 2001, the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council was established to assist the 
SRSG on the appointment and sanctioning of judges, prosecutors and lay-judges.^^^ The 
Council is made up of both local and international members appointed by the SRSG but the 
ultimate decision on the appointment and sanction of judges, prosecutors and lay-judges lies 
with the SRSG/^'
In Kosovo national judges and prosecutors normally conduct Kosovo’s criminal 
trials, but international judges and international prosecutors (known as IJPs) are also active in 
the domestic courts. The ultimate decision on their appointment and/or removal also lies 
with the SRSG.^^^ Currently, there are twelve international judges and nine international 
prosecutors working throughout Kosovo.
In line with UNMIK’s mandate, in May 2001 the SRSG, through a Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure, established Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (hereafter. 
Provisional Institutions) to which he transferred a number of powers in the legislative, 
executive and judicial f i e l d s . T h e  intention was that Kosovo be governed democratically 
through these institutions and in compliance with the regulation’s “Constitutional 
Framework” and Security Council Resolution 1244.^ '^  ^ The Constitutional Framework, 
however, does not affect the authority of the SRSG or KFOR to fulfill their mandates and the 
SRSG will oversee the provisional institutions and may take “appropriate measures” when
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the provisional institutions act contrary to either Security Council Resolution 1244 or 
contrary to the Constitutional Framework.
While it is contemplated that there will be a gradual transfer of additional 
responsibilities to those provisional institutions, for now the SRSG has reserved a number of 
powers so that they will remain exclusively with the SRSG, including; the final decision on 
whether law adopted by the Assembly should be promulgated; the authority to appoint, 
remove and/or discipline judges and prosecutors; “exercising powers and responsibilities of 
an international nature in the legal field”; “concluding agreements with states and 
international organizations in all matters within the scope of UNSCR 1244 (1999); 
“overseeing the fulfillment of commitments in international agreements entered into on 
behalf of UNMIK”; and “external relations, including with states and international 
organizations, as may be necessary for the implementation of his mandate . According 
to Jean-Christian Cady and Nicholas Booth^^^, “[(justice will remain under the ultimate 
responsibility of the international community until a functioning and independent justice 
system is established in Kosovo”^^ * and in that regard, at present the Department of Justice 
remains in the hands of UNMIK.
International judges and international prosecutors become involved in the domestic 
courts through two different routes: (i) a “Regulation 6 procedure” and (ii) a “Regulation 64 
procedure.” First, in a Regulation 6 procedure, international judges and international 
prosecutors are authorized to select a new or pending case within their appointed 
jurisdictional area on their own m o t i o n . O t h e r  than the preamble of Regulation 6 
indicating that the regulation is “for the purpose of assisting the judicial process in Kosovo,” 
the criteria for a Regulation 6 action are not found in any public document. Regulation 6 is
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primarily reserved for cases where there may be concerns about the ability to ensure a fair
and impartial trial for all involved. Such involvement usually occurs in situations where
there may be potential for partiality, corruption and/or intimidation of one or more judges
and/or prosecutors. Such cases have covered war crimes, terrorism, serious inter-ethnic
crimes, organized crime including trafficking in persons and particularly sensitive cases such
as those where criminal charges are laid against those perceived to be war heroes, politicians
and, more recently, the most serious offences resulting from the widespread March 2004 riots
throughout Kosovo. Second, in a Regulation 64 procedure, an application can be made to the
Department of Justice before the commencement of the trial or an appeal for an assignment
of an international judge or an international prosecutor if it is considered “necessary to ensure
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary or the proper administration of justice.
If the SRSG gives the approval for an international judge and/or an international prosecutor,
a panel of three judges (at least two must be international judges) will preside at a trial and
may have the assistance of an international p r o s e c u t o r . W h i l e  the preamble of the
applicable regulation mentions the above-mentioned responsibilities of the international civil
p r e s e n c e , i t  is much more detailed. It states:
Recognizing that the presence of security threats may undermine the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary and impede the ability of the 
judiciary to properly prosecute crimes which gravely undermine the peace 
process and the full establishment of the rule of law in Kosovo ...
For the purpose of ensuring the independence and impartiality of the judiciary 
and the proper administration of justice.
This quote is consistent with the informal and unpublished Department of Justice’s criteria
for this case selection procedure. Therefore, unlike the situations involving other
internationalized tribunals being compared in this thesis, depending upon the attendant
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circumstances, IJPs may be involved in the investigation or prosecution of all crimes within 
the applicable law.
As a result, the international judges and prosecutors may be involved in a case at the 
outset or may become involved in a case after it has commenced -  in effect, taking over after 
it has been initially handled by their local counterparts. As to the two procedures, it is more 
difficult to invoke the Regulation 64 procedure as local capacity builds because Regulation 
64 cases tend to use more of a very limited number of international judges. In practice, 
international judges and prosecutors use these powers with caution while appreciating the 
professionalism that most local judges and prosecutors have and display in their work. 
Further, when the circumstances that led to their involvement have ceased to exist, cases 
have been handed back to proceed with only limited or no international involvement. It has 
been this author’s view that, while local counterparts often engage in cases in a most 
professional manner, exceptions still exist.
It is also worth remembering that the ICTY has concurrent jurisdiction with the local 
courts and, accordingly, it is another way to prosecute such crimes. In that regard. Security 
Council Resolution 1244 also refers to the ICTY.^*^^
Initially, the applicable law in Kosovo was the law prior to March 24, 1999 (the 
commencement of the NATO bombing) as long as the law did not conflict with 
internationally recognized human rights standards and the law was not discriminatory in 
nature. Unfortunately, at the local level, many saw the law in 1999 as part of the Serbian 
machinery that had been previously used to discriminate and/or harm others. As a result, 
UNMIK later changed the applicable law to that existing on 22 March 1989 (that is, before
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the partial autonomy previously given to Kosovo was abrogated) and specifically set out the 
international treaties that apply in Kosovo.
Accordingly, the applicable criminal law in Kosovo, until recently, was a collection 
of three partly contradictory criminal codes, specified international treaties and UNMIK 
regulations. That changed in April 2004 when the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo and 
the Provisional Criminal Procedural Code of Kosovo became law. The new criminal codes 
import a number of common law aspects into the civil law system in K o s o v o . T h e  intent 
of UNMIK in conjunction with the Provisional Institutions was to streamline the three 
criminal codes and to bring them up to international standards. It has already been realized 
however that these codes will not be the last word on the applicable law as gaps and 
inconsistencies are found. Since April 2004 UNMIK has continued to create additional 
regulations in the criminal law sphere and more are expected.
In conclusion, at present, the Kosovo UP system works both within and outside the 
local judicial system. At times the IJPs are commingled with their local counterparts and at 
other times they work separately. Lastly, as part of the Department of Justice’s transition 
strategy, negotiations are underway for the establishment of a specialized prosecutor’s office 
that will contain international prosecutors and local prosecutors. To date, there has been no 
announced plan for a special court.
In October 2005, Kai Eide, Permanent Representative of Norway to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and Special Envoy as appointed by the Secretary-General 
delivered a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo prior to the commencement of 
status talks on the future of Kosovo. Specifically, on the rule of law situation in Kosovo, Eide 
stated;
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In light of the limitations of the police and judicial system, 
there will be a need for a continued presence of international police with 
executive powers in sensitive areas. A continued presence of international 
judges and prosecutors will also be required to handle cases related to war 
crimes, organized crime and corruption as well as difficult inter-ethnic cases. 
The currently ongoing reduction of international judges and prosecutors is 
premature and should urgently be reconsidered. The result of such reductions 
would be a loss of credibility of the justice system and of confidence among 
the population in general and the minority communities in particular. There is 
little reason to believe that local judges and prosecutors will be able to fill the 
functions carried out by international personnel in the near future.
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)^^*
Security Council resolution 1272 (dated October 25, 1999) dealt with the 
international administration in East Timor (now Timor-Leste) in a similar way. The 
administration was established after internal conflict under the auspices of Chapter Vll of the 
United Nations Charter and its set up paralleled that in Kosovo. UNTAET was “endowed 
with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and ... empowered to 
exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.
Like Kosovo, East Timor also had no real judicial infrastructure left when UNTAET 
came into the c o u n t r y . Notwithstanding the International Commission of Inquiry of East 
Timor recommendation to do so^^\ the Security Council chose not to create another ad hoc 
t r i buna l . I n s t e a d ,  through UNTAET it created a Serious Crimes Investigations Unit (SCU) 
and international judicial panels known as Special Panels for Serious Crimes (Special 
Panels).
The Special Panels, which were created through the combined operation of a number 
of regulations^^^, had exclusive jurisdiction over "serious criminal offences" (genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture) and had the ability to
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have a case deferred to it at any stage of the proceedings.^^"* In other words, the Special 
Panels had primacy.
The Special Panels’ jurisdiction was limited in that they had exclusive jurisdiction 
only for offences committed between January 1, 1999 and October 25, 1999.^^^ The 
territorial jurisdiction of each panel was not limited to East Timor as it could also cover 
serious criminal offences committed by or against an East Timorese citizen elsewhere in the 
world. N o n  bis in idem provisions were also p r e s e n t . T h e  Special Panels applied the 
law of East Timor and international law/^^ Further, Special Panel trials and appeals had two 
international judges and one East Timorese judge.
Despite the efforts of the Special Panels, state cooperation was a significant problem. 
For example, Indonesia refused to extradite its nationals and others within its borders to East 
Timor for prosecution and, although Indonesia set up its own Ad Hoc Human Rights Court 
with jurisdiction over, amongst other things, crimes committed in East Timor in 1999, severe 
criticism ensued because many considered the Indonesian trials as s h a m s . L i k e  the ad hoc 
tribunals previous discussed, there were also difficulties associated with the serious crimes 
process involving the SCU and the Special Panels. Issues included an initial lack of 
consistent prosecution strategy or focus and lack of adequate resources.^*’
The above framework continued operating when UNTAET transferred its 
responsibilities to the United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (hereafter, 
UNMISET) after Timor-Leste became independent in 2002. Although the present United 
Nations peacekeeping mission ended on 20 May 2005, the Timor-Leste Constitution allows 
“the collective judicial instance existing in East Timor, composed of national and 
international judges with competencies to judge serious crimes committed between U‘
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January 1999 and 25^ of October 1999”, to continue until the cases under investigation are 
f i n i s h e d . A f t e r  May 20, 2005 a one-year follow up mission in Timor-Leste, known as 
United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (hereafter, UNOTIL) was created.
Most recently, a Commission of Experts sent to Timor-Leste and Indonesia after May 
2005, issued a report in which it recommended, amongst other things, that the SCU and the 
Special Panels be “provisionally retained” until such time as the Secretary-General and the 
Security Council have had an opportunity to examine and make decisions based upon the 
recommendations set out in their report. In that regard, it further recommended that efforts 
be made to ensure the continuity of the work of the SCU and the Special Panels until all 
investigations, indictments and prosecutions are completed. In the alternative, the 
Commission of Experts “strongly” recommended that the United Nations set up “a 
mechanism under which investigations and prosecutions of serious violations of human 
rights could be continued and completed”. Specifically, the Commission of Experts 
recommended “a mechanism, which would allow the Government of Timor-Leste to retain 
sovereignty over the justice process, facilitate institutional capacity-building and provide 
avenues for the international community to assist in the process, as appropriate”. The Report 
continued with a variety of other alternative recommendations including the establishment of 
an international criminal tribunal for Timor-Leste; a creative but controversial use of the 
ICC; and the exercise of universal jurisdiction by other states.^*'*
Special Court for Sierra Leone
In June 2000 the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone requested United Nations 
assistance in setting up a court aimed at bringing justice to and ensuring a lasting peace in the
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country after a particularly brutal and lengthy civil war/^^ In Resolution 1315 (2000) the 
Security Council acted under Chapter Vll of the United Nations Charter but declined to 
follow the ICTY and ICTR precedents. Instead, the Security Council asked the Secretary 
General to negotiate an agreement with Sierra Leone to create an "independent special court” 
consistent with the r e s o l u t i o n . T h e  Secretary-General provided his report to the Security 
Council on October 4, 2000^^^ outlining the results of the negotiations and, on January 3, 
2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan authorized the establishment of the Special Court 
despite a shortfall in f u n d i n g . O n  January 16, 2002, the Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (the SCSL Agreement) and the Statute of the Special Court for Siena Leone 
(the Special Court Statute) were concluded.^*^ According to the Secretary-General, the 
SCSL is “Sierra-Leone specific” and that “[mjany of the legal choices made are intended to 
address the specificities of the Sierra Leonean conflict, the brutality of the crimes committed 
and the young age of those presumed responsible” .
The Court was established on January 16, 2002, officially began on July I, 2002 and 
had its first round of judges sworn in that D e c e m b e r . T h e  Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(hereafter, SCSL) is a “treaty-based sui generis court of mixed Jurisdiction and 
c o m p o s i t i o n . T h e  SCSL is to prosecute those “who bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the 
territory of Sierra L e o n e . S u b j e c t  to certain conditions, peacekeepers and related 
personnel in Sierra Leone who commit crimes will be prosecuted by the sending state and not 
by either the SCSL or the Government of Sierra L e o n e . H o w e v e r ,  to use language similar 
to that in the Rome Statute, if the sending state is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
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an investigation or prosecution, the Court may, if authorized by the Security Council on the 
proposal of any State, exercise jurisdiction over such persons.
While there was a high level of Security Council involvement in the creation of the 
SCSL,^^^ the SCSL is not a Chapter VII court despite the Security Council’s comments in its 
August 14, 2000 resolution that “the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat 
to international peace and security in the r e g i o n . I n s t e a d ,  it is a UN-Sierra Leonean 
agreement^^* and, while the Security Council is involved in the SCSL, it cannot terminate the 
SCSL and the SCSL has no Chapter VII enforcement powers.
The SCSL may exercise its functions away from the SCSL’s seat in Freetown. 
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the court is not identical to that of the ICC. The SCSL will 
be able to try cases involving (I) crimes against humanity; (2) violations of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War Victims 
and of Additional Protocol II thereto of June 8, 1977; (3) listed serious violations of 
international humanitarian law; and (4) listed crimes under Sierra Leonean law.^'’'
Unlike the ICC, the SCSL’s jurisdiction will be retroactive. It will prosecute crimes 
within its jurisdiction committed after November 30, 1996.^^^ The SCSL is expected to 
function for a minimum of three years.
According to the Secretary-General, the SCSL is “not anchored in any existing 
system (i.e.. United Nations administrative law or the national law of the [sjtate of the seat)” 
and the SCSL lies “outside the national system.” '^^ ^
The relationship between the national courts of Sierra Leone and the SCSL is one of 
limited primacy, not complementarity. While both courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the 
national courts of Sierra Leone are required to defer to the SCSL at any stage of the
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proceedings when formally requested to do so by the SCSL.^°^ The Court’s primacy, 
however, does not extend to other s t a t e s . T h e  Secretary-General contemplated that there 
would be relationship and cooperation arrangements between the respective courts and that 
there would also be arrangements between Prosecutor and the National Truth and
**^ 07 308Reconciliation Commission. Consideration is also made for non bis in idem.
The organization of the SCSL is very similar to the ICTY and the ICTR in that it 
comprises a Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber, a Prosecutor and a Registrar.^^^ 
Although the SCSL initially adopted the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the 
SCSL’s judges added their own amendments later.^*°
The SCSL involves an interesting mix of both Sierra Leonean personnel and non- 
Sierra Leonean personnel. In particular, the majority of the judges was appointed by the 
Secretary-General after consultation with the Government of Sierra Leone^" with a special 
emphasis to states of the Economic Community of West African States and the British 
Commonwealth of N a t i o n s . S i m i l a r l y ,  the Secretary-General appointed the Prosecutor 
after consultation with the Government of Sierra Leone, while the Government of Sierra 
Leone appointed the Sierra Leonean Deputy Prosecutor in consultation with the Secretary- 
General and the Prosecutor.^
The SCSL was originally to be funded by voluntary contributions from the 
international c o mmu n i t y ^ d e s p i t e  the Secretary-General’s recommendation to the 
c o n t r a r y . ^ A  “management committee” made up of the important contributors to the SCSL, 
the Government of Sierra Leone and the Secretary-General were, amongst other things, to 
“provide advice and policy direction on all non-judicial aspects of the operation of the
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Court.” '^*’ Since its inception, however, funding has remained an issue and recently the 
United Nations issued a Subvention Grant to assist the court.
With respect to the issue of legal personality, the SCSL Agreement permits the SCSL 
to have the juridical capacity to make contracts, acquire or dispose of property, institute legal 
proceedings and enter into agreements with states.^'* Further, allowance is made for 
privileges and i mmu n i t i e s . Al t h o u g h  there is no specific wording that acknowledges that 
the SCSL has an international legal personality, its power to enter into international 
agreements indicates that it does have such. In fact, SCSL case law has made that finding.^^^
The SCSL Agreement and the SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence obligate the 
Government of Sierra Leone to cooperate with the SCSL at all stages of the proceedings. 
Under the SCSL Agreement, the Republic of Sierra Leone is obligated to (1) assist the SCSL 
when it asks for assistance, (2) enforce orders of the SCSL, and (3) recognize the SCSL’s 
legal personality and privileges and immunities. There are no obligations imposed on non- 
party states but non-party states are free to enter into agreements or arrangements with the 
SCSL.^ '^
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
In 1997, the then co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia, “requested the assistance of the 
United Nations in bringing to justice persons responsible for genocide and crimes against 
humanity during the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979” whilst citing the examples of 
the ICTY and the ICTR.^^^ In 1999, the Group of Experts who had been appointed by the 
Secretary-General considered the use of international, mixed and domestic tribunals and 
considered whether to locate a tribunal inside or outside of Cambodia. In the end, the Group
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of Experts recommended the establishment of an international tribunal under Chapter VI or 
VII of the Charter.^^^ The government of the People’s Republic of China, however, indicated 
that it would veto any attempt by the Security Council to use either power.^^"* Ultimately, the 
Secretary-General commenced negotiations with the government of Cambodia as neither the 
General Assembly nor the Security Council acted on the recommendation?^^
Despite United Nations proposals that an international court be established because of 
concerns about Cambodia's ability to pursue such trials,^^^ Cambodia insisted upon control 
over the proceedings for reasons of what it termed political stability?^^ In that regard, the 
Cambodian government approved a law during the negotiations that created a national court 
with the participation of both foreign judges and prosecutors with the local judges as long as 
the local judges had in effect a veto power over all decisions?^*
Of interest to this study, the concept of sovereignty was raised in the rhetoric 
surrounding the negotiations. For example, in late 2001, the Cambodian government insisted 
that Cambodian law would take priority if there were a conflict between it and the agreement. 
According to Hans Corel 1, UN Legal Counsel, the United Nations had consistently 
maintained that the United Nations could not be bound by a national law and that such a law 
would have to meet the terms of the agreement. He further noted that “[t]he question of 
Cambodia's sovereignty is not at issue here, since the matter required an agreement to be 
implemented under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that is to say that the terms of the 
agreement are binding on both p a r t i e s . A s  well, in a not unfamiliar refrain heard in the 
ICC context, Cambodia's response in 2001 to the United Nations position was the assertion 
of sovereignty. Prime Minister Hun Sen refused United Nations control “on the grounds of 
national sovereignty”.^ "^^  Ouch Borith, Cambodia's ambassador to the United Nations, stated
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to BBC News in 2002 that the United_Nations had to "respect their sovereignty" and that the 
government is prepared to go ahead with the court notwithstanding the departure of the 
United Nations/^' According to Craig Etcheson, such references to sovereignty were more 
than simply posturing, but were representative of Cambodia’s history -  a history that 
included colonialism, occupation, intervention, occupation and a transitional authority.
Negotiations continued between the United Nations and Cambodia on a Cambodia- 
United Nations agreement for the court for three years. In February 2002, however, after a 
history of very difficult negotiations, the United Nations pulled out of the negotiations 
because the United Nations was of the opinion that “the Extraordinary Chambers, as 
currently envisaged, would not guarantee the independence, impartiality and objectivity that 
a court established with the support of the United Nations would have.”^^  ^ In other words, 
the United Nations could not guarantee the presence of international standards of justice. 
According to Daphna Shraga, Principal Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, Office of 
Legal Affairs, United Nations, “it was in fact a conflict of two visions of justice: an 
independent tribunal meeting international standards of justice, objectivity, fairness, and due 
process of law, and a politically controlled judicial process.
Talks, however, later resumed after a fair degree of pressure was apparently put on 
the United N a t i o n s . I n  March 2003, an agreement was reached between the United 
Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under 
Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
(hereafter, referred to as “the Cambodian Agreement”) that created a special court within the 
existing national court structure of Cambodia.^^*’ After the General Assembly approved it, 
Cambodia later ratified the Cambodian Agreement in October 2004 and accordingly
64
amended some of its domestic The Cambodian Agreement became effective on 29
April 2005^^^ and the nomination process of judges and prosecutors is underway.
In the course of negotiations with the United Nations, the Cambodian government 
adopted the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
(hereafter Law).^^^ An analysis of the Extraordinary Chambers in this thesis similar to that 
done with the previously mentioned internationalized tribunals is not precluded by the fact 
that there are differences between the Law and the subsequent Agreement that may likely 
require amendments to the Law.^ "**^
The Extraordinary Chambers will handle “crimes and serious violations of 
Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international 
conventions recognized by Cambodia.” Specifically, those crimes are “the crime of genocide 
as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, crimes against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and such other crimes as 
defined in Chapter 11 of the Law.” ‘^*‘
The Court will have authority to investigate or prosecute “senior leaders of 
Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious 
violations.” Further the Court will have jurisdiction over such crimes that were 
committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979.
The Cambodian Agreement contemplates a simple structure involving a Trial 
Chamber and a Supreme Court with the latter acting as the appellate court and both levels 
will have local and international j u d g e s . T h e  Court will sit in Phnom Penh.^"*  ^ It is
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anticipated that this tribunal will last three y e a rs^  with costs shared by the Cambodian 
government and the United Nations.
It is interesting that, unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the Cambodian government 
wanted primacy over the tribunal and that is in effect what it received. Notwithstanding the 
Kosovo experiences where occasional problems occurred when international judges were 
outnumbered, and despite the Secretary-General’s clear preference for a majority of 
international judges, the Extraordinary Chamber will be a mixed court with both international 
and local judges but the majority will be Cambodian. There will also be co-prosecutors (one 
international and one Cambodian); co-investigating judges (one international and one 
Cambodian) and decisions will be made by the “supermajority formula” where panel 
decisions will be made by a majority of the panel members with at least one international 
judge in a s s e n t . L a s t l y  while the Cambodian Agreement will trump Cambodian law if 
there is a conflict between the two, the procedure will be governed by Cambodian law unless 
it conflicts with international standards.
The Cambodian government is obligated to comply ‘without undue delay’ with ‘any 
request’ for assistance from the prosecutors or the Extraordinary C h a m b e r s . A s  well, if the 
government of Cambodia changes the structure of the Extraordinary Chambers or violates the 
Cambodian Agreement, the United Nations ean withdraw from the Cambodian Agreement.^^® 
Interestingly, however, there is also a provision in the Law that permits the Extraordinary 
Chambers continue to be run by the Cambodian government if the United Nations withdraws 
from the Cambodian Agreement.
Serious concerns have been expressed in the literature about this structure in that, if 
all the local judges are intimidated, there is no way for the international judges to avert a
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miscarriage of justice as they will not be able on their own to make an effective decision 
given the wording of both the Law and the Cambodian Agreement. As well, there is unease 
over the fact that, notwithstanding the fact that there is input from the United Nations as to 
the ultimate appointment of international judges, the final decision on the appointment and 
dismissal of international judges lies with the Cambodian authorities.
According to Shraga, it is anticipated that the Extraordinary Chambers will likely 
“command little credibility” because local judges and prosecutors come from a “weak and 
politicized criminal justice system.
Conclusion
This chapter has given the reader a broader understanding of the general nature of the 
ICC and the context in which it arose, and helped set the stage for the next chapter in which 
the ICC and the ICC’s effect on sovereignty is examined in detail.
Chapter Two also helped to ensure that any conclusions made about the ICC are made 
within the context in which the ICC developed and now currently resides. First, the ICTY 
and the ICTR, which were created before the Rome Statute was created, still exist. Those 
tribunals, however, are scheduled to close down within a few years. Notions of primacy and 
concurrent jurisdiction were initially taken very seriously, but it appears that these were later 
watered down with amendments to the rules. As well, primacy was rarely invoked in 
practice and, accordingly, may not sound as severe as it first sounds. In fact, the ICTY in 
particular is now permitting domestic prosecutions of cases that would have otherwise fallen 
within the jurisdiction of the ICTY. Second, the newer examples of international courts or 
tribunals since the signing of the Rome Statute are not entirely consistent with the ICTY and 
the ICTR or amongst themselves. Many of those are scheduled to terminate in the near
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future or have a very limited life span. (For a summary of the main components of the 
international or internationalized criminal tribunals before and after the creation of the Rome 
Statute, see Table 1 in the Appendix to this thesis.)
A comparison of these international courts or tribunals and the ICC is an important 
element to understanding the effect of the ICC because it will minimize conclusions taken 
out of context. In light of the summary above, one question that must now be addressed in 
the analysis section in the third chapter is what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the 
use of jurisdictional “primacy” at the ICTY and the ICTR; the use of jurisdictional 
“complementarity” at the ICC; and the use of “primacy” with the SCSL. For example, is the 
jurisdictional regime set out in the ICC framework is as “revolutionary” as some authors 
have claimed? Lastly, given the variety of techniques used before and after Rome, can it 
even be said that there is a trend beyond the current proliferation of such tribunals?
Chapter Three will now analyze the ICC framework in detail using the methodology 
described in the first chapter. Once that has been done, a comparison will also be made 
between the ICC and international or internationalized criminal tribunals to see if that how 
this comparison adds to the present analysis. These questions shall then be revisited in the 
last chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter Three: Detailed Analysis of the ICC Framework
Introduction
Although the word “sovereignty” is not found in the Rome Statute, it was an issue 
during the negotiation of the treaty and interest has not waned since. This chapter will now 
use the framework developed in the first chapter to see if it is possible to assess where a 
sovereignty claim is likely to occur and to re-examine the conclusions of Eric Leonard. In 
that regard, this chapter will be divided into three parts: the ICC framework, the ICC in 
practice and the ICC in comparative context. First, in reviewing the ICC framework, 
consideration will be made of the source of the ICC, its legal status and its territorial scope. 
Then greater consideration will be made of the ICC’s jurisdiction (subject-matter, territory 
and time) and the notion of complementarity. It is here that claims of sovereignty are most 
likely to occur. Special consideration will also be made as to the ICC’s relationship to states 
including domestic courts. I will also review the effect of the ICC on states parties and non­
states parties, and the relationship between the ICC and the United Nations.
The second part of this chapter will then look at the limited ICC practice to date in an 
effort to minimize the risk of an incorrect interpretation of the framework in the event that 
the Court’s practice is different from the treaty. Brief reference is made to the investigations 
involving the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and the Sudan. The only example of 
the ICC’s practice to date is the issuance of the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy paper in 
September 2003 that publicized the actual prosecutorial approach to be used by the Office of 
the Prosecutor (hereafter, the OTP) as it goes about its work. Some aspects of that policy 
differ from some immediate interpretations of the legal framework surrounding the ICC.
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The third part of this chapter will then look at the ICC in conjunction with other 
available judicial mechanisms including the recent proliferation of other non-domestic 
tribunals in order to minimize the risk of a wrong interpretation of the significance of the 
creation of the ICC. That review should put the ICC in its historical and contemporaneous 
context. Then, in chapter four, I will return to Leonard’s argument and conclusions.
Such a detailed analysis goes beyond that undertaken by Leonard and minimizes the 
possibility that various articles of the Statute are taken out of context. At times, proponents 
on both sides of the literature (that is, the ICC is too subservient to the notion of sovereignty 
versus the ICC is the death knell to sovereignty) do not seem to engage with each other 
because both sides can find provisions that, taken in isolation, seem to support their 
positions. An even more intensive analysis would inevitably require a more comprehensive 
look at the constitutive documents.
The ICC Framework
As noted in the first chapter, an extensive and complicated legal framework now 
accompanies the ICC. For the purposes of this thesis and the conclusions in this part, the 
ICC framework includes the Statute, RPE, Elements of Crimes, Relationship Agreement, and 
the Privileges/Immunities Agreement. While the officially announced policy of the OTP of 
the ICC is technically, in my view, also part of the ICC framework, it will be dealt separately 
in this chapter.
As previously noted, a multilateral treaty negotiated with the participation of more 
than 120 states and extensive NGO input created the ICC. Over one hundred states have 
ratified the treaty; some of the biggest and most powerful nations have not and remain
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opposed to its current form. While the treaty was the result of lengthy negotiations and 
compromise, in the end it was voted upon as a package before it was adopted. On July 1, 
2002, after the sixtieth ratification, the ICC came into existence and became the world’s first 
permanent international criminal court.
The ICC is an independent court with an international legal p e r s o n a l i t y . T h e  
Statute explicitly says that it has an international legal personality in addition to having a 
legal capacity in order to exercise its functions and fulfil its purposes. The legal personality 
of the ICC is also referred to in the Relationship Agreement and in the Privileges/Immunities 
Agreement.
International legal personality may be inferred when an international organization is 
intended to be “an autonomous body, capable of occupying a position in certain respects in 
detachment from its [mjembers” and when it does have the ability to act that way.^^^ 
Remarkably, the Statute is very specific and, accordingly, one need not necessarily look for 
the existence of these two criteria. Although it is not unusual for an international 
organization to be given broad autonomy in order to fulfil its mandate, the status of being 
explicitly made a “subject of international law” is quite rare^^^ and it is certainly not 
something normally given even to a domestic court.
What, however, is the effect of giving the ICC an international legal personality? The 
ICC can enter into agreements with states and other actors in order to fulfil its duties. 
Normally such a power would be limited to agreements for the purposes of court. Article 4 
of the Statute, however, seems to provide no restrictions to the international legal personality 
of the court. As a result, it may be u n f e t t e r e d . Wh e t h e r  or not the ICC has an international 
legal personality broader than its functions, it cannot be forgotten that the Assembly of States
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Parties (hereafter, ASP) is the executive body that negotiates the more complex matters. The 
division of powers within the ICC framework between the ICC, its organs and the ASP 
mandates that foundational agreements be ruled upon by the ASP and operational agreements 
in individual cases be handed by the relevant judicial organ(s).^^^
Nonetheless, in light of some of the general rules that can apply to international 
organizations with international legal personality, the ICC’s rights will include the right “to 
enter into international agreements with non-member [sjtates on matters within the 
organization’s province’’; “to immunity from jurisdiction of state courts for acts and activities 
performed by the organization”; and “to protection for all the organization’s agents acting in 
the territory of a third [sjtate in their official capacity as international civil servants.”^^
While it remains to be seen how exactly this international legal personality is used in 
practice, such a status may not be as surprising as it may sound at first, given the 
jurisdictional regime in the ICC framework (especially that of complementarity) and the 
attendant need for the ICC and its organs to be in direct contact with states.
ICC’s Territorial Scope and Jurisdiction
A number of provisions contemplate the ICC or its organs being situated in and 
working within the territorial boundaries of states. The ICC may exercise its functions and 
powers on the territory of any state party or, if there is a special agreement (as provided for in 
the Statute), on the territory of any other s t a t e . A s  well, the OTP may conduct 
investigations on the territory of a state in accordance with the international cooperation and 
judicial assistance provisions or, in limited cases, without the cooperation of the state party 
when authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber to do so.^^^
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Although the Court itself will normally sit in the Netherlands, it “may sit elsewhere, 
wherever it considers it d e s i r a b l e . T h e  Rules, however, require when it “considers that it 
would be in the interests of justice” to do so, that the ICC consult with the state where the 
court is to be located. This cannot be done without the state’s consent.^*’'* The 
Privileges/Immunities Agreement notes that, where the Court sits in a place other than the 
Hague, “the Court may conclude with the [sjtate concerned an arrangement concerning the 
provision of the appropriate facilities for the exercise of its f u n c t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e ,  while 
the ICC could sit in a place other than The Hague, its ability to do so is heavily 
circumscribed. Interestingly, however, as noted above, state consent is not always a 
precondition to the investigative powers of the OTP. Where a state is unwilling and unable 
genuinely to investigate or prosecute then the ICC could conceivably exercise its jurisdiction 
or carry out its functions.
Despite repeated assertions in the literature that the ICC has universal jurisdiction, it 
does not.^^ Cases may be brought before the Court via three different methods: a referral by 
a state party,^'’^  an investigation initiated by the prosecutor on his or her own,^^* or a referral 
from the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.^*^^
The Court will only have jurisdiction over crimes committed after the Statute entered 
into force (that is after July I, 2002)^™ and its jurisdiction will be dependent upon a number 
of preconditions. Further, even when the Court has jurisdiction, the case may still not be 
admissible under the Statute.^’ ’
The ICC’s subject-matter jurisdiction is limited to four crimes (one of which, the 
crime of aggression, has not yet been defined) and the Court, through the notion of 
complementarity, does not have automatic jurisdictional priority over national c o u r t s . I t  is
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conceivable that the Statute could be amended in the future to include additional crimes, 
including the crime of terrorism. The ASP, however, must approve such an amendment.
The Court will only have jurisdiction over individuals eighteen years of age or older 
irrespective of their official capacity^^^ and it will have no power to determine the criminal 
liability of states. Having said that, however, depending upon the nature of the crimes 
involved and depending upon the facts of each individual case, states may be at least 
indirectly implicated.
When it does have jurisdiction, the ICC is to investigate and prosecute “the most 
serious crimes of international c o n c e r n . W h e r e  some action has occurred at the state 
level, the ICC will be concerned with crimes of “sufficient gravity to justify further 
a c t i o n . F u r t h e r ,  the Prosecutor has to be satisfied that a prosecution is “in the interests of 
justice.”^ ’^
The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if the alleged crime occurred on the territory of 
a state party; the alleged crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft registered in a 
state party; the person accused is a national of a state party; or a non-state party has made a 
declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction.^^* Security Council Chapter VII referrals, 
however, have no such pre-conditions.*^^ As a result, unlike the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) which requires explicit state consent before the ICJ may assert jurisdiction, the 
ICC could become involved in a case without a state’s specific consent on a case by case 
basis.
Interesting questions, however, arise when (I) the alleged crime occurred on the 
actual or deemed territory of a state party, but the accused person is not a national of a state 
party; and (2) when the United Nations Security Council refers a case to the ICC. In the first
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scenario, the consent of the accused person’s state is not a necessary precondition to ICC 
jurisdiction. For example, if an accused, who is not a national of a state party, commits a 
prescribed crime in the territory of a state party, the ICC may be able to assert jurisdiction 
even if the non-state party objects. A large part of the literature supporting the American 
government’s opposition to the Statute erroneously claims that the investigation or 
prosecution of an accused who is not a national of a state party without that state’s consent is 
new and infringes state sovereignty. Such a jurisdictional claim is not new. Jurisdiction can 
arise in a number of circumstances and is not dependent on the consent of the national 
government of an accused. States traditionally will prosecute foreigners who commit 
offences in the state’s country. Less likely, but not implausible, is the scenario where a state 
will prosecute an individual for crimes committed elsewhere in the world -  extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Even less frequently is the use of the concept of universal jurisdiction. 
Universal jurisdiction applies to a small number of crimes that any state can investigate or 
prosecute anywhere in the world given their heinous nature (such a genocide) or the lack of 
territory associated with the crime (such as piracy).
The same preconditions in the first scenario do not apply to the second scenario - that 
is, a Security Council referral to the ICC. Conceivably the ICC could after such a referral 
assert jurisdiction over a case where the crimes were committed by a non-state party national 
on the territory of a non-state party. While, in the second scenario, it may be argued that 
state consent is not completely removed from the equation as the Security Council draws its 
legitimacy from treaty ratifications, it is remarkable that a Court could assert jurisdiction 
where the crime was not committed on the territory of a state party, where the accused is not 
a national of a state party and where a non-state party has not accepted the court’s
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jurisdiction. That precise situation appears to be unfolding with the recent referral by the 
Security Council of the situation in Darfur. While Sudanese government has signed the 
Statute, it has not ratified it and, as a result is not a state party within the meaning of the 
Statute. Notwithstanding that fact, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
considers the prosecution of Sudanese nationals possible with a Security Council referral and 
the Sudanese government sees such action as contrary to law. The Sudanese government has 
indicated that it will not accept it^*° and accordingly this will likely be heavily litigated in the 
future.
Even if the ICC asserts jurisdiction in one of the above scenarios, it is not the end of 
the matter. Despite the ICC asserting such jurisdiction, the Security Council, a state party or 
a non-state party that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned, may 
request the deferral of an ICC investigation or an ICC prosecution. In practice, the Security 
Council has essentially a collective renewable right to seek a deferral. If the Security 
Council seeks such a deferral, a resolution must be adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
and the deferral would last for twelve months or may be extended for additional twelve­
month periods.^*' If a state party or a state that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
concerned crimes asks for a deferral, the request is subject to a review and, depending upon 
the circumstances, the Prosecutor may still opt to continue with the investigation.^*^ In that 
case, however, there is an appeal process to challenge that decision.
Even if such a deferral is not requested, there are still further restrictions on whether 
the ICC will be able to handle a case. Specifically, cases will not be admissible before the 
Court where (a) “the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
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prosecution” [Emphasis added.]; (b) “the case has been investigated by a state which has 
jurisdiction over it and the state has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the 
deeision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state genuinely to prosecute”; (c) 
“the person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint” unless the trial was done in a manner with the intent that the person not be 
brought to justice or unless the trial was meant to shield the person from criminal 
responsibility, or (d) “the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.”^^
In deciding whether a state is “unwilling” to carry out an investigation or prosecution 
in a particular case, the ICC, “having regard to the principles of due process recognized by 
international law,” will look at whether any of the following has occurred: “(a) the 
proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose 
of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court,” “(b) there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which 
in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; or 
(c) the proceedings were not or are not being condueted independently or impartially, and 
they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.” *^^
In deciding whether a state is “unable” to carry out an investigation or prosecution, 
the ICC will look at whether “the state is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary 
evidence and testimony or otherwise [is] unable to carry out its proceedings” because of “a 
total or substantial collapse” or the unavailability of the states’ national judicial system^**’.
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Therefore, to summarize, the ICC will not have jurisdiction when a state has the 
jurisdiction to prosecute and has the ability to prosecute and willingly takes on the task. As 
well, if the person has been already tried for the conduct in question, or the state has made a 
decision not to prosecute, the ICC will not have jurisdiction if the process was independent, 
impartial and furthered the course of justice.
The Statute also provides for challenging the jurisdiction of the Court and challenging 
the admissibility of a case/^^ Such challenges may be brought by the Court on its own 
m o t i o n , b y  “an accused or person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has 
been issued,” by “a [sjtate which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is 
investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted,” or by “a [sjtate from 
which acceptance of jurisdiction is r e q u i r e d . A s  well, a state that would “normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned” may also be able to bring such a 
c h a l l e n g e . I n  such instances those who made a referral under Article 13 and alleged 
victims may also submit observations to the Court.
Complementarity
Special mention should again be given to the notion of complementarity which 
addresses the relationship between states and the ICC. Complementarity, as it has become 
known, is the manner in which the ICC can affect its jurisdiction while at the same time 
respecting/complementing the jurisdiction of the states parties and non-states parties. 
According to Cassese, complementarity “creates a presumption in favour of action at the 
level of states.
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Newton describes the complementarity principle as “the critical node in ascertaining 
whether the ICC will trample on the sovereign prerogatives of states, or will coexist in a 
constructive and beneficial relationship with all nations.
While the term complementarity is not used in the Statute, the notion is reflected in 
the combined reading of the Statute and the subsequent documents that form part of the ICC 
legal framework. The Statute’s Preamble states, “that the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation.” It also emphasizes, “that the International Criminal Court 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”^^  ^
The rest of the Statute -  especially the jurisdiction and admissibility provisions noted above - 
is replete with efforts to ensure states will handle most such prosecutions unless specific 
circumstances (and a very limited set of circumstances) allow the ICC to take the case.
The complementarity concept pre-dated the Rome Conference. It may have appeared 
as early as the 1953 Commission on International Criminal Jurisdiction and certainly by the 
time of the International Law Commission draft statute in 1993 and 1994.^^“^
Earlier in the thesis it was noted that one of the reasons Marc Grossman, United 
States Under Secretary for Political Affairs, opposed the ICC was because it amounted to a 
form of judicial review. According to John T. Holmes, however, during the Rome 
negotiations, “delegations were mindful that the ICC was not envisaged as an appellate body 
to review decisions of domestic courts”^^  ^ and this was one of the rare areas of consensus 
from which the United States delegation did not d i s s e n t . G r o s s m a n ’s claim, therefore, is 
another example of the American government’s position shifting over time.
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Notwithstanding the comments of Holmes, it is my opinion that a reasonable 
interpretation of the combined effect of the complementarity provisions could give rise to an 
occasion where the ICC may have to rule on the legality of state decisions to investigate 
and/or prosecute and/or state decisions not to do so. There is, however, a threshold that the 
ICC must meet. The only way that the ICC can take on a case after a finding of 
‘unwillingness” is if the Court finds that the state had not acted in good faith. Historically, 
international bodies have been quite loath to accuse national governments of bad faith.
The term complementarity and the accompanying jurisdictional regime have a 
positive ring to it that at first glance seems to fit nicely with (and is not necessarily against) 
state interests. On reflection, however, part of complementarity can be seen as positive and 
parts of it can be considered negative. In other words, the concept has two different prongs 
to it -  one that fits side by side with the jurisdiction of states and one that inevitably conflicts 
with the jurisdiction of states. It is the latter scenario that will no doubt give rise to 
sovereignty claims. Specifically, the latter scenario will occur when the ICC decides that a 
state has been ‘unwilling’ and all other jurisdictional preconditions have been met. Further, 
while the authority of the ICC to determine the adequacy of the state actions or non-actions 
lies completely with the Chambers of the ICC, its procedural decisions can then be appealed 
to the ASP and then, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice (hereafter, ICJ).
The exact nature of the ICC’s position when it takes on a case after a finding of 
‘unwillingness’, however, is not entirely clear. It is not one of clear superiority in a vertical 
or hierarchical point of view. The relationship between the ICC and states (whether a state 
party or not) is much more complicated. For example, even if the ICC properly exercises its
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jurisdiction after having ruled that a state was ‘unwilling’, a state may still interfere with that 
result by either prosecuting the case or asking for a deferral.
Therefore, the notion of complementarity evokes three different potential types of 
relationship between the ICC and states -  one where the states prosecute and the ICC may, if 
necessary assist or cooperate with them (that is, a horizontal relationship); one where the ICC 
‘reviews’ a decision of a state to or not to prosecute and, upon a finding of unwillingness and 
the satisfaction of other preconditions, where the ICC prosecutes with no state or Security 
Council response (that is, a vertical relationship); or one where the ICC has taken on the 
prosecution, but a state or the Security Council either defers it or the state takes on the 
prosecution itself (that is, a vertical on top of a vertical relationship). What makes the 
concept even more complicated is that the ICC could be acting in different relationships with 
different states at the same time in relation to allegations all over the world. In other words, I 
agree with Patricia McKeon who noted that, “[tjhe difficulty with complementarity arises in 
its application”.
The precise meaning of complementarity, however, will become known with practice. 
As one expert said in the course of OTP’s consultation process, complementarity raises more 
questions than it a n s w e r s . T h e  literature has, however, focused on complementarity in its 
positive form and failed to consider in detail the exceptions. In the positive situation -  that is 
when a state is able to prosecute and makes a legitimate decision to prosecute or not - there is 
no obvious need for ICC involvement and no potential for conflict between the ICC and a 
state. The implication upon the state’s monopoly is effectively nil. But when a state makes a 
decision with which the ICC does not agree and where the ICC acts in response, sovereignty 
claims are likely to occur because the final authority has now moved to the ICC.
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Obligations and Effects on States Parties
Beyond the Preamble of the Statute which states, “it is the duty of every [sjtate to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international c r i m e s , t h e  
Statute also creates a set of obligations upon states parties. These obligations to cooperate 
with the ICC are primarily found in Part 9 of the Statute. The Rules also contain chapters 
dedicated to the issues of international cooperation and judicial assistance and 
enforcement."^ *^ ^
States parties are obligated, in accordance with the Statute, to “cooperate fully with 
the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
C o u r t , i n c l u d i n g  compliance with requests for arrest and surrender.'^°^ The Statute further 
requires that there are national procedures in place to facilitate that cooperation.
The Court is authorized to ‘request’ cooperation from states parties.'*®'* Non-states 
parties may provide assistance “on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with 
such state or any other appropriate basis.”'*®^ Failure on the part of a state party or a non-state 
party to cooperate or assist may result in notification of the ASP or, in the case of a Security 
Council referral, notification of the Security Council.'*®®
States parties are required to give effect to Court imposed fines and forfeiture 
orders.'*®  ^ Only states that indicated a willingness to accept persons sentenced by the Court 
may be asked to assist in the enforcement of prison sentences.'*®*
I agree with Antonio Cassese’s argument that the cooperation provisions of the Rome 
Statute have a largely state-oriented approach and that the ICC is not a “supra-state” 
model.'*®® Cited examples include the fact that, in competing requests between states and the
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ICC for the surrender of persons, the ICC does not automatically win and the fact there is 
built-in protection for national security information.'*'*^
While I do not agree that the ICTY and the ICTR are in the end “supra-states” for the 
reasons explained below, the state-oriented approach to these provisions is as one would 
expect given the nature of the crimes being investigated and prosecuted. Simple 
consideration of this factor alone unfortunately does not assist us in discerning the real effect 
of the ICC.
Additional Implications for States Parties
Assuming for the sake of argument that the territorial integrity of a state is 
discernable and watertight,'*" do the provisions within the ICC framework delve into or 
affect the internal affairs or territorial integrity of that individual state?
First, the Preamble, amongst other things, reaffirms “the Purposes and Principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular that all [sjtates shall refrain from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any [sjtate, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and emphasizes 
“in this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any [sjtate Party 
to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any [sjtate.”'*'^
Conceivably, if the ICC were to prosecute an individual under the Statute after he or 
she had been previously acquitted or convicted in a particular state, there would on the face 
of it be an interference with the internal affairs of the state. The ability of the ICC to do that, 
however, is limited. For example, no one previously convicted or acquitted of genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes can be tried by the ICC unless that earlier trial was
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“for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the court” or the trial was “not conducted independently or 
impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and 
[was] ...conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent 
to bring the person concerned to j u s t i c e . O t h e r w i s e  the ICC framework will have to 
respect the state’s decision.
In the Statute, efforts are also made to ensure there is no infringement of a state 
party’s laws' '^'* and a state party is not put in a position where it may have to violate 
international agreements or other international law obligations.'^'^ As well, the Statute 
specifically considers thé laws of a state party when there is a request for assistance and the 
request is “prohibited in the requested state on the basis of an existing fundamental legal 
principle of general application.”'"^ As well, the execution of a request from the Court may 
be postponed if it would interfere with another ongoing investigation or prosecution.'"^ 
Lastly, as noted above, there is also a specified procedure for protecting national security 
information otherwise subject to disclosure under the Statute.'"*
Although no reservations were permitted with this trea ty ,'^ som e would argue that 
there remains an “escape” from the Statute by virtue of the withdrawal p r o v i s i o n s . I t  
remains to be seen however whether any state will actually use that provision. The political 
repercussions would likely be much worse than the negative publicity the United States 
received for “unsigning” this treaty -  a treaty to which the United States Senate had not 
consented and thus remained un-ratified.
84
Implication for Non-States Parties
While there is no question in law that a treaty cannot create obligations or rights for a 
state without the consent of the state/^' the literature on the ICC is quite split as to whether 
the Statute places obligations on non-states parties. For example, David Scheffer, Madeline 
Morris and others argue that the ICC improperly affects non-party states'*^  ^whereas Michael 
Scharf arrives at the opposite conclusion.'^^^
As previously mentioned, ICC investigations and prosecutions against nationals of a 
non-state party (subject to certain conditions) can occur without the consent of the non-state 
party. Gennady Danilenko, in my view, correctly points to the distinction between being 
bound by the treaty and being affected by it. Non-parties to the Statute are “affected” and 
fall into the latter category. In particular, the ability of the ICC to assert jurisdiction over 
non-party nationals “will implicate vital legal interests of non-[m]ember [sjtates” and that 
“will affect an essential element of state sovereignty, namely criminal jurisdiction of all 
[sjtates over their nationals.” He further stated, that the ICC “will also affect all [sjtates’ 
governmental structures and decision-making processes.
If the situation in Darfur goes to trial in the ICC, it is likely that this precise issue will 
be litigated. In the Darfur situation, however, the crucial event for jurisdiction is the Security 
Council referral which affects even non-states parties to the Rome Statute.
Lastly, while a state may not be a party to the Statute and may not be bound by it, it 
may still be affected by the existence of the ICC. A state cannot properly ignore it given the 
incredible support for the ICC from around the world. Further, as previously noted, both 
international and domestic courts are citing the provisions of the Statute and likely will cite 
its jurisprudence down the road. In fact, a state may amend its domestic law so as to comply
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with international standards so as to avoid the possibility of falling within the hands of the 
ICC.
ICC, the United Nations and Security Council
While there has also been some speculation as to whether the Security Council could 
alter or affect the ICC by either limiting or expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction, the Relationship 
Agreement precludes such action.
According to Mundis: “the United Nations recognizes the Court as “an independent 
permanent judicial institution” and the Court recognizes the “responsibilities of the United 
Nations under the Charter. The Relationship Agreement seeks to elaborate on this general 
principle, adding that the parties agree to cooperate and to “consult each other on matters of 
mutual interest.
With respect to the relationship between the United Nations and the ICC, the term 
“mutual respect” may imply that the two international organizations remain at arms length. 
Unfortunately, however, a true arms length arrangement will not be possible. For example, 
the Security Council may actually refer a case to the ICC; the Security Council may suspend 
an ICC investigation; and the Security Council may be needed to help investigate and/or 
enforce orders of the ICC.
While in theory the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC is one of 
mutual respect, it may not always be a harmonious one. What happens if the Security 
Council defers a case? What happens if the Security Council takes its own action under 
Chapter VII and sets up a court to deal with alleged atrocities and there is an overlap between
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its jurisdiction and that of the ICC? How does that affect the earlier “vertical on top of 
vertical” relationship?
Conceivably there may also be an overlap between the ICC and the role of the 
Security Council when it comes to the as yet undefined crime of aggression. Acts of 
aggression are the fundamental cornerstone of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter."*^  ^
Is the International Criminal Court supranational?
According to Heifer and Slaughter, “supranational” involves “a larger transfer of or 
limitation on state sovereignty” with the establishment of an international organization.'*^* 
According to Grieves, “[t]he term “supranational” signifies that signatory states have 
transferred to an international institution certain limited decision-making powers normally 
exercised only by the governmental organs of a sovereign state.
In my opinion, the ICC is clearly an international entity with respect to its 
jurisdiction, but it is not supranational. No governmental qualities are handed over. When 
the ICC exercises its jurisdiction in the case of a state that is either unable or unwilling to 
investigate or prosecute a crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the ICC has quite obviously not 
dismantled the domestic government.
Simply, the ICC, in a limited set of circumstances, may prosecute persons for a 
limited number of very specific crimes. The ICC framework is replete with checks and 
balances upon the power of the ICC organs. The ICC’s negotiating power is effectively 
circumscribed to its mandate which is to be the court of last resort only if no other court can 
or will take action. The ICC itself is also largely dependent upon states for its continued 
survival. The ICC organs need the cooperation of states to help investigate, find and arrest 
perpetrators and to enforce court orders.
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While it is my conclusion that the ICC is heavily circumscribed in its reach, it does 
have the potential of becoming less so and can, in some circumstances, go against the wishes 
of states. For example, if a state is held to be “unwilling” to prosecute persons for crimes and 
the ICC is permitted under the complicated framework to take on the case, the ICC could 
judicially review the behaviour of the state. Specifically, the ICC comes closer to being 
supranational when the following exceptional circumstances crystallize: if the ICC disagrees 
with the decision of a state not to prosecute and if the ICC then prosecutes the perpetrator 
that the state would not.
ICC in Practice: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Central African 
Republic and Darfur
At present, given the young age of the ICC, the only indicators of its practice are its 
policy paper and its regulations.
Notwithstanding the fact that the ICC has not yet heard a case, there has been a lot of 
action in the OTP since its creation. In addition to having received close to 500 
communications within its first year of operation,'^^^ the OTP received a referral from the 
Security Council in relation to the situation in Darfur and has had three referrals from states, 
namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and the Central African 
Republic. The referrals from the DRC and Uganda have resulted in the commencement of 
investigations by the ICC. The circumstances under which the DRC and Uganda referrals 
were made elucidate the current approach or policy of the OTP.
First, in July 2003, the Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, stated that he would 
“closely follow” the situation in the DRC and that his office would give it priority.'^^’ Later,
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the Prosecutor announced that the first situation “which merits to be closely followed by the 
Office” is the situation in Ituri,
The Prosecutor then said that, while the OTP was conscious of the peace process and 
hoped that efforts to stop the violence would be successful, “I hope the national system can 
be reinvigorated with assistance from the international community in order to enable the 
Congolese themselves to investigate and prosecute those responsible.” But then Mr. Ocampo 
continued: “[i]f necessary, however, I stand ready to seek authorization from a Pre-Trial 
Chamber to start an investigation under my proprio motu powers” and seek the support of 
national or international f o r ce s . I n t e r es t i ng l y ,  Mr. Ocampo then suggested a referral or 
active support from the DRC itself and stated that, “[t]he Court and the territorial [sjtate may 
agree that a consensual division of labour could be an effective approach,” for example, the 
ICC could prosecute “the leaders who bear the most responsibility for the crimes” and the 
national authorities “with the assistance of the international community could implement 
appropriate mechanisms to deal with other individuals r e s p o n s i b l e . M r .  Ocampo also 
indicated that he would be sending letters to all states parties and other countries, including 
the ones concerned, and asking for their cooperation."*^^
In March 2004, the President of the DRC referred to the OTP the situation of crimes 
within ICC jurisdiction."*^'' On July 5, 2004, the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC decided that 
there was a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation"*^^ and thereby commenced the ICC’s 
first investigation.
On 23 July 2004, the OTP announced its decision to open an investigation of crimes 
committed in the DRC, not only the Ituri region. Mr. Ocampo stated that, “[tjhe decision to 
launch an investigation has been taken with the cooperation of the DRC, other governments
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and international organizations.” Subsequent to that, the OTP and the Registry of the ICC 
made an official visit to the DRC and met with “senior political and judicial Congolese 
authorities in order to discuss mechanisms of cooperation between the DRC and the Organs 
ofthelCC."^^^
In December 2003 (in the midst of the DRC case above) the President of Uganda 
referred a situation to the OTP concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). By the end of 
January, 2004, the OTP announced the fact that there “is a sufficient basis to start planning 
for the investigation of the ICC” and that “[djetermination to initiate the investigation will 
take place in the coming m o n t h s . O n  the same day as the decision to initiate an 
investigation into the DRC, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC decided that it would analyze 
the situation in Uganda and seek additional information.
In a letter dated December 22, 2004, a representative of President Bozizé of the 
Central African Republic asked the OTP to “investigate crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court that may have been committed since I July 2002 anywhere on the territory of the 
Central African Republic”. On January 7, 2005, the OTP announced that it would analyze 
the situation in order to determine whether the office would seek to commence an 
investigation or seek further information. On January 19, 2005, the President of the ICC, 
assigned this situation to another pre-trial chamber
More recently, the OTP received a referral from the Security Council in relation to 
the situation in Darfur following an earlier recommendation for such from the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General. As the Security 
Council considered that the situation in Darfur continues to be a threat to international peace 
and security, it issued the resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. While
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eleven members of the Security Council voted in favour of the resolution and no members 
voted against it, four members (including the United States) abstained.'*'*^
The Security Council also decided that the Government of Sudan and all other parties 
to the conflict in Darfur, “shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to 
the Court and the Prosecutor.” Further, the resolution recognized that non-states parties have 
no obligation under the Statute, and urged all states and concerned regional and other 
international organizations to cooperate fully.
As well, similar to the OTP’s prior requests in relation to the state referrals, the 
Security Council also invited “the Court and the African Union to discuss practical 
arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the 
possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional 
efforts in the fight against impunity” and encouraged “the Court, as appropriate and in 
accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic efforts 
to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur.”'^ '^ '*
On 1 June 2005, the OTP decided to open an investigation into the situation in 
Darfur, Sudan.' '^^  ^ Shortly after that, the Government of Sudan announced that it would 
establish a new specialized tribunal to deal with some of the persons suspected in relation to 
crimes committed in Darfur. Not surprisingly, the OTP did not cease its investigation. The 
OTP instead announced that it would follow the work of that tribunal as part of its on-going 
admissibility assessment “in order to determine whether it is investigating, or has 
investigated or prosecuted, the cases of relevance to the ICC, and whether any such 
proceedings meet the standards of genuineness as defined by article 17 of the Rome Statute.
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Interestingly, the ICC as part of its work in relation to the situation in Dafur has commenced 
negotiations towards a relationship agreement between the ICC and the African Union."^ "**^  
Assessing the Practice
Were state referrals to the ICC from states against themselves contemplated by the 
negotiators of the Rome Statute when they came up with the notion of complementarity? On 
the contrary, few if anyone expected that the first two cases before the ICC would involve 
states referring cases about events involving their own nationals in their own state. In fact, 
with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that there is nothing in the Statute to prevent a state 
party from making such a referral even if there is no “unwillingness” and no “inability” on 
the state to investigate or prosecute.
Further to the earlier conclusion that the notion of complementarity evokes three 
different potential types of relationship between the ICC and states, practice has shown us a 
fourth type of relationship. Earlier, the first three types of relationship were described as (a) 
one where a state prosecutes and the ICC, if necessary, assists or cooperates with it (that is, a 
horizontal relationship); (b) one where the ICC ‘reviews’ a decision of a state to or not to 
prosecute and, upon a finding of unwillingness and the satisfaction of other preconditions, 
where the ICC goes against the state decision and prosecutes the perpetrator (that is, a 
vertical relationship); and (c) one where the ICC has taken on the prosecution, but a state or 
the Security Council either defers it or a state takes on the prosecution itself (that is, a vertical 
on top of a vertical relationship). The fourth type of relationship allows for an ICC 
investigation or prosecution in a non-vertical, but horizontal relationship. In the cases of the 
DRC and Uganda, the OTP is investigating a matter after a state party referred a situation to 
the OTP involving incidents in the state’s own territory and/or with its own nationals. In
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other words, depending upon the underlying circumstances that led to the ICC receiving 
jurisdiction, an investigation or prosecution may be horizontal in some cases and vertical in 
others.
While it is obvious that the OTP was following the specific rules in the Statute in 
terms of notifying those involved and states parties and in terms of seeking judicial 
authorization, it is interesting to note that the OTP may also have been using the media as a 
tool in order to encourage state cooperation. In the DRC case above, while the OTP 
indicated it clearly preferred the DRC be able to prosecute the case and asked for its support, 
the OTP also sought the assistance of the international community and indicated that, if 
necessary, it would exercise its proprio motu power and investigate the case. One may view 
the OTP’s actions as being done in the full spirit of the notion of complementarity in so far as 
the OTP put the state in question on notice that the issue was being investigated, of the 
OTP’s intentions to exercise its own powers and gave the state one last chance to avoid a 
ruling that the state was “unwilling” or “unable.” One may, however, also consider that the 
DRC was pressured into giving the referral to the ICC by the OTP press releases and 
announcements. The pressuring of a state by an international organization may be indicative 
of a rather proactive approach by the OTP in the assertion of ICC jurisdiction 
notwithstanding its outward deference to states.
As noted previously, the United States remains opposed to being bound by the ICC 
and had limited success in trying to get immunity from the ICC via Security Council 
Resolutions. When the most recent efforts failed, it focused on Article 98(2) immunity 
agreements. It is of interest that the Darfur resolution specifically decided that “nationals, 
current or former officials or personnel from a contributing [sjtate outside Sudan which is not
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a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing [sjtate for all alleged acts or omissions arising out 
of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African 
Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing 
[s]tate."447
The United Nations Press Release relating to the Darfur referral explained that the 
United States government remained opposed to the ICC and that it preferred the use of a 
hybrid t r i buna l Spec i f i c a l l y ,  Anne Woods Patterson stated that the American government 
abstained from the vote because it did not agree with a Security Council referral to the ICC 
but that it did not veto the resolution as it felt that the resolution’s wording protected 
American nationals from the jurisdiction of the court and that the international community 
assistance was needed in order to end the climate of impunity.' '^^^
It appears likely this language was, given the American government’s opposition to 
the ICC, the only way of avoiding a veto from the United States. Such a veto would have 
ensured that there was no referral from the Security Council. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether a precedent was created by the inclusion of such language in the Security Council 
resolution.
ICC Policy Paper
The Prosecutor of the ICC has publicly stated that, “[a]s a consequence of 
complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its 
efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the 
regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major s u c c e s s . I n  other words, the
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OTP considers one of its main functions will be to help states meet their obligation to 
investigate and prosecute. The approach of encouraging national governments to prosecute 
the cases themselves, however, will not work in the unwilling state scenario.
The OTP conducted extensive “expert consultations” and public hearings with 
selected international experts so that they could comment on a draft policy paper and 
regulations for the OTP.'^^' One of the key themes was “respecting national sovereignty”^^  ^ - 
therefore sovereignty is still very much on the discussion agenda.
The Summary of Recommendations provides some information about the intended 
approach of the OTP. First, the “presumption in favour of [sjtate action enshrined in the 
Statute is principally based on a recognition of the duty of [sjtates to investigate and 
prosecute.” Second, no deferral to national jurisdiction will occur where there is a Security 
Council referral under Chapter VII of the Charter. Third, the OTP will work closely with 
states, inter-govemmental organizations, governmental organizations as well as prosecutors. 
For example, the OTP has said that it will continue “to assist territorial [sjtates with national 
investigations and prosecutions even where the Office is acting concurrently with regards to 
key leaders” in an effort to minimize what has been called by some as the “impunity gap.” 
Fourth, the OTP has announced that it is considering the issue of having “shared caseloads” 
between international and national jurisdictions “particularly in the context of transitional 
justice in post-conflict [ s j t a t e s . F u r t h e r ,  the OTP has also contemplated sharing of 
information between the ICC and national authorities and vice versa.^^‘^
After the public hearings noted above, the OTP issued a policy paper outlining the 
Office’s general strategy and priorities. With its issuance, the OTP sought public debate on
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it. A number of important points were raised that may not have been apparent from reading 
the Statute and its accompanying documents.
First, the OTP recognized that it operates on a different basis and in a different 
environment than national prosecution systems and emphasized the need for state support 
and close cooperation between the OTP and all p a r t i e s . S e c o n d ,  because of the OTP’s 
limited resources, its permanent structure will involve a small number of senior staff, it will 
use external resources whenever possible (including national investigators and prosecutors) 
and it will have a variable number of investigation teams in different regions."^^^ Third, the 
OTP will use what it terms a ‘two-tiered approach’. The OTP will focus its efforts and 
resources on “those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the [sjtate or 
organization allegedly responsible for those crimes”'*^  ^ and it will “encourage national 
prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators” or, with the international 
community, seek to ensure that the offenders are brought to justice by some other means. 
Fourth, the OTP will undertake investigations only when there is a clear case of failure to act 
by the [sjtate or [sjtates concemed.'^^^ “The Prosecutor will encourage [sjtates and civil 
society to take ownership of the Court” and anticipates close interaction between [sjtate 
authorities and the OTP including information sharing in both directions in order to assist the 
work of each.”'^ *’'’ Fifth, on the issue of complementarity, the OTP considers the absence of 
trials by the ICC as a major success if the absence was due to the effective functioning of 
national systems."^^' Lastly, the OTP is of the view that, “[tjhere is no impediment to the 
admissibility of a case before the Court where no state has initiated any investigation”'*'^  ^ and 
further held that despite the view that complementarity is based on the duty of states to 
prosecute those responsible for international crimes, the OTP foresees ICC prosecutions
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where (1) the parties who would otherwise have jurisdiction see the ICC as the only neutral 
and impartial venue and (2) all parties agree that the ICC is the more effective forum/^^ This 
latter scenario was not foreseen by this author upon a simple reading of the Statute. 
Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the ICC may not be as limited as first thought, but it 
nonetheless will be inextricably tied to the notion of complementarity.
The OTP general strategy (at least at this point in time) seems to be to work closely 
with state authorities and to be more enmeshed and integrated with them than first thought by 
most working in this area. In my opinion, this early strategy allows the Office to establish 
networks and set up a foundation of cooperation. The OTP has chosen its first cases as ones 
that are not on its face antagonistic to state authorities. States referred the cases to them. I 
doubt that this will remain the long-term approach; as the Darfur experience has shown, there 
will also be scenarios that lack full cooperation from the state in which the incident occurred 
or whose nationals have been charged.
No test as to whether this is an accurate assessment of the OTP’s orientation can be 
made at this time due to the lack of an established track record. Further, whether the OTP’s 
announced policy will be set in stone or will vary upon the individual circumstances of each 
alleged atrocity or set of atrocities cannot be known and should be the subject of future 
research once a larger number of OTP actions can be examined and once a body of 
jurisprudence has developed.
It is this author’s opinion, however, that the OTP has chosen an initial policy that 
aims to cooperate and work with states. This is a critical foundation to maximizing a new 
court’s credibility as it corresponds with the Statute. Legitimacy within the international 
community will help maximize the political will of states to avoid crimes against humanity.
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war crimes and genocide and, if such highly condemned crimes should occur, to ensure 
international cooperation for the prosecution of those responsible. Further, a court that is 
respected by and respectful to states will help allay some of the deeply held concerns of those 
states opposed to the court and, perhaps, convince them to ratify the Statute or agree to be 
bound by it.
Comparing the ICC with Other Tribunals
While there is debate as to whether the IMT and the IMTFE were truly international 
or were simply “ ‘victors’ justice,” there is no question of the international character of the 
ICTY and ICTR. As a result, that is where the real comparisons with the ICC will begin.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that some of the literature on prior ad hoc 
tribunals considered the issue of sovereignty with similar evocative language as found in the 
ICC-sovereignty literature. Bodley, for example, concluded that the ICTY weakened state 
sovereignty and found it surprising that there was not “more vociferous objection by the 
international community for its potential use against other states that might in the future 
encounter troubles similar to those in the former Yugoslavia.”‘^ "^^ Bodley considered the 
ICTY's significant powers “to investigate, demand the extradition of, and prosecute the 
citizens of the former Yugoslav States without their consent” as “a substantial incursion into 
the sovereignty of the states ... which has been weakened and undermined by the ... 
suspected and demonstrated non-cooperation by ... states.
In the course of her analysis, Bodley also noted that, while the appellate decision in 
Blaskic^^^^ is “cloaked in the language of respect for sovereignty” as the ICTY could not issue 
a subpoena against a state, states could receive “orders or requests” from the ICTY."^^  ^ In that
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regard, she continued, “[i]n spite of this purportedly cabined stance vis-à-vis sovereign states, 
it is noteworthy that the judgment in fact extends the Tribunal’s reach beyond the power to 
indict, try, and imprison individuals; it also strengthens the Tribunal’s claim to demand the 
loosely-defined “cooperation” of s t a t e s . T h i s  analysis, however, forgot that the ICTY and 
the ICTR are children of, or subsidiary organs of, the Security Council.
The ICTY did have occasion to deal directly with the issue of sovereignty when it 
was argued that Yugoslavia’s sovereignty was violated with the establishment of the ICTY. 
In that regard, it may be recalled that Yugoslavia did not consent to the creation of the 
I C t y .4 6 9
In the ICTY’s seminal decision in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the Appeals Chamber 
made some interesting comments on jurisdiction and the notion of s o v e r e i g n t y . T h e  
Appeals Chamber decided that it had the jurisdiction to hear and decide on the appeal"*’ ’ and 
interpreted the concept of jurisdiction at the international level in a very broad fashion and 
advocated what it called a “modem vision of the administration of justice.”"*’  ^ It also held 
that the trial court erred in using “a narrow concept of jurisdiction ... limited in its scope “in 
time and space and as to persons and subject-matter.” The appellate court considered 
jurisdiction as something more than an ambit or sphere or “competence.” To the Appeals 
Chamber, jurisdiction is legitimate legal power “to state the law ... within this ambit, in an 
authoritative and final manner.”"” ^
Further, the Appeals Chamber held that a narrow concept of jurisdiction was not 
warranted in the international law context because of the lack of an integrated judicial system 
and a centralized structure internationally: “[i]n international law, every tribunal is a self- 
contained system (unless otherwise provided).” It also held that a narrow concept of
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jurisdiction presupposes a certain division of labour that does not exist at the international
level. Further, the Appeals Chamber noted that, while the constitutive instrument of an
international tribunal can limit some of its jurisdictional powers, it could “only do so to the
extent to which such limitation does not jeopardize its “judicial character” ... Such limitations
cannot, however, be presumed and, in any case, they cannot be deduced from the concept of
jurisdiction itself.” Further, the Appeals Chamber noted that “a major part of the incidental
or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial or arbitral tribunal” consisted of its “jurisdiction to
determine its own jurisdiction” [termed “la competence de la compétence” in French]. This is
not merely a power in the hands of the tribunal. In international law, where there is no
integrated judicial system and where every judicial or arbitral organ needs a specific
constitutive instrument defining its jurisdiction, “the first obligation of the Court -  as of any
other judicial body -  is to ascertain its own competence.
The Appeals Chamber allowed Tadic to allege a violation of state sovereignty as part
of his defence. In response, the appellate court gave the following ruling:
... Dating back to a period when sovereignty stood as a sacrosanct and 
unassailable attribute of statehood, this concept recently has suffered 
progressive erosion at the hands of the more liberal forces at work in the 
democratic societies, particularly in the field of human rights.
Whatever the situation in domestic litigation, the traditional doctrine upheld 
and acted upon by the Trial Chamber is not reconcilable, in this International 
Tribunal, with the view that an accused, being entitled to a full defence, 
cannot be deprived of a plea so intimately connected with, and grounded in, 
international law as a defence based on violation of State sovereignty."^^^
T he A ppeals Chamber further held that.
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, 
should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully 
against human rights. Borders should not be considered as a shield against the 
reach of the law and as a protection for those who trample underfoot the most 
elementary rights of humanity.
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Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is created, it 
must be endowed with primacy over national courts. Otherwise, human 
nature being what it is, there would be a perennial danger of international 
crimes being characterised as “ordinary crim es"..., or proceedings designed to 
shield the accused,” or cases not being diligently prosecuted....
If not effectively countered by the principle of primacy, any one of those 
stratagems might be used to defeat the very purpose of the creation of an 
international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of the very people whom it 
has been designed to prosecute.
Further, the Appeals Chamber also adopted the Trial Chamber’s view that the crimes 
over which it had jurisdiction were “not crimes of a purely domestic nature” but were crimes 
of a universal nature that transcended “the interest of any one State.
The Appeals Chamber noted that, even without certain provisions of the United 
Nations Charter, with the unique set up of the ICTY, “matters can be taken out of the 
jurisdiction of a [sjtate” and relied upon the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s and the 
Federal Republic of Germany’s consent to the International Tribunal’s jurisdiction and 
collaboration with it and the universal character of the crimes."^^^
In an unprecedented fashion, both the ICTY and the ICTR were created under 
Chapter VII “to maintain or restore international peace and s e c u r i t y . T h e  Security 
Council resolutions that created both tribunals bind all member states under the United 
Nations Charter. Further, both resolutions required that all states would comply. Although 
some think that the ICTY and the ICTR “enjoyed legitimacy and authority vis à vis sovereign 
states immediately upon their inception”"^ °^ there was nonetheless a fair bit of debate as to 
whether the Security Council had the authority to set up legal bodies in such a manner and 
whether or not there was a real threat to international peace and security. The ICTY and the 
ICTR were created without input from one affected state (Yugoslavia) and with the clear
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opposition of another (Rwanda). Accordingly,, these tribunals were not the result of 
consensus and were created in a non-‘complementary’ fashion. The structure was imposed 
from outside of the concerned state and, therefore, to some, both tribunals interfered with a 
state’s domestic affairs.
Both tribunals were limited in mandate and scope. While the statutes did not give the 
ICTY or the ICTR an international legal personality, it did allow for certain privileges and 
immunities to be attributed to its judges, the Prosecutor, the Registrar and their personnel."^*' 
The powers of the Prosecutor are quite broad - much broader than that of the ICC 
Prosecutor."^*^ For example, the Prosecutor is required to initiate investigations ex officio or 
as a result of information received from any source.
Unlike the ICC, both the ICTY and the ICTR invoke notions of primacy. Despite the 
creative use of Chapter VII to create both tribunals, they have been the subjects of significant 
controversy. Initially, in addition to a lack of Security Council enforcement'**'’ and their huge 
cost,'**'* criticisms have also focused on the inefficiencies of the tribunals and the slow pace of 
prosecution. Those criticisms have especially fallen upon the ICTR after it was subject to a 
damning internal review and resulting reorganization. Some states continue to refuse to 
comply with court orders or otherwise cooperate with either tribunal.
As noted previously, the primacy originally given to the ICTY and the ICTR was 
watered down with subsequent amendments to the rules. The ICC, however, does not 
explicitly invoke the notion of primacy. Instead it relies upon the notion of complementarity. 
But complementarity can, in certain circumstances amount to primacy -  the situation where 
the ICC disagrees with a state’s decision not to investigate or prosecute and the ICC does it 
instead.
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As both the ICTY and the ICTR had been created by Security Council resolutions, 
both tribunals will cease to exist upon a decision to that effect from the Security Council. 
The future of the ICC, however, is not dependent upon a Security Council resolution. 
Accordingly, at least in that regard, the ICC is more removed from the Security Council than 
either the ICTY or the ICTR and, therefore, is possibly more independent. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that the Security Council nonetheless still has an important relationship 
to the ICC. The Security Council may refer a situation to the OTP and the Security Council 
may repeatedly delay an investigation or a prosecution. Also, without the assistance of the 
Security Council, the Court’s enforcement abilities may be seriously weakened.
Specifically, in relation to the previously cited decision of the Appeals Chamber of 
the ICTY in the Tadic case, it remains to be seen whether the ICC will see jurisdietion in as 
broad a fashion. In my opinion, times have changed since that decision was released. While 
there is still no overall centralized structure in international law, the creation of the ICC has 
set up, to use the words from the Tadic decision, “an integrated judicial system operating in 
an orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals, where certain aspects or 
components of Jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or vested in one of them but not 
the others.” In other words, the ICC and its notion of complementarity have set up an 
integrated judicial system. The ICC is only self-contained in a certain set of circumstances -  
essentially if it has allegations of one of its defined core crimes and a state is unwilling to 
prosecute.
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Special Court for Sierra Leone
Although the Agreement and the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(hereafter, the SCSL) use some language identical or similar to the Rome Statute, the SCSL 
differs in many ways from the ICC. The notion of complementarity does not exist in the 
SCSL legal framework. Instead, the SCSL -  a court created with international involvement 
post-Rome -  contains primacy and concurrency provisions.
Although it is a young court, the SCSL has already issued a number of decisions 
about the legality of its existence, the nature of its jurisdiction, the impact upon the 
sovereignty of Sierra Leone and the ability of the United Nations to delegate authority. 
These decisions are of interest in that they see the SCSL as being something very different 
than that of the ICTY or the ICTR or other internationalized criminal tribunals.
The fact that the SCSL enjoys primacy over national courts does not necessarily 
represent a trend away from the use of complementarity in the area of international criminal 
law. In fact, it should not be forgotten that the government of Sierra Leone asked for the 
SCSL in the first place.
Early case law of the SCSL considered whether it should be considered a domestic or 
an international court. First, in the Prosecutor v. Kallon, Norman and Kamara, defence 
counsel argued that granting the SCSL concurrent jurisdiction with national courts and 
primacy violated the Constitution and that it was a domestic court not an international court. 
Although the SCSL was established by an agreement between the United Nations and the 
government of Sierra Leone, the SCSL found that it “is not anchored in any existing system 
and is therefore outside the national court system” and that it “acts only in an international 
sphere”. T h e  SCSL also came to that conclusion because the Special Court is not part of
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the judiciary of Sierra Leone; it possessed the juridical capacity necessary to enter into 
agreements - a power not given to national courts and is a treaty-based o r g a n I n  the end, 
the SCSL concluded that the issuance of concurrent and primary jurisdiction did not amend 
the constitution.
The Appeals Chamber of the SCSL in a later decision cited the Secretary-General’s 
Report which proposed a Special Court which was “a treaty-based organ not anchored in any 
existing system” and relied upon the higher level involvement of the Security Council in the 
establishment of the SCSL"*^  ^before it concluded that the SCSL “is not a national court and is 
not a part of the judicial system of Sierra Leone exercising judicial powers of Sierra 
L e o n e , F u r t h e r ,  the Appeals Chamber adopted the following similar conclusions of 
Professor Sands that:
(a) The special Court is established by treaty and has the
characteristics associated with classical international organizations 
(including legal personality; the capacity to enter into agreements 
with other international persons governed by international law; 
privileges and immunities; and an autonomous will distinct from 
that of its members).
(b) The competence and jurisdiction ... are broadly similar to that of
the ICTY and the ICTR and the IC C ....
(c) Accordingly, there is no reason to conclude that the Special Court
should be treated as anything other than an international tribunal or 
court, with all that implies for the question of immunity for a 
serving Head of State."*^^
The court then held that as the SCSL was an international criminal court and not a national
court, the equality of sovereign states was not applicable. Consequently, state-issued
im m unity could  not negate a prosecution.'^^*'
Second, in the case of Prosecutor v. Kondewa, in a separate opinion. Justice
Robertson opined that, although the SCSL had been established by a treaty, the SCSL existed
“in another dimension: it may be situated in Sierra Leone but it is not part of the court system
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established and regulated by the constitution and other local laws of that country”"*^ '; it has 
no power from Sierra Leonean law and is not a part of the system of that state; and that while 
“it has certain rights and obligations under local law,” the “Special C ourt/o r Sierra Leone is 
not a Special Court c/S ierra Leone.” [Italics added].'*^^
Mr. Justice Robertson, also noted that the court’s authority did not derive from 
national law and that it “doesn’t operate in any sense as a national court.” More particularly, 
he felt that the term “hybrid” did not apply to the SCSL as a hybrid denotes the offshoot of 
two species but that the SCSL is simply the creation of international law and “derives no 
juristic authority from national law and does not operate in any sense as a national court 
subject to the Constitution of Sierra Leone”. Justice Robertson described the SCSL as “an 
international court onto which a few national elements have been grafted” or a “court with 
international jurisdiction plus.”'^ ^^
Justice Robertson commented on the rarity “of a state agreeing to grant to an 
international court some power to prosecute its own citizens under its own national la\v’\^^^ 
Interestingly (and in this author’s opinion, wrongly), in the course of his opinion. Justice 
Robertson also stated that there is no “exact precedent” for the SCSL and the ICC in the 
sense that the ICC does not mean that a state party has invested the ICC with its own judicial
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Third, the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Gbao decided that the establishment of 
the SCSL “did not involve a transfer of jurisdiction or sovereignty by Sierra Leone” and that 
“the judicial power exercised by the Special Court is not that of Sierra Leone, but that of the 
Special Court itself reflecting the interests of the international community.” It further held 
that the SCSL was a completely new organization established by an international treaty and
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that it was not a transfer of jurisdiction but the creation of a new jurisdiction operating in the 
sphere of international law/^^
The SCSL also concluded that there was nothing illegal in the United Nations having 
made the SCSL beyond the control of the United Nations and that there was no improper 
delegation of its authority. According to Justice Robertson,“[tjhere is nothing in the UN 
Charter which precludes such arrangements, if they are genuinely conducive to the 
maintenance or restoration of peace and security” and there is no difference if it is done by an 
agreement with a single state, by unilateral action or by an agreement with many states.
These three decisions are of concern to this study for the following three reasons. 
First, it may be a different type of interaction than what we see with the ICC and national 
courts, but it is still nonetheless an interaction. Therefore, although the SCSL has held that it 
is an international tribunal, it is also an internationalized tribunal according to the definitions 
used in this thesis. Second, the SCSL’s limited primacy and concurrence do not take it to 
“another dimension” removed from national courts. There is still an interaction between the 
SCSL and national courts. Third, irrespective of the label issue an international tribunal 
stands for the proposition that different rules apply between international courts and national 
courts for at least the issue of official immunity. If the court is an international court under 
current international law, a state’s decision for an amnesty or immunity is not enforceable. 
The question then to be asked in future research is exactly what rules apply in a mixed-up 
environment like the ICC where courts may share cases and/or jointly try accused as 
contemplated by the OTP policy paper.
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UNMIK (Kosovo) and UNTAET (East Timor (now Timor-Leste))
While some might argue that UNMIK and UNTAET should not be included in this 
list, this author disagrees. Both stand out as examples where a separate tribunal was not 
created. Instead, international personnel in both UN administrations worked within the 
domestic legal system as prosecutors and/or judges. In particular, international judges sat in 
special panels in East Timor with two international judges and a local judge. In Kosovo 
international judges were the only international judge, the majority of or the entire assigned 
panel of judges depending on the procedure used. Notwithstanding the importance of being 
aware this unusual arrangement in the midst of the recent proliferation of international 
criminal tribunals, very little has been written about either approach. I hope the present 
discussion ensures that they become part of the debate.
While the judicial solution used by the Security Council in these instances was not the 
creation of a Chapter VII court, both arrangements were subject to close scrutiny by the 
Security Council. The UNMIK and UNTAET models are also closer to the state than the 
ICTY, ICTR and the ICC in their location and mixed use of staff and law. In my opinion, 
Ruffert correctly notes that both SRSGs and their missions are “subsidiary organs of the 
Security Council or at least of the organization as a whole” while “[a]t the same time, acting 
as organs of the territories concerned.
Not only were both administrations temporary because they were meant to end once 
certain preconditions were in place, but they could also conceivably be terminated at the wish 
of the Security Council. Ruffert has some difficulty classifying them into extant categories 
such as a “state,” “protectorate,” “modem protectorate” and “internationalized territory.” He 
ultimately concluded that neither has a functional legal personality.'^^^ I agree.
108
Further, legislative and executive authority, including the administration of the 
judiciary was vested in each administration and was exercised by the respective SRSGs. 
Both issued regulations that set out, among other things, rules on the appointment of local 
and international judges and prosecutors. Both the SRSGs were authorized by the Security 
Council to issue regulations and, accordingly, UNMIK is and UNTAET was less proximate 
to the Security Council than the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the ICC. The use of 
international judges and prosecutors in Kosovo and East Timor demonstrate that the creation 
of a specific court may not be the only available judicial mechanism to combat impunity. 
While both were experiments and the subject of criticism, it remains to be seen if their 
models or variants of their models are used elsewhere.
Aptly, according to Ruffert UNMIK and UNTAET are representative of “a territorial 
legal system from an international source” that could also be characterized as “a UN legal 
system, but with reference to specific t e r r i t o r y . I t  may be that the intended OTP approach 
in the ICC is generally going to fall into those lines unless the ICC disagrees with a state and 
prosecutes anyway.
Additional UN missions created in the future may overlap with the ICC especially 
where they create what might be considered to be an additional system of justice within a 
state or territory. Such a scenario would obviously complicate an analysis of the effect of the 
ICC framework.
The situation in Cambodia involves yet a different set up. The Extraordinary 
Chambers, are very limited in jurisdiction, time and are crisis-specific. There is increased 
state control as compared to other models. As things currently stand there will be no overlap 
between the Extraordinary Chambers and the ICC, as the ICC cannot handle crimes that
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occurred before 2000. The presence of other international and internationalized tribunals, 
however, highlights the fact that there is the possibility that the ICC will have to share its 
space with them as well as states.
Conclusion
The ICC, unlike the other courts discussed, is permanent. Its mandate is not restricted 
to one particular conflict or area of the world. It is an independent institution separate from 
the United Nations and has an international legal personality. It is, as a result, not dependent 
on states and, specifically, the Security Council, for its survival. It will, however, have to 
have a close relationship both with states and the Security Council as both could conceivably 
hamper its ability to do its work. As well, the ICC will also need the cooperation and 
assistance of states and, specifically, the United Nations Security Council, if it is to be 
effective.
The above analysis clearly illustrates some of the aspects of the ICC that, at first 
blush, seem to be radical may in fact not be. For example, while the ICC has the ability 
potentially to review a state decision not to prosecute and possibly prosecute a perpetrator, 
the Rome Statute also has incredible built in respect for state prosecutions. In fact, the ICTY 
and the ICTR may have been the high-water mark of going beyond state courts with their 
original version of primacy.
My review has indicated the 1998 Rome Statute (and the associated but later creation 
of the ICC) has not stopped the creation of additional international or internationalized courts 
or tribunals. Examples studied above include the Kosovo Courts and UNMIK, the Special 
Panels affiliated with UNTAET, the SCSL and the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia.
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The comparison has also shown the existence of the ICC will not prevent the creation 
of other courts and that their form will not necessarily mirror that of the ICC. (A summary of 
the comparisons to be made between the ICC and these international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals can be found in Table 2, in the Appendix to this thesis).
My review has also indicated that there is no apparent consistent model used with 
such courts either before or after 1998. As a result, it cannot necessarily be said that the 
creation of the ICC is a “trend” that operates in one direction. While the ICC is certainly an 
institution that is different than any of the other available legal mechanisms, it is not a given 
that priority treatment will be given to states (complementarity) when other international or 
internationalized tribunals enter the picture.
Although the SCSL and the ICC are very different, the ICC could handle some or all 
the same crimes as the SCSL.^^' Accordingly, it is worth reviewing the opinion of Leonard 
that the ICC is an example of a “transformation” from state-centered to non-state-centered 
global governance.
In Kosovo, the International Judges and the International Prosecutors (hereafter, IJPs) 
under the specific procedures operated separately but within the domestic legal system with 
the ability, if necessary, to disregard decisions made by local prosecutors or local judges. In 
East Timor, a similar arrangement was made but no special procedure had to be followed.
The SCSL also has limited primary and concurrent jurisdiction with domestic courts. 
The SCSL, however, was not a Chapter VII creation. The SCSL was created neither directly 
by a Security Council resolution (such as the ICTY and the ICTR) nor indirectly by a 
Security Council resolution (such as in Kosovo and East Timor). Instead, the SCSL was the 
result of a negotiated agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone and, for that
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court’s purposes, it starkly moves away from the notion of complementarity with Sierra 
Leone’s domestic courts/"^
Another important revelation of this chapter’s review has been to show that the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is not affixed to traditional boundaries. While the ICC and the 
national courts are concurrent and the latter have a jurisdictional primacy that is rebuttable, 
there may be times when the ICC will be able to assert its jurisdiction in their place. In other 
words, it is not guaranteed that national courts will keep that primacy.
The jurisdictional space occupied by the ICC is not fixed in time, space or territory. 
As well, the jurisdictional space of the ICC is highly contingent and is not necessarily 
hierarchical in nature. At times, the ICC and a domestic court may even share personal 
jurisdiction with the ICC assisting or handling the more senior leaders and the domestic court 
handling others at a lower level.
To allow an international organization to exercise itself in an area traditionally seen to 
be within the sole prerogative of states is remarkable but it is not necessarily new. Compared 
to other international courts, the ICC’s international legal status and aspects of the ICC’s 
precise relationship with states (as complicated as it is) are new. With an overview of other 
international and internationalized tribunals, however, it is not necessarily clear whether it 
may be called a trend.
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Chapter Four: A Transformation From State-Centered Governance to Non-State-
Centered Governance?
This thesis has shown that the first permanent international court to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes will operate in a controlled environment, subject to strict rules 
and qualified powers. The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited and is based on a presumption that 
states will prosecute the core crimes whenever possible. State consent requirements fill the 
Statute as does the need for state (and Security Council) assistance in investigating and 
enforcing the law. In most instances, the ICC will likely permit states to prosecute or respect 
their decisions not to prosecute alleged perpetrators. The ICC may, however, also assist a 
state if requested to do so. As a result, in that sense, the ICC is “complementary” to states. It 
shows what might be described as the positive side of complementarity namely, a situation 
where there is cooperation between the ICC and states.
On the other hand, this thesis has also shown that the ICC will be able to prosecute 
individuals for a limited number of crimes when a state is “unable” or “unwilling” to 
prosecute or subject persons accused of such crimes to a meaningful trial. In other words, 
there will be occasions where the ICC may review state actions and/or inactions and 
prosecute those responsible contrary to the wishes of a particular state. While I expect that 
those provisions will be interpreted narrowly and rarely, the potential is there for ICC action 
that illustrates what might be termed negative complementarity or at least the less positive 
side of complementarity.
This thesis went beyond and updated Leonard’s work by first embarking upon a 
detailed analysis of the jurisdictional provisions of the Statute and the notion of 
complementarity. Then the third chapter looked at the ICC framework that has been
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established since 1998 in the context of other international and internationalized criminal 
tribunals. The previous chapter then looked at the limited practice of the Court and the 
announced prosecution strategy of the Office of the Public Prosecutor. In light of the above, 
it is now time to re-examine the conclusions of Eric Leonard in order to determine whether 
exclusive authority has been ceded to the ICC, its type and its extent.
As may be recalled, Leonard in his first work concluded that the formation of the ICC 
was an example of a transformation from state-centered governance to non-state-centered 
governance. Leonard opined that states had ceded some of their authority to the ICC (a new 
sphere of authority), but retained much of their power. Further, he felt that, while states still 
had an important or critical role, they would not control the actions of the Court, as the state 
was no longer the final arbitrator in questions of authority. Speaking from a 
postintemationalist perspective, Leonard stated that he had seen a shift “from the 
Westphalian state to multiple spheres of authority, both at the sub-national and the 
supranational level” and considered the creation of the ICC as an example of such.
On the issue of transformation, I can concur that by creating a new institution there 
will by definition be a transformation or a shift. It is the exact nature of the transformation, 
however, that is worthy of deeper consideration.
By describing a movement beyond the modem state to a “third face of sovereignty” in 
his more recent work, Leonard seems to see the transformation as permanent and 
unidirectional. It is my opinion, however, that it is not a given that the transformation is 
fixed despite the fact that the ICC is now a permanent institution. As well, it is not a given 
that the transformation involves a movement in only one direction
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More specifically, the third chapter has shown that the ability of the ICC to assert 
jurisdiction (what one could call a jurisdictional shift) may be temporary and may go both 
ways. For example, it is only in a limited set of circumstances that the ICC can assert 
jurisdiction and there is no guarantee that the ICC will maintain it. In one case, ICC 
jurisdiction could revert back to a state or go to a different state under the principle of 
complementarity. In another case, ICC jurisdiction could effectively be temporarily or 
permanently vetoed by a state or a Security Council deferral respectively. As a result, in 
some cases the state may still control the actions of the court and may still be the final 
arbitrator in questions of authority.
Further, the jurisdictional shift may not be a complete shift. It may phase in and 
phase out such as, for example, when a state successfully defers ICC proceedings. Such a 
deferral can only be done for a limited period of time. Another example would be, as 
contemplated in the OTP policy paper, where the ICC and states co-prosecute persons that 
fall under the Statute or where the ICC commences proceedings, assists the state so that it is 
“able” to prosecute and then the ICC later sends the matter back to the state to prosecute.
By creating the ICC, states parties have obviously ceded some authority to the ICC. 
The handing over of such authority, however, is not necessarily permanent. For example, a 
state party has the right to withdraw from the Statute and has limited opt-out provisions. As 
well, the ultimate future of the ICC is largely dependent upon the ASP - a body of states that 
can conceivably widen or restrict the power of the ICC.
I agree with Leonard’s conclusion that states still have an important or critical role 
even within the ICC structure. This thesis, however, has disproved Leonard’s sweeping 
statement that the state is no longer the final arbitrator in questions of authority. The state
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has retained that authority in most cases. It is only in a very limited circumstance that the 
ICC could conceivably review a state decision not to investigate and/or prosecute. It is that 
judicial review component that is perhaps the most remarkable facet of the ICC framework.
In assessing the ultimate conclusion of Leonard that the creation of the ICC is an 
example of a transformation from state-centered governance to one of non-state-centered 
governance, one must remember that the type of change varies from situation to situation. 
This thesis has shown that there are in fact four different types of relationship between the 
ICC and states. First, a horizontal relationship occurs where a state prosecutes and the ICC, 
if necessary, assists or cooperates with it. Second, a vertical relationship occurs where the 
ICC ‘reviews’ a decision of a state to or not to prosecute and, upon a finding of unwillingness 
and the satisfaction of other preconditions, where the ICC goes against the state decision and 
prosecutes the perpetrator. Third, a vertical on top of vertical relationship can occur where 
the ICC has taken on the prosecution, but a state or the Security Council either defers it or a 
state takes on the prosecution itself. Fourth, a different type of horizontal relationship occurs 
where states parties refer situations in their own territory to the ICC such as was done in the 
cases of the DRC and Uganda. And yet another type of horizontal relationship exists when 
the ICC and a domestic court share personal jurisdiction with the ICC handling the more 
senior leaders and the domestic court handling others at a lower level.
In other words, depending upon the underlying circumstances that led to the ICC 
receiving jurisdiction, an investigation or prosecution may be horizontal in some cases and 
vertical in others. Further, it should be noted that, as the ICC takes on matters and asserts 
jurisdiction in individual situations or cases, it is also conceivable that the ICC may be using 
one or more of the above relationships around the world simultaneously. Accordingly,
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Leonard’s conclusion is too simplistic. The jurisdictional space occupied by the ICC is not 
fixed in time, space or territory and it is highly contingent and is not necessarily hierarchical 
in nature.
When the ICC framework and practice is considered in conjunction with other 
international or internationalized criminal tribunals, it is difficult to see any particular trend. 
In fact, on some levels the ICC involves a lesser transfer of authority than perhaps the other 
tribunals discussed in this thesis. The ICC is arguably on the whole more deferential to 
states than all of the other discussed tribunals.
In his more recent work, Leonard found that the jurisdiction of the ICC is quite broad 
whilst noting that, except for a Security Council referral, the trigger mechanisms limit the 
jurisdiction of the court and its ability to use its power. Leonard also concluded that by 
virtue of the notion of complementarity, the ICC can only assert jurisdiction “when the state 
failed to act according to the principles of international justice”. Lastly, similar to his 
previous conclusions, Leonard also considered the ICC as an example of a trend towards 
non-state authority wherein the state, although still a crucial agent, is no longer the privileged 
one. To him, the state “no longer holds supreme authority in the area of humanitarian 
law.” °^^
It may also be recalled that Leonard asked and briefly answered three questions in 
that analysis as follows:
1. Q. Does the ICC undermine the principles of state sovereignty?
A. Yes, it undermines the concept of state sovereignty but not sovereignty.
2. Q. What are the implications of this institution on sovereignty?
A. Sovereignty has changed and evolved so as to involve non-state authority.
3. Q. Can we consider the authority structure of the ICC a new form of sovereignty?
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A. Complementarity is a new form of sovereignty in a limited way. Specifically, 
he stated, the ICC maintains supreme authority with no higher authority and a 
clear set of spatial boundaries only within the realm of humanitarian law.”^^"*
In response to Leonard’s newer work, this thesis has shown that the three core crimes 
that fall within the ICC’s mandate are not broad. Instead they are narrow. All the same, 
however, the mechanisms that trigger such jurisdiction severely limit the jurisdiction of the 
court and its ability to exercise its power. In my opinion, Leonard was also wrong when he 
interpreted complementarity as limiting the court’s jurisdiction so that it could only assert 
jurisdiction when a state failed to act according to the principles of international justice. In 
fact, practice has shown that the ICC has accepted jurisdiction when the affected state 
referred a case involving its own territory or its own nationals and that the notion of 
complementarity need not necessarily be applied to a Security Council Chapter VII referral 
as was done in relation to the situation in the Sudan. In addition the OTP foresees ICC 
prosecutions as possible in more situations including where (1) the parties who would 
otherwise have jurisdiction see the ICC as the only neutral and impartial venue and (2) all 
parties agree that the ICC is the more effective forum.
Lastly, it is difficult to determine whether the creation of the ICC is indicative of a 
“trend” and, in particular, an example of a change from state-centered governance to non­
state-centered governance. Admittedly, in a limited set of circumstances one could arrive at 
this conclusion especially if one focuses on the vertical relationship scenario discussed 
above. But before one arrives at a final answer on this point, one should look to the rest of 
the ICC framework and practice as well as developments post-Rome. The ICC framework 
and practice clearly indicates a considerable respect for and deference to state actions.
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Since Rome, other international and internationalized criminal tribunals have been 
created and, when they are compared with the ICC, it is much more difficult to discern a 
“trend”. The creation of the ICC has not stopped the creation of other international and 
internationalized tribunals and their form (which has not remained consistent) has not 
necessarily mirrored that of the ICC and their set up in some ways is more deferential to the 
state courts and other ways less deferential to the state courts. No discernable trend can also 
be seen from their source, status, jurisdictional limits (subject-matter, territorial and 
temporal), life span and their fit either inside or outside the domestic courts.
As well, even if any trend could be discerned, looking at the events before Rome 
(including the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR), it may be argued that except for the 
limited circumstance noted above, there is a trend back towards state-centered governance. 
In fact, the ICTY and the ICTR may have been the high-water mark of going beyond state 
courts with their original version of primacy.
While the ICC is certainly an institution that is different than any of the other 
available legal mechanisms, it is also not a given that priority treatment will be given to 
states (complementarity) when other international or internationalized tribunals enter the 
picture. This is an area that will become clearer over time.
While I agree with Leonard’s opinion that there are now multiple spheres of 
authority, he was in my view partially incorrect when he said that the state had been 
subsumed by the ICC. That assessment over-simplified a complicated relationship and, by 
doing so, ignored the fact that the state was still inextricably part of the process. As well, this 
thesis has shown that those spheres of authority are not necessarily exclusive and 
“interaction” is likely to occur.
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In my opinion there is now no permanent absolute autonomy of the ICC or states in 
the field of international criminal justice. The authority may at times lie with a state or with 
the ICC and at times the final authority may be shared because of an overlap. Prescient 
comments by Mireille Delmas-Marty can, therefore, close this thesis:
complementarity means neither the absolute autonomy of national and 
international systems of criminal justice, nor the strict subordination of one to 
the other. As a result, it is difficult to understand the whole system by 
reference to traditional concepts of legal systems based on hierarchical 
principles.^°^
Where Do We Go From Here?
This thesis has attempted to contribute to the research in this field by critically 
examining the ICC framework, taking into account the limited available indicia of its 
practice, in order to ascertain its effect. Consideration was also made of the recent 
proliferation of other international or internationalized tribunals so as to minimize inaccurate 
generalizations and to include contextual variables that are rarely considered in the study of 
the ICC.
First, a literature review revealed that the literature easily links the ICC with the 
notion of sovereignty but does not engage in sophisticated critical analysis either of 
sovereignty or the related notion of jurisdiction. Further, more often than not state-centric 
vocabulary enters into the equation and, in particular, the idea that sovereignty is an absolute, 
exclusive, intransigent concept that will not change over time and that is linked to the state in 
time and territory. After having reviewed the American position on the ICC, it became 
evident that a good part of the literature simply echoes that view and reflects the theoretical 
stance upon which it is based.
1 2 0
Second, an attempt was then made to examine the ICC framework in detail through 
adding to the research of Eric Leonard. That analysis showed that in fact the relationship 
between states and the ICC is more complicated than first thought. In addition to its 
international legal personality, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction in conjunction with or in 
contradiction to the state.
There are, however, a number of areas that this thesis could not cover. First, because 
of the complexity of the ICC framework and space limitations, a true analysis of the 
proliferation of courts and tribunals outside of the criminal context was not possible. 
Fascinating work is currently being done by the Project on International Courts and 
Tribunals. In this regard the project is currently looking at the proliferation of courts and 
bodies outside the criminal arena including specialized tribunals, economic-related tribunals 
and regional courts. Similarly, apart from specific international and/or internationalized 
courts and their comparison to the ICC, this thesis does not discuss the impact of domestic 
courts practicing international law within their jurisdictions and their interpretation of 
international law and the inevitable cross-fertilization that may occur in each direction. As 
well, this thesis did not address the inter-relationship between the ICC and international and 
internationalized criminal tribunals despite the fact that there is little doubt that we will have 
the ICC and national courts and international criminal tribunals and internationalized 
criminal tribunals all working at the same time around the world.
Second, there were some serious limitations to this study because of the very nature 
of the two subjects chosen -  sovereignty and the ICC. In that regard, sovereignty remains a 
contested subject and to some is indefinable. The criteria upon which efforts were made to 
look for it were based on the traditional notion of sovereignty, as it would be the easiest to
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discern. Litfin, however, is correct, in my opinion, when she states that sovereignty is a 
multidimensional concept. Should better measuring vehicles be available, this research 
should be supplemented with further study. As well, the ability to study the ICC is somewhat 
hampered by virtue of the fact that it is so new and does not yet have a record upon which to 
assess its performance including its legitimacy and effectiveness.
Third, while the focus of this study was primarily the ICC and the state, future
research should be done on the inter-relationship between the ICC and states and other non­
state actors including, for example, the Security Council and international and
internationalized tribunals.
The ICC causes one to reconsider the boundary between domestic and international 
law and to ask whether that boundary is really as clear as we normally assume it to be. Is it 
simply a fiction created because of the underlying theoretical premises of political science, 
domestic law, international relations and international law?
The Secretary-General in August 2004 described the creation of the ICC as
“undoubtedly, the most significant recent development in the international community’s long 
struggle to advance the course of justice and rule of law.” °^^  Further, the Secretary-General 
stated that, “[i]t is now crucial that the international community ensure that this nascent 
institution has the resources, capacities, information and support it needs to investigate, 
prosecute and bring to justice those who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide, in situations where national authorities are unable or 
unwilling to do so. The Security Council has a particular role to play in this regard, 
empowered as it is to refer situations to the International Criminal Court, even in cases where 
the countries concerned are not [sjtates parties to the Statute of the C o u r t . 1 am excited
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about the future prospects of the ICC especially if, with that necessary political will, it will 
more often than not work side by side and together with national courts so that the net closes 
in on those who commit the most heinous of acts. In closing, I hope this thesis has 
demonstrated that more questions should be asked about the jurisdictional impact of the ICC 
and what that means for states and non-state actors around the world.
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1946. T.I.A.S. No. 1589. See also Beigbeder, pp. 54-58. 
Ball, p. 76.
131
Beigbeder, p. 55.
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pp. 68 and 69, a former policy adviser to the SRSG, describes the status issue as the “most prominent challenge 
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^  UNM lK/REG/2001/8 “On the Establishment o f  the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council” (6 April
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^  Ibid, chapter 1, section 1.4.
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Violations o f  Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 attached to the Letter dated 24 June 2005  
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President o f  the Security Council, S /2005/458. Specifically, Report 
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the senior political affairs officer in UNAM ET, UNATET and UNMISET.
Report o f  the International Commission o f  Inquiry o f  East Timor A /54/726, S /2000/59 (January 2000).
Elizabeth Neuffer, “Lagging Tribunal Is Called a Threat to a Viable East Timor” Boston Globe (September 
2, 2001). Internet: http://www.globalpolicv.org/security/issues/etimor/vote01/0902critic.htm,
UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (27 November 1999); UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (6 March 2000); 
UNTAET/REG/2000/14 (10 May 2000) and UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000). UNTAET Regulations 
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to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in "Khmer Rouge leaders to stay in jail", BBC News Online, November 
16, 2001. Internet: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid 1659000/1659536.stm.
Shraga in Romano et al. (2004), p. 18.
Etcheson in Romano et al. (2004), pp. 203 to 205
Report o f the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials (12 October 2004) A /59/432, paragraph 27 
(hereafter known as the 2004 Khmer Rouge Trials Report). W hile this new set o f negotiations, according to the 
United Nations, improved on the earlier draft Agreement, the Secretary-General still expressed concerns about 
the court: Report o f the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials (12 October 2004) A/59/432, paragraph 27. 
The General Assembly, however, approved the draft Agreement: Report o f the Secretary-General on Khmer 
Rouge Trials (31 March 2003), UN Doc. A/57/769 [79]; General Assembly Resolution 57/228B (13 May
2003); and Shraga in Romano et al. (2004), p. 19.
UNGA Res 57/228 on Khmer Rouge Trials (22 May 2003); 2004 Khmer Rouge Trials Report, p. 2 and 
Addendum A /59/432/A dd.l at p. 1.
U N News Service, “Agreement between United Nations and Cambodia on Khmer Rouge trials takes effect” 
Internet: http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=14134.
^^^Law NS/RK M /0801/I2, adopted in its final version by the National Assembly on 11 July 2001, approved by 
the Senate on 2 3  July 2 0 0 1 , pronounced as being fully in accordance with the Constitution by the Constitutional 
Council in its Decision 043/005/2001 KBth Ch (7 August 2001) and signed by the Cambodian king on 10 
August 2001. Internet translation in English: http://csf.colorado.edu/bcas/main-cas/camb-law.htm/ and 
www.derechos.org/human-rights/seasia/doc/krlaw.html.
^  Ernestine E. Meijer “The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts o f Cambodia for Prosecuting Crimes 
Committed by the Khmer Rouge: Jurisdiction, Organization, and Procedure o f  an Internationalized National 
Tribunal”, Chapter 11 in Romano et al. (2004), compares in detail the differences between the Law and the
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Agreement and considers where there may be need for amendment o f  the law and where there may be problems 
with clarity and/or with the application o f the documents so as to ensure a fair trial.
Articles 1 to 8 o f the Law; Preamble, paragraph 3 and Article 1, Article 2, paragraph 1, Article 9 o f  the 
Agreement.
Articles 1 and 2 o f  the Law; Preamble, paragraph 3 and Articles 1, 2, 5 and 6 o f the Agreement.
Articles 1 to 8 o f the Law; Preamble o f the Agreement. See also Meijer in Romano et al. (2004), pp. 207 and 
211 .
^  Article 3, paragraph 2 o f  the Agreement.
Article 43 o f the Law.
Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials (31 March 2003), pp. 16 and 17.
Articles 15 to 17 o f the Agreement; and Report o f the Secretary-General on the Khmer Rouge Trials, supra, 
at p. 4.
Article 3, Article 5, paragraph 1, Article 6, paragraph 1 and Article 7 o f  the Cambodian Agreement; 
Articles 16 and 23 o f the Law.
Article 25 o f the Agreement.
Article 28 o f the Agreement.
Article 46 o f the Law.
See Meijer in Romano et al. (2004), pp. 220-221.
Shraga in Romano et al. (2004), p. 29.
Statute, Preamble, paragraph 9 and Articles 1 and 4.
Statute, Article 4, Privileges/Immunity Agreement, Article 2; and Negotiated Relationship Agreement, 
Article 2.
Antonio Cassese (2001), pp. 70-72.
See Reparations fo r  Injuries Suffered in the Sendee o f  the United Nations, Advisory Opinion o f 11 April 
1949, [1949] ICJ Rep 174 regarding the United Nations having international legal personality and Kenneth S. 
Gallant, “The International Criminal Court in the System o f States and International Organizations’’ Leiden 
Journal o f  International Law  16 (2003), p. 555, discussing the International Seabed Authority as another 
example. See also C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles o f  the Institutional Law o f  International Organizations (New  
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 85.
Statute, Article 4; Privileges/Immunities Agreement, Article 2.
Gallant, pp. 561-569.
Cassese (2001), pp. 73-75. Specifically see Statute, Article 48 and Privileges/Immunities Agreement, Article
3.
Statute, Article 4, paragraph 2.
Statute, Article 54, paragraph 2, Article 57, paragraph 3 (d) and Part 9 o f  the Statute.
Statute, Article 3, paragraph 3. See also Article 62: “Unless otherwise decided, the place o f the trial shall be 
the seat o f the Court.”
Rule 100.
Statute, Article 12.
The possibility o f  giving the ICC universal jurisdiction was discussed at length at Rome, but dismissed: see 
for example, Gennady M. Danilenko, “ICC Statute and Third Parties” Chapter 48 in Cassese et al. (2002), p. 
1876.
Statute, Article 13(a) and the procedure for such a referral is set out in Articles 14 and 18, paragraph 1. 
Proprio motu meaning o f their own accord: Article 13(c) and the required procedure for such is found in 
Statute, Articles 15 and 18, paragraph 1.
Statute, Article 13(b) and no specific procedure is articulated in the Statute.
Statute, A rtic le  11, paragraph I, A rtic le  2 2 , A rtic le  2 4  and A rtic le  126. S tatu te, A rtic le  11, paragraph 2 a lso  
states that, if  a state become a party to the Statute after it enters into force, the Court may only exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes after the entry into force o f the Statute and before the state became a party, if the state 
has made an Article 12, paragraph 3 declaration giving the Court such jurisdiction.
Reference may also be made to the Chapter 3 o f  the Rules which deals with jurisdiction and admissibility 
and with Statute, Articles 11-19.
The Statute invokes the concept o f complementarity and primacy. Primacy means having the first right 
(should that be the wish) to prosecute an alleged perpetrator. The term complementarity will be analyzed in 
detail later in this chapter.
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Statute, Article 1, Article 25, paragraphs 1 and 2 and Articles 26 and 27.
See Statute, Article 33 which deals with the criminal responsibility o f a person who, pursuant to a 
Government order, commits a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, is not relieved o f criminal responsibility. 
Reference may also be made to the definition o f  crimes against humanity (Statute, Article 7(2)(a) “attack 
directed against any civilian population” and Statute, Article 7(2)(i) “enforced disappearance o f persons”) 
where state involvement is a prerequisite.
Statute, Article 1. It should be noted that the wording is slightly different in paragraphs 4 and 9 o f the 
Preamble which state; “the most serious crimes o f  concern to the international community as a whole.”
Statute, Article 17, paragraph 1(d).
Statute, Article 53, paragraphs I and 2. In arriving at a decision about the “interests o f justice”, the 
Prosecutor is required to take into account all o f  the circumstances, “including the gravity o f the crime, the 
interests o f the victims and the age or infirmity o f the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged 
crime.”
Statute, Article 12(2) and (3).
The historical use o f  Chapter V ll o f  the Charter o f the United Nations has been very limited. Most recently, 
it was used to create the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR). This raises some very interesting questions as to the kind o f cases that may end up before 
the Court assuming there is no veto by any o f  the permanent members.
International Commission Report, paragraphs 583 to 589; Press Release relating to the Darfur Security 
Council Resolution and particularly strong language against the referral as an indication o f the Sudanese 
government’s position.
Statute, Article 16.
Statute, Article 18, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.
Statute, Article 18, paragraph 1.
Statute, Article 17, paragraph 1.
Statute, Article 17, paragraph 2 and 3.
Statute, Article 17, paragraphs 2 and 3.
Statute, Article 19.
Statute, Article 19, paragraph 1.
Statute, Article 19, paragraph 2.
Reference may be made to the cumulative effect o f  Statute, Article 18, paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 7.
Cassese (1999), p. 158.
Newton, pp. 26-27.
Statute, Preamble, paragraphs 4 and 10. Reference may also be made to Statute, Articles 1 and 15, 17, 18 and 
19 is the framework.
John T. Holmes, “Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC” Chapter 18.1 in Cassese et al. (2002), 
pp. 670- 672; Susan Hannah Farbstein, “The Effectiveness o f  the Exercise o f  Jurisdiction by the International 
Criminal Court: The Issue o f Complementarity” European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMl) Working Paper 
#12 (August 2001), pp. 21-33. See for example. Holm es in Cassese et al. (2002), pp. 671-672 and Jeffrey L. 
Bleich, “Complementarity” D enver Journal o f  International Law and Policy 25 (1997), pp. 281-292.
Holmes in Cassese et al. (2002), p. 673.
See Newton, pp. 44-47; John T. Holmes, “The Principle o f  Complementarity” in The International Criminal 
Court: The Making o f  the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations, Results, edited by Roy S. Lee (The Hague, 
London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp. 41, 43; Ward, p. 1132.
McKeon, p. 555.
R oelof Haveman, Legal Training and the ICC -  A Steep Learning Curve- Contribution To An Expert 
C o n su lta tio n  P ro c e s s  on  G e n e ra l Issu es R e le v a n t to  th e  IC C  O ffice  o f  the  P ro se c u to r .  (15 April 2003), ICC- 
OTP 2003.
Statute, Preamble, paragraph 6
Rules, Chapters 11 and 12.
Statute, Articles 86 and 93.
Statute, Article 89.
Statute, Article 88.
Statute, Article 87, paragraph 1.
Statute, Article 87, paragraph 5.
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Statute, Article 110.
Statute, Article 87, paragraph 5(b) and paragraph 7.
408
409
Statute, Article 103, paragraph 1. 
Cassese (1999), pp. 164-167.
Statute, Article 72.
As may be evidenced elsewhere in this thesis, I do not accept the idea that boundaries are fixed and that 
states are watertight.
Statute, Preamble, paragraphs 7 and 8.
Statute, Article 20, paragraph 3.
For example, see Statute, Article 99, paragraph 1.
Statute, Article 90, Article 93, paragraph 9. See also Statute. Articles 97(c) and 98.
Statute, Article 93, paragraph 3.
Statute, Article 94.
Statute, Articles 72 and 93, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.
Statute, Article 120.
Statute, Article 127 regarding total withdrawal from the Statute and Article 121, paragraph 6 regarding total 
withdrawal due to a successful amendment to which a state party does not accept.
The Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331.
Madeline Morris, “High Crimes and Misconceptions; The ICC and Non-Party States” in Shelton (2000). See 
also Madeline Morris, “High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States” Law and  
Contemporary Problems 64 (2001), pp. 13-66, which modifies that chapter; and Lietzau.
Michael P. Scharf, “The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over The Nationals o f  Non-Party States: A Critique o f  the U.S. 
Position” Law and Contemporary Problems 64 (2001), pp. 67-117.
Danilenko in Cassese et al. (2002), pp. 1871-1872.
D. Sarooshi, “Aspects o f the Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations” 
Netherlands Yearbook o f  International Law  32 (2001), pp. 27-53.
ASP Report, pp. 5-6; Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the 
United Nations, ICC-ASP/3/Res.l, ASP Report, pp. 243-251. See also the now outdated article o f Darryl A. 
Mundis, “The Assembly o f  States Parties and the Institutional Framework o f the International Criminal Court” 
American Journal o f  International Law  97 (2003), p. 133.
United Nations Charter, Chapter VII.
Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Toward a theory of effective supranational adjudication” 
Yale Law Journal 107 (1997), pp. 273-391.
Heifer and Slaughter citing Forest L. Grieves, Supranationalism and International Adjudication  (Urbana: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1969), p. 14.
Report o f  Prosecutor o f  the ICC to the Second Assembly o f  States Parties, 8 September 2003, p.2 (hereafter 
ICC Prosecutor Report).
“Prosecutor receives referral o f the situation in the Democratic Republic o f Congo” ICC Press Release (19 
April 2004).
ICC Prosecutor Report, p.2.
Ibid, p. 4.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 5 and “The Prosecutor on the cooperation with Congo and other States regarding the situation in 
Ituri, DRC” ICC Press Release (26 September 2003).
See endnote 4 3 1.
Decision, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04 (July 5, 2004).
438 “Yhe Office o f  the Prosecutor o f  the International Criminal Court opens its first investigation” ICC Press 
Release (23 June 2004) and “First M ission to the Democratic Republic o f Congo” ICC Press Release (30 July
2004).
“President o f  Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC” ICC Press 
Release (29 January 2004). See also ICC Press Release, 23 February 2004.
Decision, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/04 (July 5, 2004).
Decision assigning the situation to Pre-Trial Chamber III, ICC-01/05 (19 January 2005).
Security Council Resolution 1593, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005). See also The Report o f  the International 
Commission o f  Inquiry on Darfur to  the United Nations Secretary-General, UN Doc. S /2005/60 pursuant to
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Security Council Resolution 1564, UN Doc. S/RES/1564 (2004) (hereafter the Darfur Report). The Darfur 
Report, paragraphs 568 to 570, found that the Sudanese courts are unable and unwilling to prosecute and try the 
alleged offenders and recommended that there be a referral by the Security Council to the ICC and that a 
Compensation Commission be created to provide compensation to the victims.
Security Council Resolution 1593, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).
Ibid.
“The Prosecutor o f the International Criminal Court reports to the United Nations Security Council on the 
Situation in Darfur" ICC Press Release (29 June 2005), ICC-OTP/20050629.052-EN.
‘'‘'^Statement o f  the Prosecutor o f the International Criminal Court Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo to the Security 
Council on 29 June 2005 Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), p. 3; Report of the Prosecutor o f the International 
Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), pp. 4 and 
6 .
Ibid.
The Darfur Report, however, specifically rejected the possibility o f  expanding the mandate o f an existing ad 
hoc tribunal; rejected the possibility o f  creating a new ad hoc tribunal; rejected the possibility o f  establishing 
mixed composition courts; and did not recommend the use o f  other state courts -  see paragraphs 573 to 582 and 
paragraphs 604 to 616.
United Nations Press Release SC8351 (31 March 2005).
Statement o f Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking o f the Chief Prosecutor 
(June 16, 2003).
While there has also been some speculation as to whether the Security Council could alter affect the ICC by 
either limiting or expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction, the ICC-UN relationship precludes otherwise.
Summary o f  recommendations received during the first Public Hearing o f the Office o f the Prosecutor, 
convened from 17-18 June 2003 at The Hague, Comments and Conclusions o f  the Office o f the Prosecutor. 
Both the policy paper and draft regulations are available at the ICC website.
Verbatim transcripts o f  the hearing are available at the OTP website found on the ICC website.
Summary, pp. 2-4.
ICC Prosecutor Report, p. 5.
Paper on some policy issues before the Office o f  the Prosecutor (Septem ber 2003), p.2.
Ibid, pp. 3 and 8-9.
Ibid, p. 7.
Ibid, pp. 2-3.
Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid, pp. 2-3.
Ibid, p. 4.
Annex to the "Paper on some po licy  issues before the Office o f  the Prosecu tor” Referrals and 
Communications (OTP-ICC 2003).
Ibid, p. 5.
Bodley, p. 439.
Ibid, p. 458.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment on the Request o f  the Republic o f Croatia for Review o f the Decision of 
Trial Chamber II o f 18 July 1997, Case No. IT-95-14-ARIOSbis (Oct. 29, 1997).
Bodley, p. 463.
Ibid.
Reference may be made to Bodley at p. 435 quoting from Letter dated 19 May 1993 from the Charge 
D ’Affaires A.I. o f  the Permanent M ission o f Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations 
A d d ressed  to the Secretary-G en era l, U N  D o c . A /4 8 /1 7 0 -S /2 5 8 0 1  (1 9 9 3 ).
“D ecision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction”, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 
Case No.; IT-94-1-IAR72, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995. Judges Li, Abi-Saab and Sidhwa appended 
separate opinions to the Decision o f the Appeals Chamber. While this thesis only cites the main decision 
(unless noted otherwise), the separate opinions also provide for an interesting read.
An interlocutory appeal is an interim appeal before the completion o f a trial. W hile the above decision 
involved an interlocutory decision by the Appeals Chamber, it has since been held to have the same status as a 
final decision on appeal: “Judgement”, “Celebici Case", Case No.; IT-96-2I-A, Appeals Chamber, 20 February 
2001, paragraph. 122.
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Tadic, paragraph 6.
Ibid, paragraph 10.
Ibid, paragraphs 11-12 and 18.
Ibid, paragraphs 55.
Ibid, paragraph 58.
Ibid, 59 quoting Decision at Trial, para. 42.
Ibid, paragraphs 56 and 57. The ICTR shares same appeals chamber as ICTY, therefore Tadic decision also 
bind the ICTR. See also Prosecutor  v. Kanyabashi (Jurisdiction) (18 June 1997) ICTR-96-I5-IT.
Security Council Resolution 808, UN Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
Newton, p. 41.
For example, ICTY Statute, Article 30.
Article 18 and for example. Rules 37-42.
Bodley, pp. 447 to 452 outlines some o f the problems with state cooperation.
^  The ICTY budget for 2002-2003 is greater than US$223 million -  see 
http://www.un.org/ictv/glance/index.htm.
Prosecutor v. Kallon, Norman and Kamara, Case Numbers SC SL-2004-15-A R72(E), SCSL 2004-14- 
AR72(E) and SCSL 2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Constitutionality and Lack o f Jurisdiction, (13 March
2004).
Paragraphs 49 to 52.
^  The preamble to Security Council Resolution I3I5 , UN Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000), it “made clear that the 
Special Court was established to fulfil and international mandate and is part o f  the machinery o f international 
justice.”
Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case Number SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (Appeals 
Chamber), (31 May 2004), paragraphs 34 to 42. See also Prosecutor v. Kallon, Norman and Kamara, (13 
March 2004); and Prosecutor v. Kallon and Kamara, Case Numbers SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16- 
AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty (13 March 2004).
Ibid, paragraph 4L
Case concerning Arrest Warrant o f  11 April 2000 (Dem ocratic Republic o f  Congo v. Belgium) (2002) ICJ 
Reports, (14 February 2002) (also known by some as the “Yerodia case”), paragraph 51.
Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case Number SC SL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack o f  
Jurisdiction: Establishment o f  Special Court Violates Constitution o f Sierra Leone, (25 May 2004) (Appeals 
Chamber), paragraph 13.
'’’^Ibid, paragraph 16.
Ibid, paragraphs 15; 17 and 18. This case also shows the difficulty with trying to label and classify items and 
place them in their respective pigeon-holes. For example, to the SCSL, the SCSL is an international court. To 
Doherty, supra, the SCSL is a hybrid and to Archibold, the SCSL is a national court: Archibold, International 
Criminal Courts Practice, Procedure and Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 2003, London) sees SCSL as a 
not an international tribunal -  “spearheaded by the national system, with an injection o f international assistance. 
An international tribunal is thus not imposed or instituted to replace the domestic system ” at p. 30.
Prosecutor v. Kondewa, (25 May 2004) (Appeals Chamber), paragraph 15.
Ibid, paragraphs 19, 26 and 27.
Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case Number SCSL-2004-15-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motion on the Invalidity of 
the Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government o f  Sierra Leone on the Establishment o f the 
Special Court, (25 May 2004) (Appeals Decision), paragraph 6.
Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case Number SCSL-2004-I4-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack o f  
Jurisdiction Materiae: Illegal Delegation o f Powers by the United Nations, (25 May 2004) (Appeals Chamber), 
paragraphs 3 and 5.
Ibid, pp 622, 626 and 630.
Ruffert, pp. 627-630.
Ruffert, pp. 622 and 623. It should be noted that Ruffert, however, also notes at p. 623 that “[fjrom another 
perspective the fabric woven by the manifold regulations establishes the legal system o f the territories 
concerned; it is the law o f K osovo or law o f East-Timor” and that the “UN-legislation and municipal legal 
provisions are complementing each other”
The question o f how the ICC inter-relates with other existing international or internationalized tribunals is an 
interesting one and beyond the scope o f this thesis.
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Ms. Frulli’s view that the different route taken may have been to ensure that the state concerned was 
involved as much as possible is likely correct.
Leonard, at pp. 94 and 101-102.
^  Ibid, p. 103.
Mireille Delmas-Marty, “The ICC and the Interaction o f International and National Legal System s” Volume 
II, Chapter 50, The Rome Statute o f  the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press,
2002) p. 1915.
The rule o f  law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Report o f the Secretary- 
General, 3 August 2004, S/2(X)4/616 at p. 16.
'"'Ibid.
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Table 1
CO M PARISO N OF INTERN A TIO N AL AND IN TE RN A TIO N AL IZE D  C R IM IN A L TR IB U N A LS BEFO RE A N D  A FT E R  T H E 1998 RO M E STATUTE^
ICTY
(1993)
ICTR
(1994)
Kosovo Regulation 6 and 64 
Panels (UNMIK) 
(2000)
Special Panels and 
Serious Crimes Unit 
(UNTAET) (2000)
Special Court for 
Sierra Leone 
(2002)
Extraordinary
Chambers
Cambodia
(2005)
Source Security Council 
Resolution under 
Chapter VII -  direct
Security Council 
Resolution under 
Chapter VII -direct
Security Council 
Resolution under 
Chapter VII -  indirect
Security Council 
Resolution under 
Chapter VII -  
indirect
Agreement 
Between United 
Nations and 
Sierra Leone -  
Security Council 
indirect and see 
Talyor case
Agreement 
between the 
United Nations 
and Cambodia^
Status Tribunal separate 
from state
Tribunal separate from 
state
Special international or 
mixed panels separate from 
but within domestic court 
system as defined by the 
United Nations; no 
specialized tribunal
Special mixed 
panels separate from 
but within domestic 
court system as 
defined by the 
United Nations, no 
specialized tribunal
‘Court’ separate 
from domestic 
courts
‘Court separate 
from domestic 
courts
International versus 
internationalized
International International Internationalized Internationalized International Internationalized 
and likely  
international
' This Chart does not include the IMT or the IMTFE as both ceased to exist decades ago and given the criticisms that they were ‘victor’s justice’ as noted above. This 
Chart also does not include the recently created War Crime Chamber (WCC) and the Special War Crimes Department in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate tribunal 
given its relation to the ICTY. Other tribunals have been recommended in other parts o f the world and this list may grow in the near future.
See also the Law on the Establishment o f  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts o f  Cambodia for the Prosecution o f  Crimes Committed during the Period o f  
Democratic Kampuchea.
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ICTY
(1993)
ICTR
(1994)
Kosovo Regulation 6 and 64 
Panels (UNMIK) 
(2000)
Special Panels and 
Serious Crimes Unit 
(UNTAET) (2000)
Special Court for 
Sierra Leone 
(2002)
Extraordinary
Chambers
Cambodia
(2005)
Jurisdiction 
a. subject matter Grave breaches o f the 
Geneva conventions 
of 1949, violations of 
the laws or customs o f  
war, genocide and 
crimes against 
humanity; serious 
violations of 
international 
humanitarian law 
committed in the 
territory of the former 
Yugoslavia; not 
conflict specific and 
not limited to any 
particular side
Genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations 
o f Article 3 o f  the 
Geneva Conventions and 
of the Additional 
Protocol II (Articles 2- 
4); serious violations o f  
international 
humanitarian law  
committed in the 
territory o f  Rwanda and 
Rwandan citizens 
responsible for such 
violations committed in 
the territory o f  
neighbouring states; not 
conflict specific and not 
limited to any particular 
side
Domestic law and UNMIK  
regulations; when local 
judges/prosecutors 
Cannot or ought not 
to do it, not 
conflict specific and 
not limited to any 
particular side
Serious criminal 
offences (genocide, 
war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, 
murder, sexual 
offences and 
torture); committed 
in East Timor or by 
an East Timorese 
citizen or where the 
victim was an East 
Timorese citizen; 
not conflict specific 
and not limited to 
any particular side
Crimes against 
humanity, 
violations of 
Article 3 
common to the 
Geneva
Conventions of  
August 12, 1949 
and o f  Additional 
Protocol II o f  
June 8, 1977, 
listed serious 
violations o f  
international 
humanitarian law  
and listed crimes 
under Sierra 
Leonean law; to 
prosecute those 
who bear the 
greatest
responsibility for 
the above crimes 
committed in the 
territory o f  Sierra 
Leone; not 
conflict specific 
and not limited 
to any particular 
side
The crime of  
genocide as 
defined in the
1948 Convention 
on the Prevention 
and Punishment 
o f the Crime of  
Genocide, crimes 
against humanity 
as defined in the 
1998 Rome 
Statute and grave 
breaches o f  the
1949 Geneva 
Conventions and 
such other crimes 
as defined in 
Chapter II o f the 
Law on the 
Establishment of 
the Extraordinary 
Chambers as 
promulgated on 
10 August 2001; 
senior leaders of  
Democratic 
Kampuchea who 
were most 
responsible for 
the above crimes; 
conflict specific
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ICTY
(1993)
ICTR
(1994)
Kosovo Regulation 6 and 64 
Panels (UNMIK) 
(2000)
Special Panels and 
Serious Crimes Unit 
(UNTAET) (2000)
Special Court for 
Sierra Leone 
(2002)
Extraordinary
Chambers
Cambodia
(2005)
but not limited to 
any side
b. territory
Former Socialist 
Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, but it sits 
in The Hague and it 
can sit elsewhere with 
permission
Rwanda and offences 
committed in the 
territory o f neighbouring 
states, but it sits in 
Tanzania and it can sit 
elsewhere with 
permission
Territory o f  Former Socialist 
Federal Republic o f  
Yugoslavia and sits in 
Kosovo but the panels can 
hear evidence in other 
jurisdictions
East Timor and sat 
in East Timor 
(especially D ili) but 
the special panels 
could hear evidence 
in other jurisdictions
Territory of 
Sierra Leone and 
sits in Sierra 
Leone (although 
can sit outside if  
certain 
preconditions 
exist)
Cambodia and 
sits in Phnom  
Penh, Cambodia
c. temporal
Retroactive and open 
ended
Retroactive and one 
month
Retroactive and open ended Retroactive Retroactive and 
open ended
Retroactive
International legal 
personality
No No Yes because part o f  an 
interim administration
Yes as part o f  an 
interim
administration
Yes No
Relationship with 
domestic courts
•  Not within the 
domestic court 
system
•  Not within the 
domestic court 
system
• Beside and within the 
domestic court system  
as defined by the United 
Nations
•  Beside and 
within the 
domestic court 
system as 
defined by the 
United Nations
•  Not in 
domestic 
court system
• Not within 
the dom estic 
court system
•  Concurrent •  Concurrent •  Concurrent jurisdiction^ • Concurrent •  Concurrent •  Concurrent
Also concurrent with ICTY and ICTY has primacy over Kosovo Regulation 6 and 64 panels.
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ICTY
(1993)
ICTR
(1994)
Kosovo Regulation 6 and 64 
Panels (UNMIK) 
(2000)
Special Panels and 
Serious Crimes Unit 
(UNTAET) (2000)
Special Court for 
Sierra Leone 
(2002)
Extraordinary
Chambers
Cambodia
(2005)
jurisdiction jurisdiction jurisdiction jurisdiction jurisdiction
•  Primacy and later 
changed to 
limited primacy 
by rule
amendment and
completion
strategy
• Primacy and later 
changed to limited 
primacy by rule 
amendment and 
completion strategy
•  Primacy •  Primacy •  Primacy 
towards 
Sierra 
Leonean 
courts, but 
no primacy 
to other 
states
•  Primacy
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Table 2
CO M PA R ISO N  O F TH E IN TE R N A TIO N A L C R IM IN A L C O U R T W ITH O TH ER IN T E R N A T IO N A L  
AND IN TE R N A TIO N AL IZE D  CRIM INAL TRIBUN A LS B E FO R E  A ND AFTER  TH E 1998 R O M E  STATUTE
I. ICTY (1993)
II. ICTR (1994)
Kosovo Panels 
(UNMIK) 
(2000)
Special Panels and 
Serious Crimes Unit 
(UNTAET) 
(2000)
SCSL
(2002)
ICC
(2002)
Extraordinary Chambers 
Cambodia 
(2005)
Source Both created by 
different 
Security Council 
Resolutions 
under Chapter 
VII -  direct
Security Council 
Resolution under 
Chapter VII -  
indirect
Security Council 
Resolution under 
Chapter VII - 
indirect
Agreement 
between United 
Nations and 
Sierra Leone
Multilateral
treaty
Agreement between the 
United Nations and 
Cambodia*
Status Both tribunals 
separate from 
state
Special international 
or mixed panels 
located within 
domestic court 
system as defined by 
United Nations; no 
specialized tribunal
Special mixed 
panels located 
within the domestic 
court system as 
defined by United 
Nations, no 
specialized tribunal
‘Court’ separate 
from domestic 
courts
Court ‘Court’ separate from 
domestic courts
Duration I. Temporary
II. Temporary
Temporary Temporary Temporary Permanent Temporary
International or I. International Internationalized Internationalized International International Internationalized and
' See also the Law on the Establishment o f  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts o f  Cambodia for the Prosecution o f  Crimes Committed during the 
Period o f Democratic Kampuchea.
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1. iCTY(1993) 
li. iCTR (1994)
Kosovo Panels 
(UNMIK) 
(2000)
Special Panels and 
Serious Crimes Unit 
(UNTAET) 
(2000)
SCSL
(2002)
ICC
(2002)
Extraordinary Chambers 
Cambodia 
(2005)
Internationalized II. International likely international
International 
legal personality
Both no Yes but part o f  
interim
administration
Yes but part o f  
interim
administration
Yes Yes No
Reiationship 
with nationai 
courts
Both
• Not within 
the domestic 
court system
• Concurrent 
jurisdiction
•  Beside and 
within the 
domestic court 
system
•  Concurrent 
jurisdiction^
•  Beside and 
within the 
domestic court 
system
•  Concurrent 
jurisdiction
•  Not in 
domestic 
court system
•  Concurrent 
jurisdiction
•  Complemen 
-tarity
•  Concurrent 
jurisdiction
•  Within the 
domestic court 
system
•  Concurrent 
jurisdiction
• Primacy and 
later
changed to 
limited 
primacy by 
mle
amendment
and
completion
strategy
•  Primacy •  Primacy
•  Primacy 
towards 
Sierra 
Leonean 
courts, but 
no primacy 
to other 
states
•  Limited 
primacy as, 
in limited 
circum­
stances can 
judicially 
review state 
decisions 
and assert 
jurisdiction
•  This limited
•  Primacy
■ Also concurrent with ICTY and ICTY has primacy over Kosovo Regulation 6 and 64 panels.
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I. ICTY (1993)
II. ICTR (1994)
Kosovo Panels 
(UNMIK) 
(2000)
Special Panels and 
Serious Crimes Unit 
(UNTAET) 
(2000)
SCSL
(2002)
ICC
(2002)
Extraordinary Cham bers 
Cambodia 
(2005)
primacy can, 
however, 
dissolve if  
states or the 
Security 
Council seek  
an ICC 
deferral
Primacy 
with a 
Security 
Council 
referral
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ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Statute.
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures 
pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic 
may be shattered at any time.
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have 
been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity.
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and 
well-being of the world.
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by 
enhancing international cooperation.
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes 
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.
Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations,
Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be 
taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in 
the internal affairs of any State,
Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future 
generations, to establish an independent permanent International Criminal 
Court in relationship with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over 
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this 
statute shall be c omp lementary to national criminal ju r i s d i c t i o n s ,
Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of 
international justice.
Have agreed as follows :
PART 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT 
Article 1 
The Court
An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It 
shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the 
Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.
Article 2
Relationship of the Court with the United Nations
The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations 
through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties to this 
Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf.
Article 3 
Seat of the Court
1. The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague in the 
Netherlands ("the host State").
2. The Court shall enter into a headquarters agreement with the host State, 
to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties and thereafter concluded by 
the President of the Court on its behalf.
3. The Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable, as 
provided in this Statute.
Article 4
Legal status and powers of the Court
1. The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have 
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and 
the fulfilment of its purposes.
2. The Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this 
Statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the 
territory of any other State.
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PART 2. JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY AND APPLICABLE LAW
Article 5
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has 
jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following 
crimes :
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes ;
(d) The crime of aggression.
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the 
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 6 
Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article 7 
Crimes against humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of 
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in 
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 :
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of 
life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to 
bring about the destruction of part of a population;
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(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of 
such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children;
(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from 
the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under 
international law;
(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under 
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of 
any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. 
This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws 
relating to pregnancy;
(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of 
the group or collectivity;
(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar 
to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial 
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention 
of maintaining that regime;
(i) "Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence 
of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge 
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts 
of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of 
the law for a prolonged period of time.
3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term "gender" 
refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The
term "gender" does not indicate any meaning different from the above.
Article 8 
War crimes
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular 
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.
-5-
2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, 
any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the 
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention;
(i) Wilful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body 
or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve 
in the forces of a hostile Power;
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person 
of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking of hostages.
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population 
as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part 
in hostilities ;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that 
is, objects which are not military objectives;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, 
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are 
entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian 
objects under the international law of armed conflict ;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long­
term and severe damage to the natural environment which would
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be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, 
dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not 
military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms 
or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at 
discretion;
(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of 
the military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the 
United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the 
Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal 
inj ury;
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power 
of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the 
population of the occupied territory within or outside this 
territory;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to 
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, 
historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and 
wounded are collected, provided they are not military 
objectives ;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to 
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of 
any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or 
hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in 
his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously 
endanger the health of such person or persons ;
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the 
hostile nation or army;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of 
law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile 
party;
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(xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in
the operations of war directed against their own country, even
if they were in the belligerent's service before the
commencement of the war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons ;
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices ;
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the
human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not 
entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions ;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in 
violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided 
that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are 
included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in 
accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 
121 and 123;
(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence 
also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected 
person to render certain points, areas or military forces 
immune from military operations;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, 
medical units and transport, and personnel using the 
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity 
with international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of 
warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their 
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as 
provided for under the Geneva Conventions ;
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen 
years into the national armed forces or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities.
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, 
serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons 
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention or any other cause:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(iii) Taking of hostages;
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are 
generally recognized as indispensable.
(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international 
character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts 
of a similar nature.
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed 
conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework 
of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population 
as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part 
in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, 
medical units and transport, and personnel using the 
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity 
with international law;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, 
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
wit h  the charter of the U ni t e d  Nations, as long as they are 
entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian 
objects under the international law of armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to 
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes.
historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and 
wounded are collected, provided they are not military 
objectives;
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced 
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions ;
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen 
years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities ;
(viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for 
reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the 
civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;
(ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
(x) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the
conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the
medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned
nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death
to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless 
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of the conflict ;
(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international
character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts 
of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the 
territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a 
Government to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend 
the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate means.
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Article 9 
Elements of Crimes
1. Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and 
application of articles 6, 7 and 8. They shall be adopted by a two-thirds 
majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties.
2. Amendments to the Elements of Crimes may be proposed by:
(a) Any State Party;
(b) The judges acting by an absolute majority;
(c) The Prosecutor.
Such amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of 
the Assembly of States Parties.
3. The Elements of Crimes and amendments thereto shall be consistent with 
this Statute.
Article 10
Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in 
any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other 
than this Statute.
Article 11 
Jurisdiction ratione temporis
1. The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after 
the entry into force of this Statute.
2. If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, 
the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed 
after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State 
has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.
Article 12
Preconditions to the exercise o£ ~iurisdict.ion
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
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2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise 
its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this 
Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with 
paragraph 3 :
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred 
or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of 
registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is 
rec[uired under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the 
Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to 
the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court 
without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.
Article 13 
Exercise of jurisdiction
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred 
to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with
article 14;
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a 
crime in accordance with article 15.
Article 14
Referral of a situation bv a State Partv
1. A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or 
more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed 
requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of 
determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the
commission of such crimes.
2. As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances 
and be accompanied by such supporting documentation as is available to the 
State referring the situation.
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Article 15 
Prosecutor
1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of 
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information 
received. For this purpose, he or she may seek additional information from 
States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and 
may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed 
with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a 
request for authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting 
material collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
4. If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the 
supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed 
with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the 
investigation, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court 
with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.
5. The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation 
shall not preclude the presentation of a subsequent request by the Prosecutor 
based on new facts or evidence regarding the same situation.
6. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, 
the Prosecutor concludes that the information provided does not constitute a 
reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall inform those who 
provided the information. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from 
considering further information submitted to him or her regarding the same 
situation in the light of new facts or evidence.
Article 16
Deferral of investigation or prosecution
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has 
requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council 
under the same conditions.
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Article 17 
Issues of admissibility
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court 
shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, 
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under 
article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by 
the Court.
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court 
shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by 
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable :
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of 
its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the 
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its
p r o c e e d i n g s .
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Article 18
Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility
1. When a situation has been referred to the Court pursuant to 
article 13 (a) and the Prosecutor has determined that there would be a 
reasonable basis to commence an investigation, or the Prosecutor initiates an 
investigation pursuant to articles 13 (c) and 15, the Prosecutor shall notify 
all States Parties and those States which, taking into account the information 
available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned.
The Prosecutor may notify such States on a confidential basis and, where the 
Prosecutor believes it necessary to protect persons, prevent destruction of 
evidence or prevent the absconding of persons, may limit the scope of the 
information provided to States.
2. Within one month of receipt of that notification, a State may inform the 
Court that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals or others 
within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which may constitute 
crimes referred to in article 5 and which relate to the information provided 
in the notification to States. At the request of that State, the Prosecutor 
shall defer to the State's investigation of those persons unless the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, on the application of the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the 
investigation.
3. The Prosecutor's deferral to a State's investigation shall be open to 
review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any time 
when there has been a significant change of circumstances based on the State's 
unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.
4. The State concerned or the Prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Chamber 
against a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with article 82. The 
appeal may be heard on an expedited basis.
5. When the Prosecutor has deferred an investigation in accordance with 
paragraph 2, the Prosecutor may request that the State concerned periodically 
inform the Prosecutor of the progress of its investigations and any subsequent 
prosecutions. States Parties shall respond to such requests without undue 
delay.
6. Pending a ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber, or at any time when the 
Prosecutor has deferred an investigation under this article, the Prosecutor 
may, on an exceptional basis, seek authority from the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
pursue necessary investigative steps for the purpose of preserving evidence 
where there is a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a 
significant risk that such evidence m a y  not be subsequently available.
7. A State which has challenged a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber under 
this article may challenge the admissibility of a case under article 19 on the 
grounds of additional significant facts or significant change of 
circumstances.
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Article 19
Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court 
or the admissibility of a case
1. The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case 
brought before it. The Court may, on its own motion, determine the 
admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17.
2. Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in 
article 17 or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by:
(a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to 
appear has been issued under article 58;
(b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is 
investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted; or
(c) A State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under 
article 12.
3. The Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of 
jurisdiction or admissibility. In proceedings with respect to jurisdiction or 
admissibility, those who have referred the situation under article 13, as well 
as victims, may also submit observations to the Court.
4. The admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court may be 
challenged only once by any person or State referred to in paragraph 2. The 
challenge shall take place prior to or at the commencement of the trial. In 
exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a challenge to be 
brought more than once or at a time later than the commencement of the trial.
Challenges to the admissibility of a case, at the commencement of a trial, or 
subsequently with the leave of the Court, may be based only on article 17, 
paragraph 1 (c).
5. A State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) shall make a challenge at 
the earliest opportunity.
6. Prior to the confirmation of the charges, challenges to the 
admissibility of a case or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court shall 
be referred to the Pre-Trial Chamber. After confirmation of the charges, they 
shall be referred to the Trial Chamber. Decisions with respect to 
jurisdiction or admissibility may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber in 
accordance with article 82.
7. If a challenge is made by a State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) or (c), 
the Prosecutor shall suspend the investigation until such time as the Court 
makes a determination in accordance with article 17.
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8. Pending a ruling by the Court, the Prosecutor may seek authority from 
the Court :
(a) To pursue necessary investigative steps of the kind referred to in 
article 18, paragraph 6;
(b) To take a statement or testimony from a witness or complete the 
collection and examination of evidence which had begun prior to the making of 
the challenge; and
(c) In cooperation with the relevant States, to prevent the absconding 
of persons in respect of whom the Prosecutor has already requested a warrant 
of arrest under article 58.
9. The making of a challenge shall not affect the validity of any act 
performed by the Prosecutor or any order or warrant issued by the Court prior 
to the making of the challenge.
10. If the Court has decided that a case is inadmissible under article 17, 
the Prosecutor may submit a request for a review of the decision when he or 
she is fully satisfied that new facts have arisen which negate the basis on 
which the case had previously been found inadmissible under article 17.
11. If the Prosecutor, having regard to the matters referred to in 
article 17, defers an investigation, the Prosecutor may request that the 
relevant State make available to the Prosecutor information on the 
proceedings. That information shall, at the request of the State concerned, 
be confidential. If the Prosecutor thereafter decides to proceed with an 
investigation, he or she shall notify the State to which deferral of the 
proceedings has taken place.
Article 20 
Ne bis in idem
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the 
Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the 
person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in 
article 5 for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the 
Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also 
proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to 
the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
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(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and 
were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with 
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Article 21 
Applicable law
1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established 
principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from
national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the 
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute 
and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its 
previous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must 
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without 
any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth 
or other status.
PART 3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Article 22 
Nullum crimen sine lege
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless 
the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be 
extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be 
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or 
convicted.
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3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as 
criminal under international law independently of this Statute.
Article 23
Nulla Doena sine lege
A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with 
this Statute.
Article 24 
Non-retroactivitv ratione personae
1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct 
prior to the entry into force of the Statute.
2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to 
a final judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, 
prosecuted or convicted shall apply.
Article 25 
Individual criminal responsibilitv
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this 
Statute.
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall 
be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this 
Statute.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with 
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime w h i c h  in 
fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, 
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission;
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(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.
Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court ; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites 
others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because 
of circumstances independent of the person=s intentions. However, a person 
who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the 
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute 
for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily 
gave up the criminal purpose.
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal 
responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international 
law.
Article 26
Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under eighteen 
The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the 
age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.
Article 27 
Irrelevance of official capacity
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of 
State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not 
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
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Article 28
Responsibilitv of commanders and other superiors
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this 
Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and 
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of 
his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces
were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or 
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described
in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her 
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were 
committing or about to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities 
for investigation and prosecution.
Article 29
N on-applicabilitv of statute of limitations
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to 
any statute of limitations.
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Article 3 0 
Mental element
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if 
the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed accordingly.
Article 31
Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, 
at the time of that person's conduct:
(a) The person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys 
that person's capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her 
conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the 
requirements of law;
(b) The person is in a state of intoxication that destroys that person's 
capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or 
capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law, 
unless the person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such circumstances 
that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the 
intoxication, he or she was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another 
person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the 
survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for
accomplishing a mil itary mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of 
force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the 
other person or property protected. The fact that the person was involved in 
a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a 
ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph;
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(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of 
imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that 
person or another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to 
avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater 
harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be:
(i) Made by other persons; or
(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's 
control.
2. The Court shall determine the applicability of the grounds for excluding 
criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute to the case before it.
3. At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility other than those referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground 
is derived from applicable law as set forth in article 21. The procedures 
relating to the consideration of such a ground shall be provided for in the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Article 32 
Mistake of fact or mistake of law
1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime.
2. A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be a ground for 
excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by 
such a crime, or as provided for in article 33.
Article 33
Superior orders and prescription of law
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, 
whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal 
responsibility unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the 
Government or the superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
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2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes 
against humanity are manifestly unlawful.
PART 4. COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURT
Article 34 
Organs of the Court 
The Court shall be composed of the following organs;
(a) The Presidency;
(b) An Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division;
(c) The Office of the Prosecutor;
(d) The Registry.
Article 35 
Service of judges
1. All judges shall be elected as full-time members of the Court and shall 
be available to serve on that basis from the commencement of their terms of 
office.
2. The judges composing the Presidency shall serve on a fullntime basis as 
soon as they are elected.
3. The Presidency may, on the basis of the workload of the Court and in 
consultation with its members, decide from time to time to what extent the 
remaining judges shall be required to serve on a full-time basis. Any such 
arrangement shall be without prejudice to the provisions of article 40.
4. The financial arrangements for judges not required to serve on a 
fullntime basis shall be made in accordance with article 49.
Article 36
Qualifications, nomination and election of judges
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, there shall be 18 judges of 
the Court.
2. (a) The Presidency, acting on behalf of the Court, may propose an 
increase in the number of judges specified in paragraph 1, indicating the
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reasons why this is considered necessary and appropriate. The Registrar shall 
promptly circulate any such proposal to all States Parties.
(b) Any such proposal shall then be considered at a meeting of the
Assembly of States Parties to be convened in accordance with article 112. The
proposal shall be considered adopted if approved at the meeting by a vote of
two thirds of the members of the Assembly of States Parties and shall enter
into force at such time as decided by the Assembly of States Parties.
(c) (i) Once a proposal for an increase in the number of judges has
been adopted under subparagraph (b), the election of the 
additional judges shall take place at the next session of the 
Assembly of States Parties in accordance with paragraphs 3 
to 8, and article 37, paragraph 2 ;
(ii) Once a proposal for an increase in the number of judges has 
been adopted and brought into effect under subparagraphs (b)
and (c) (i), it shall be open to the Presidency at any time
thereafter, if the workload of the Court justifies it, to 
propose a reduction in the number of judges, provided that the
number of judges shall not be reduced below that specified in
paragraph 1. The proposal shall be dealt with in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b). In
the event that the proposal is adopted, the number of judges
shall be progressively decreased as the terms of office of
serving judges expire, until the necessary number has been
reached.
3. (a) The judges shall be chosen from among persons of high moral
character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required
in their respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices.
(b) Every candidate for election to the Court shall:
(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and
the necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, 
prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal 
proceedings; or
(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international 
law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human 
rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal 
capacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of the 
Court ;
(c) Every candidate for election to the Court shall have an excellent
knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of the
Court.
4. (a) Nominations of candidates for election to the Court may be made by 
any State Party to this Statute, and shall be made either:
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(i) By the procedure for the nomination of candidates for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in the State in 
question; or
(ii) By the procedure provided for the nomination of candidates for 
the International Court of Justice in the Statute of that 
Court.
Nominations shall be accompanied by a statement in the necessary detail 
specifying how the candidate fulfils the requirements of paragraph 3.
(b) Each State Party may put forward one candidate for any given 
election who need not necessarily be a national of that State Party but shall 
in any case be a national of a State Party.
(c) The Assembly of States Parties may decide to establish, if 
appropriate, an Advisory Committee on nominations. In that event, the 
Committee's composition and mandate shall be established by the Assembly of 
States Parties.
5. For the purposes of the election, there shall be two lists of 
candidates :
List A containing the names of candidates with the qualifications 
specified in paragraph 3 (b) (i); and
List B containing the names of candidates with the qualifications 
specified in paragraph 3 (b) (ii).
A candidate with sufficient qualifications for both lists may choose on which 
list to appear. At the first election to the Court, at least nine judges 
shall be elected from list A and at least five judges from list B. Subsequent 
elections shall be so organized as to maintain the equivalent proportion on 
the Court of judges qualified on the two lists.
6. (a) The judges shall be elected by secret ballot at a meeting of the
Assembly of States Parties convened for that purpose under article 112.
Subject to paragraph 7, the persons elected to the Court shall be the
18 candidates who obtain the highest number of votes and a two-thirds majority 
of the States Parties present and voting.
(b) In the event that a sufficient number of judges is not elected on 
the first ballot, successive ballots shall be held in accordance with the 
procedures laid down in subparagraph (a) until the remaining places have been 
filled.
7. No two judges may be nationals of the same State. A person who, for the
purposes of membership of the Court, could be regarded as a national of more
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than one State shall be deemed to be a national of the State in which that 
person ordinarily exercises civil and political rights.
8. (a) The States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into
account the need, within the membership of the Court, for:
(i) The representation of the principal legal systems of the world;
(ii) Equitable geographical representation; and
(iii) A fair representation of female and male judges.
(b) States Parties shall also take into account the need to include
judges with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but not limited to,
violence against women or children.
9. (a) Subject to subparagraph (b), judges shall hold office for a term of
nine years and, subject to subparagraph (c) and to article 37, paragraph 2, 
shall not be eligible for re-election.
(b) At the first election, one third of the judges elected shall be 
selected by lot to serve for a term of three years; one third of the judges 
elected shall be selected by lot to serve for a term of six years; and the 
remainder shall serve for a term of nine years.
(c) A judge who is selected to serve for a term of three years under
subparagraph (b) shall be eligible for re-election for a full term.
10. Notwithstanding paragraph 9, a judge assigned to a Trial or Appeals 
Chamber in accordance with article 39 shall continue in office to complete any 
trial or appeal the hearing of which has already commenced before that 
Chamber.
Article 37 
Judicial vacancies
1. In the event of a vacancy, an election shall be held in accordance with 
article 36 to fill the vacancy.
2. A judge elected to fill a vacancy shall serve for the remainder of the 
predecessor's term and, if that period is three years or less, shall be 
eligible for re-election for a full term under article 36.
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Article 38 
The Presidency
1. The President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents shall be elected 
by an absolute majority of the judges. They shall each serve for a term of 
three years or until the end of their respective terms of office as judges, 
whichever expires earlier. They shall be eligible for re-election once.
2. The First Vice-President shall act in place of the President in the 
event that the President is unavailable or disqualified. The Second 
VicenPresident shall act in place of the President in the event that both the 
President and the First Vice-President are unavailable or disqualified.
3. The President, together with the First and Second Vice-Presidents, shall 
constitute the Presidency, which shall be responsible for:
(a) The proper administration of the Court, with the exception of the 
Office of the Prosecutor; and
(b) The other functions conferred upon it in accordance with this 
Statute.
4. In discharging its responsibility under paragraph 3 (a), the Presidency 
shall coordinate with and seek the concurrence of the Prosecutor on all 
matters of mutual concern.
Article 39 
Chambers
1. As soon as possible after the election of the judges, the Court shall 
organize itself into the divisions specified in article 34, paragraph (b).
The Appeals Division shall be composed of the President and four other judges, 
the Trial Division of not less than six judges and the Pre-Trial Division of 
not less than six judges. The assignment of judges to divisions shall be 
based on the nature of the functions to be performed by each division and the 
qualifications and experience of the judges elected to the Court, in such a 
way that each division shall contain an appropriate combination of expertise 
in criminal law and procedure and in international law. The Trial and Pre- 
Trial Divisions shall be composed predominantly of judges with criminal trial 
experience.
2. (a) The judicial functions of the Court shall be carried out in each
division by Chambers.
(b) (i) The Appeals Chamber shall be composed of all the judges of the
Appeals Division;
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(ii) The functions of the Trial Chamber shall be carried out by 
three judges of the Trial Division;
(iii) The functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be carried out 
either by three judges of the Pre-Trial Division or by a single
judge of that division in accordance with this Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(c) Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the simultaneous
constitution of more than one Trial Chamber or Pre-Trial Chamber when the
efficient management of the Court's workload so requires.
3. (a) Judges assigned to the Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions shall serve in 
those divisions for a period of three years, and thereafter until the 
completion of any case the hearing of which has already commenced in the 
division concerned.
(b) Judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve in that 
division for their entire term of office.
4. Judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve only in that 
division. Nothing in this article shall, however, preclude the temporary 
attachment of judges from the Trial Division to the Pre-Trial Division or 
vice versa, if the Presidency considers that the efficient management of the 
Court's workload so requires, provided that under no circumstances shall a 
judge who has participated in the pre-trial phase of a case be eligible to sit 
on the Trial Chamber hearing that case.
Article 40 
Independence of the judges
1. The judges shall be independent in the performance of their functions.
2. Judges shall not engage in any activity which is likely to interfere
with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence.
3. Judges required to serve on a full-time basis at the seat of the Court
Shall not engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.
4. Any question regarding the application of paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be 
decided by an absolute majority of the judges. Where any such question 
concerns an individual judge, that judge shall not take part in the decision.
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Article 41 
Excusing and disqualification of judges
1. The Presidency may, at the request of a judge, excuse that judge from 
the exercise of a function under this Statute, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.
2. (a) A judge shall not participate in any case in which his or her
impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. A judge shall be 
disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if, inter alia, 
that judge has previously been involved in any capacity in that case before 
the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the 
person being investigated or prosecuted. A judge shall also be disqualified 
on such other grounds as may be provided for in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
(b) The Prosecutor or the person being investigated or prosecuted may 
request the disqualification of a judge under this paragraph.
(c) Any question as to the disqualification of a judge shall be decided 
by an absolute majority of the judges. The challenged judge shall be entitled 
to present his or her comments on the matter, but shall not take part in the 
decision.
Article 42 
The Office of the Prosecutor
1. The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ 
of the Court. It shall be responsible for receiving referrals and any 
substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for 
examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the 
Court. A member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any 
external source.
2. The Office shall be headed by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall have 
full authority over the management and administration of the Office, including 
the staff, facilities and other resources thereof. The Prosecutor shall be 
assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors, who shall be entitled to carry out 
any of the acts required of the Prosecutor under this Statute. The Prosecutor 
and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be of different nationalities. They shall 
serve on a full-time basis.
3. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be persons of high moral 
character, be highly competent in and have extensive practical experience in 
the prosecution or trial of criminal cases. They shall have an excellent 
knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of the 
Court.
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4. The Prosecutor shall be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority 
of the members of the Assembly of States Parties. The Deputy Prosecutors 
shall be elected in the same way from a list of candidates provided by the 
Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall nominate three candidates for each position 
of Deputy Prosecutor to be filled. Unless a shorter term is decided upon at 
the time of their election, the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall 
hold office for a term of nine years and shall not be eligible for re- 
election.
5. Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall engage in any 
activity which is likely to interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions 
or to affect confidence in his or her independence. They shall not engage in 
any other occupation of a professional nature.
6. The Presidency may excuse the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor, at his 
or her request, from acting in a particular case.
7. Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall participate in any 
matter in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground.
They shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if,
inter alia, they have previously been involved in any capacity in that case
before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving
the person being investigated or prosecuted.
8. Any question as to the disqualification of the Prosecutor or a Deputy 
Prosecutor shall be decided by the Appeals Chamber.
(a) The person being investigated or prosecuted may at any time request
the disqualification of the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor on the grounds
set out in this article;
(b) The Prosecutor or the Deputy Prosecutor, as appropriate, shall be 
entitled to present his or her comments on the matter;
9. The Prosecutor shall appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific 
issues, including, but not limited to, sexual and gender violence and violence 
against children.
Article 43 
The Registry
1. The Registry shall be responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the
administration and. servicing of the Court, without prejudice to the functions
and powers of the Prosecutor in accordance with article 42.
2. The Registry shall be headed by the Registrar, who shall be the
principal administrative officer of the Court. The Registrar shall exercise 
his or her functions under the authority of the President of the Court.
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3. The Registrar and the Deputy Registrar shall be persons of high moral 
character, be highly competent and have an excellent knowledge of and be 
fluent in at least one of the working languages of the Court.
4. The judges shall elect the Registrar by an absolute majority by secret 
ballot, taking into account any recommendation by the Assembly of States 
Parties. If the need arises and upon the recommendation of the Registrar, the 
judges shall elect, in the same manner, a Deputy Registrar.
5. The Registrar shall hold office for a term of five years, shall be 
eligible for re-election once and shall serve on a full-time basis. The 
Deputy Registrar shall hold office for a term of five years or such shorter 
term as may be decided upon by an absolute majority of the judges, and may be 
elected on the basis that the Deputy Registrar shall be called upon to serve 
as required.
6. The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Witnesses Unit within the 
Registry. This Unit shall provide, in consultation with the Office of the 
Prosecutor, protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and 
other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the 
Court, and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such 
witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with expertise in trauma, including 
trauma related to crimes of sexual violence.
Article 44 
Staff
1. The Prosecutor and the Registrar shall appoint such qualified staff as 
may be required to their respective offices. In the case of the Prosecutor, 
this shall include the appointment of investigators.
2. In the employment of staff, the Prosecutor and the Registrar shall 
ensure the highest standards of efficiency, competency and integrity, and 
shall have regard, mutatis mutandis, to the criteria set forth in article 36, 
paragraph 8.
3. The Registrar, with the agreement of the Presidency and the Prosecutor, 
shall propose Staff Regulations which include the terms and conditions upon 
which the staff of the Court shall be appointed, remunerated and dismissed.
The Staff Regulations shall be approved by the Assembly of States Parties.
4. The Court may, in exceptional circumstances, employ the expertise of
gratis personnel offered by States Parties, intergovernmental organizations or 
non-governmental organizations to assist with the work of any of the organs of 
the Court. The Prosecutor may accept any such offer on behalf of the Office 
of the Prosecutor. Such gratis personnel shall be employed in accordance with 
guidelines to be established by the Assembly of States Parties.
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Article 45
Solemn undertaking
Before taking up their respective duties under this Statute, the judges, 
the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar 
shall each make a solemn undertaking in open court to exercise his or her 
respective functions impartially and conscientiously.
Article 46 
Removal from office
1. A judge, the Prosecutor, a Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar or the
Deputy Registrar shall be removed from office if a decision to this effect is
made in accordance with paragraph 2, in cases where that person:
(a) Is found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach 
of his or her duties under this Statute, as provided for in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence; or
(b) Is unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute.
2. A decision as to the removal from office of a judge, the Prosecutor or a
Deputy Prosecutor under paragraph 1 shall be made by the Assembly of States
Parties, by secret ballot:
(a) In the case of a judge, by a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties upon a recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the other 
judges;
(b) In the case of the Prosecutor, by an absolute majority of the 
States Parties;
(c) In the case of a Deputy Prosecutor, by an absolute majority of the 
States Parties upon the recommendation of the Prosecutor.
3. A decision as to the removal from office of the Registrar or Deputy 
Registrar shall be made by an absolute majority of the judges.
4. A judge. Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Registrar or Deputy Registrar 
whose conduct or ability to exercise the functions of the office as required 
by this Statute is challenged under this article shall have full opportunity 
to present and receive evidence and to make submissions in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The person in question shall not otherwise 
participate in the consideration of the matter.
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Article 47
Disciplinary measures
A judge, Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Registrar or Deputy Registrar 
who has committed misconduct of a less serious nature than that set out in 
article 46, paragraph 1, shall be subject to disciplinary measures, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Article 48 
Privileges and immunities
1. The Court shall enjoy in the territory of each State Party such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
2. The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors and the Registrar 
shall, when engaged on or with respect to the business of the Court, enjoy the 
same privileges and immunities as are accorded to heads of diplomatic missions 
and shall, after the expiry of their terms of office, continue to be accorded 
immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or 
written and acts performed by them in their official capacity.
3. The Deputy Registrar, the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor and the 
staff of the Registry shall enjoy the privileges and immunities and facilities
necessary for the performance of their functions, in accordance with the
agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Court.
4. Counsel, experts, witnesses or any other person required to be present 
at the seat of the Court shall be accorded such treatment as is necessary for 
the proper functioning of the Court, in accordance with the agreement on the 
privileges and immunities of the Court.
5. The privileges and immunities of:
(a) A judge or the Prosecutor may be waived by an absolute majority of 
the judges;
(b) The Registrar may be waived by the Presidency;
(c) The Deputy Prosecutors and staff of the Office of the Prosecutor may
be waived by the Prosecutor;
(d) The Deputy Registrar and staff of the Registry may be waived by the 
Registrar.
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Article 49
Salaries, allowances and expenses
The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar and 
the Deputy Registrar shall receive such salaries, allowances and expenses as 
may be decided upon by the Assembly of States Parties. These salaries and 
allowances shall not be reduced during their terms of office.
Article 50 
Official and working languages
1. The official languages of the Court shall be Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish. The judgements of the Court, as well as other 
decisions resolving fundamental issues before the Court, shall be published in 
the official languages. The Presidency shall, in accordance with the criteria 
established by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, determine which decisions 
may be considered as resolving fundamental issues for the purposes of this 
paragraph.
2. The working languages of the Court shall be English and French. The 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall determine the cases in which other 
official languages may be used as working languages.
3. At the request of any party to a proceeding or a State allowed to 
intervene in a proceeding, the Court shall authorize a language other than 
English or French to be used by such a party or State, provided that the Court 
considers such authorization to be adequately justified.
Article 51
Rules of Procedure and Evidence
1. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall enter into force upon adoption
by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties.
2. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence may be proposed by;
(a) Any State Party;
(b) The judges acting by an absolute majority; or
(c) The Prosecutor.
Such amendments shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds 
majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties.
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3. After the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in urgent 
cases where the Rules do not provide for a specific situation before the 
Court, the judges may, by a two-thirds majority, draw up provisional Rules to 
be applied until adopted, amended or rejected at the next ordinary or special 
session of the Assembly of States Parties.
4. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amendments thereto and any 
provisional Rule shall be consistent with this Statute. Amendments to the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as provisional Rules shall not be 
applied retroactively to the detriment of the person who is being investigated 
or prosecuted or who has been convicted.
5. In the event of conflict between the Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, the Statute shall prevail.
Article 52 
Regulations of the Court
1. The judges shall, in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, adopt, by an absolute majority, the Regulations of the 
Court necessary for its routine functioning.
2. The Prosecutor and the Registrar shall be consulted in the elaboration 
of the Regulations and any amendments thereto.
3. The Regulations and any amendments thereto shall take effect upon 
adoption unless otherwise decided by the judges. Immediately upon adoption, 
they shall be circulated to States Parties for comments. If within six months 
there are no objections from a majority of States Parties, they shall remain 
in force.
PART 5. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
Article 53
Initiation of an investigation
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to 
him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there 
is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to 
initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable 
basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or 
is being committed;
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and
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(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of 
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed and his or her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) 
above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.
2. If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a 
sufficient basis for a prosecution because:
(a) There is not a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant 
or summons under article 58;
(b) The case is inadmissible under article 17; or
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into 
account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the 
interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and 
his or her role in the alleged crime;
the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a 
referral under article 14 or the Security Council in a case under article 13, 
paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.
3. (a) At the request of the State making a referral under article 14 or 
the Security Council under article 13, paragraph (b), the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 1 or 2 not to proceed 
and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision.
(b) In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, 
review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on 
paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor 
shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
4. The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to 
initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.
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Article 54
Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations
1. The Prosecutor shall:
(a) In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover 
all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating 
and exonerating circumstances equally;
(b) Take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, 
respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, 
including age, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and 
take into account the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves 
sexual violence, gender violence or violence against children; and
(c) Fully respect the rights of persons arising under this Statute.
2. The Prosecutor may conduct investigations on the territory of a State:
(a) In accordance with the provisions of Part 9; or
(b) As authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 57,
paragraph 3 (d).
3. The Prosecutor may:
(a) Collect and examine evidence;
(b) Request the presence of and question persons being investigated,
victims and witnesses;
(c) Seek the cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization 
or arrangement in accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate;
(d) Enter into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with 
this Statute, as may be necessary to facilitate the cooperation of a State, 
intergovernmental organization or person;
(e) Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or 
information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality 
and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of 
the information consents; and
(f) Take necessary measures, or request that necessary measures be 
taken, to ensure the confidentiality of information, the protection of any 
person or the preservation of evidence.
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Article 55
Rights of persons during an investigation
1. In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person:
(a) Shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to 
confess guilt;
(b) Shall not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to 
torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment ;
(c) Shall, if questioned in a language other than a language the person 
fully understands and speaks, have, free of any cost, the assistance of a 
competent interpreter and such translations as are necessary to meet the 
requirements of fairness; and
(d) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and shall 
not be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedures as are established in this Statute.
2. Where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court and that person is about to be questioned 
either by the Prosecutor, or by national authorities pursuant to a request 
made under Part 9, that person shall also have the following rights of which 
he or she shall be informed prior to being questioned:
(a) To be informed, prior to being questioned, that there are grounds to 
believe that he or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court ;
(b) To remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the 
determination of guilt or innocence;
(c) To have legal assistance of the person's choosing, or, if the person 
does not have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or 
her, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by the person in any such case if the person does not have sufficient 
means to pay for it; and
(d) To be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has 
voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel.
Article 56
Role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in relation 
to a unique investigative opportunity
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1. (a) Where the Prosecutor considers an investigation to present a unique 
opportunity to take testimony or a statement from a witness or to examine, 
collect or test evidence, which may not be available subsequently for the 
purposes of a trial, the Prosecutor shall so inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.
(b) In that case, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, upon request of the 
Prosecutor, take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency 
and integrity of the proceedings and, in particular, to protect the rights of 
the defence.
(c) Unless the Pre-Trial Chamber orders otherwise, the Prosecutor shall 
provide the relevant information to the person who has been arrested or 
appeared in response to a summons in connection with the investigation 
referred to in subparagraph (a), in order that he or she may be heard on the 
matter.
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 (b) may include:
(a) Making recommendations or orders regarding procedures to be
followed;
(b) Directing that a record be made of the proceedings;
(c) Appointing an expert to assist;
(d) Authorizing counsel for a person who has been arrested, or appeared
before the Court in response to a summons, to participate, or where there has
not yet been such an arrest or appearance or counsel has not been designated, 
appointing another counsel to attend and represent the interests of the 
defence;
(e) Naming one of its members or, if necessary, another available judge 
of the Pre-Trial or Trial Division to observe and make recommendations or 
orders regarding the collection and preservation of evidence and the 
questioning of persons;
(f) Taking such other action as may be necessary to collect or preserve 
evidence.
3. (a) Where the Prosecutor has not sought measures pursuant to this 
article but the Pre-Trial Chamber considers that such measures are required to 
preserve evidence that it deems would be essential for the defence at trial, 
it shall consult with the Prosecutor as to whether there is good reason for 
the Prosecutor's failure to request the measures. If upon consultation, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber concludes that the Prosecutor's failure to request such 
measures is unjustified, the Pre-Trial Chamber may take such measures on its 
own initiative.
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(b) A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative 
under this paragraph may be appealed by the Prosecutor. The appeal shall be 
heard on an expedited basis.
4. The admissibility of evidence preserved or collected for trial pursuant 
to this article, or the record thereof, shall be governed at trial by 
article 69, and given such weight as determined by the Trial Chamber.
Article 57
Functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber
1. Unless otherwise provided in this Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
exercise its functions in accordance with the provisions of this article.
2. (a) Orders or rulings of the Pre-Trial Chamber issued under articles 15, 
18, 19, 54, paragraph 2, 61, paragraph 7, and 72 must be concurred in by a 
majority of its judges.
(b) In all other cases, a single judge of the Pre-Trial Chamber may 
exercise the functions provided for in this Statute, unless otherwise provided 
for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or by a majority of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.
3. In addition to its other functions under this Statute, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may:
(a) At the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants as 
may be required for the purposes of an investigation;
(b) Upon the request of a person who has been arrested or has appeared 
pursuant to a summons under article 58, issue such orders, including measures 
such as those described in article 56, or seek such cooperation pursuant to 
Part 9 as may be necessary to assist the person in the preparation of his or 
her defence;
(c) Where necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of victims 
and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of persons who 
have been arrested or appeared in response to a summons, and the protection of 
national security information;
(d) Authorize the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within 
the territory of a State Party without having secured the cooperation of that 
State under Part 9 if, whenever possible having regard to the views of the 
state concerned, the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined in that case that the 
State is clearly unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the 
unavailability of any authority or any component of its judicial system 
competent to execute the request for cooperation under Part 9.
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(e) Where a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued under 
article 58, and having due regard to the strength of the evidence and the 
rights of the parties concerned, as provided for in this Statute and the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, seek the cooperation of States pursuant to 
article 93, paragraph 1 (k), to take protective measures for the purpose of 
forfeiture, in particular for the ultimate benefit of victims.
Article 58
Issuance bv the Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant of arrest 
or a summons to appear
1. At any time after the initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial
Chamber shall, on the application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest
of a person if, having examined the application and the evidence or other 
information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and
(b) The arrest of the person appears necessary:
(i) To ensure the person's appearance at trial,
(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the
investigation or the court proceedings, or
(iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with 
the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within 
the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same 
circumstances.
2. The application of the Prosecutor shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying 
information;
(b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court which the person is alleged to have committed;
(c) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute
those crimes;
(d) A summary of the evidence and any other information which establish
reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed those crimes; and
(e) The reason why the Prosecutor believes that the arrest of the person 
is necessary.
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3. The warrant of arrest shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying 
information;
(b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court for which the person's arrest is sought; and
(c) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute 
those crimes.
4. The warrant of arrest shall remain in effect until otherwise ordered by 
the Court.
5. On the basis of the warrant of arrest, the Court may request the 
provisional arrest or the arrest and surrender of the person under Part 9.
6. The Prosecutor may request the Pre-Trial Chamber to amend the warrant of 
arrest by modifying or adding to the crimes specified therein. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall so amend the warrant if it is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the modified or 
additional crimes.
7. As an alternative to seeking a warrant of arrest, the Prosecutor may 
submit an application requesting that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue a summons 
for the person to appear. If the Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the crime alleged 
and that a summons is sufficient to ensure the person's appearance, it shall 
issue the summons, with or without conditions restricting liberty (other than 
detention) if provided for by national law, for the person to appear. The 
summons shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying 
information;
(b) The specified date on which the person is to appear;
(c) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court which the person is alleged to have committed; and
(d) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute the 
crime.
The summons shall be served on the person.
Article 59
Arrest proceedings in the custodial State
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1. A State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for 
arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in 
question in accordance with its laws and the provisions of Part 9.
2. A person arrested shall be brought promptly before the competent 
judicial authority in the custodial State which shall determine, in accordance 
with the law of that State, that;
(a) The warrant applies to that person;
(b) The person has been arrested in accordance with the proper process;
and
(c) The person's rights have been respected.
3. The person arrested shall have the right to apply to the competent 
authority in the custodial State for interim release pending surrender.
4. In reaching a decision on any such application, the competent authority 
in the custodial State shall consider whether, given the gravity of the 
alleged crimes, there are urgent and exceptional circumstances to justify 
interim release and whether necessary safeguards exist to ensure that the 
custodial State can fulfil its duty to surrender the person to the Court. It 
shall not be open to the competent authority of the custodial State to
consider whether the warrant of arrest was properly issued in accordance with
article 58, paragraph 1 (a) and (b).
5. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall be notified of any request for interim 
release and shall make recommendations to the competent authority in the 
custodial State. The competent authority in the custodial State shall give 
full consideration to such recommendations, including any recommendations on 
measures to prevent the escape of the person, before rendering its decision.
6. If the person is granted interim release, the Pre-Trial Chamber may 
request periodic reports on the status of the interim release.
7. Once ordered to be surrendered by the custodial State, the person shall 
be delivered to the Court as soon as possible.
Article 60
Initial proceedings before the Court
1. Upon the surrender of the person to the Court, or the person's 
appearance before the Court volunt ari ly or pursuant to a summons, the Pre- 
Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the person has been informed of the 
crimes which he or she is alleged to have committed, and of his or her rights 
under this Statute, including the right to apply for interim release pending 
trial.
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2. A person subject to a warrant of arrest may apply for interim release 
pending trial. If the Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied that the conditions set 
forth in article 58, paragraph 1, are met, the person shall continue to be 
detained. If it is not so satisfied, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall release the 
person, with or without conditions.
3. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall periodically review its ruling on the 
release or detention of the person, and may do so at any time on the request 
of the Prosecutor or the person. Upon such review, it may modify its ruling 
as to detention, release or conditions of release, if it is satisfied that 
changed circumstances so require.
4. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not detained for an 
unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor.
If such delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing the person, with or 
without conditions.
5. If necessary, the Pre-Trial Chamber may issue a warrant of arrest to 
secure the presence of a person who has been released.
Article 61
Confirmation of the charges before trial
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, within a reasonable time after 
the person's surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall hold a hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor 
intends to seek trial. The hearing shall be held in the presence of the
Prosecutor and the person charged, as well as his or her counsel.
2. The Pre-Trial Chamber may, upon request of the Prosecutor or on its own 
motion, hold a hearing in the absence of the person charged to confirm the 
charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial when the person has :
(a) Waived his or her right to be present; or
(b) Fled or cannot be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to
secure his or her appearance before the Court and to inform the person of the
charges and that a hearing to confirm those charges will be held.
In that case, the person shall be represented by counsel where the 
Pre-Trial Chamber determines that it is in the interests of justice.
3. wit hin  a reasonable time before the hearing, the pers on shall:
(a) Be provided with a copy of the document containing the charges on
which the Prosecutor intends to bring the person to trial; and
(b) Be informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely
at the hearing.
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The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders regarding the disclosure of 
information for the purposes of the hearing.
4. Before the hearing, the Prosecutor may continue the investigation and 
may amend or withdraw any charges. The person shall be given reasonable 
notice before the hearing of any amendment to or withdrawal of charges. In 
case of a withdrawal of charges, the Prosecutor shall notify the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of the reasons for the withdrawal.
5. At the hearing, the Prosecutor shall support each charge with sufficient
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed
the crime charged. The Prosecutor may rely on documentary or summary evidence 
and need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.
5. At the hearing, the person may;
(a) Object to the charges;
(b) Challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor; and
(c) Present evidence.
7. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the basis of the hearing, determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged. Based on its 
determination, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall:
(a) Confirm those charges in relation to which it has determined that 
there is sufficient evidence, and commit the person to a Trial Chamber for 
trial on the charges as confirmed;
(b) Decline to confirm those charges in relation to which it has 
determined that there is insufficient evidence;
(c) Adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider;
(i) Providing further evidence or conducting further investigation 
with respect to a particular charge; or
(ii) Amending a charge because the evidence submitted appears to 
establish a different crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.
8. Where the Pre-Trial Chamber declines to confirm a charge, the Prosecutor 
shall not be precluded from subsequently requesting its confirmation if the 
request is supported by additional evidence.
9. After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the 
Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice
-46-
to the accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional 
charges or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to 
confirm those charges must be held. After commencement of the trial, the 
Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the 
charges.
10. Any warrant previously issued shall cease to have effect with respect to 
any charges which have not been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber or which 
have been withdrawn by the Prosecutor.
11. Once the charges have been confirmed in accordance with this article, 
the Presidency shall constitute a Trial Chamber which, subject to paragraph 9 
and to article 64, paragraph 4, shall be responsible for the conduct of 
subsequent proceedings and may exercise any function of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
that is relevant and capable of application in those proceedings.
PART 6. THE TRIAL 
Article 62 
Place of trial
Unless otherwise decided, the place of the trial shall be the seat of 
the Court.
Article 63 
Trial in the presence of the accused
1. The accused shall be present during the trial.
2. If the accused, being present before the Court, continues to disrupt the 
trial, the Trial Chamber may remove the accused and shall make provision for 
him or her to observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside the 
courtroom, through the use of communications technology, if required. Such 
measures shall be taken only in exceptional circumstances after other 
reasonable alternatives have proved inadequate, and only for such duration as 
is strictly required.
Article 64
Functions and powers of the Trial Chamber
1. The functions and powers of the Trial Chamber set out in this article 
shall be exercised in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence.
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2. The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and 
is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard 
for the protection of victims and witnesses.
3. Upon assignment of a case for trial in accordance with this Statute, the 
Trial Chamber assigned to deal with the case shall:
(a) Confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary 
to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings;
(b) Determine the language or languages to be used at trial; and
(c) Subject to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, provide 
for disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed, 
sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the trial to enable adequate 
preparation for trial.
4. The Trial Chamber may, if necessary for its effective and fair 
functioning, refer preliminary issues to the Pre-Trial Chamber or, if 
necessary, to another available judge of the Pre-Trial Division.
5. Upon notice to the parties, the Trial Chamber may, as appropriate, 
direct that there be joinder or severance in respect of charges against more 
than one accused.
6. In performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of a 
trial, the Trial Chamber may, as necessary:
(a) Exercise any functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to in 
article 61, paragraph 11;
(b) Require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of 
documents and other evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance of 
States as provided in this Statute;
(c) Provide for the protection of confidential information;
(d) Order the production of evidence in addition to that already 
collected prior to the trial or presented during the trial by the parties;
(e) Provide for the protection of the accused, witnesses and victims;
and
(f) Rule on any other relevant matters.
7. The trial shall be held in public. The Trial Chamber may, however, 
determine that special circumstances require that certain proceedings be in 
closed session for the purposes set forth in article 68, or to protect 
confidential or sensitive information to be given in evidence.
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8. (a) At the commencement of the trial, the Trial Chamber shall have read 
to the accused the charges previously confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The 
Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused understands the nature of 
the charges. It shall afford him or her the opportunity to make an admission 
of guilt in accordance with article 65 or to plead not guilty.
(b) At the trial, the presiding judge may give directions for the 
conduct of proceedings, including to ensure that they are conducted in a fair 
and impartial manner. Subject to any directions of the presiding judge, the 
parties may submit evidence in accordance with the provisions of this Statute.
9. The Trial Chamber shall have, inter alia, the power on application of a 
party or on its own motion to;
(a) Rule on the admissibility or relevance of evidence; and
(b) Take all necessary steps to maintain order in the course of a 
hearing.
10. The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a complete record of the trial, 
which accurately reflects the proceedings, is made and that it is maintained 
and preserved by the Registrar.
Article 65 
Proceedings on an admission of guilt
1. Where the accused makes an admission of guilt pursuant to article 64, 
paragraph 8 (a), the Trial Chamber shall determine whether:
(a) The accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission 
of guilt;
(b) The admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient 
consultation with defence counsel; and
(c) The admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the case that 
are contained in:
(i) The charges brought by the Prosecutor and admitted by the 
accused;
(ii) Any materials presented by the Prosecutor which supplement the 
charges and which the accused accepts; and
(iii) Any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses, 
presented by the Prosecutor or the accused.
2. Where the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the matters referred to in 
paragraph 1 are established, it shall consider the admission of guilt,
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together with any additional evidence presented, as establishing all the 
essential facts that are required to prove the crime to which the admission of 
guilt relates, and may convict the accused of that crime.
3. Where the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the matters referred to in 
paragraph 1 are established, it shall consider the admission of guilt as not 
having been made, in which case it shall order that the trial be continued 
under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this Statute and may remit the 
case to another Trial Chamber.
4. Where the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a more complete 
presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, 
in particular the interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may:
(a) Request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence, including the 
testimony of witnesses; or
(b) Order that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial 
procedures provided by this Statute, in which case it shall consider the 
admission of guilt as not having been made and may remit the case to another 
Trial Chamber.
5. Any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding 
modification of the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be 
imposed shall not be binding on the Court.
Article 66 
Presumption of innocence
1. Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court
in accordance with the applicable law.
2. The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused.
3. In order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 67
Rights of the accused
1. In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a 
public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair 
hearing conducted impartially, and to the following minimum guarantees, in 
full equality;
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(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and 
content of the charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and 
speaks ;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the 
defence and to communicate freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in 
confidence ;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to 
conduct the defence in person or through legal assistance of the accused's 
choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have legal assistance, of 
this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case 
where the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused 
lacks sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and 
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf 
under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her. The accused shall 
also be entitled to raise defences and to present other evidence admissible 
under this Statute;
(f) To have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter 
and such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness, 
if any of the proceedings of or documents presented to the Court are not in a 
language which the accused fully understands and speaks;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain 
silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of 
guilt or innocence;
(h) To make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence;
and
(i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of 
proof or any onus of rebuttal.
2. In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the 
Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in 
the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends 
to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, 
or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt 
as to the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide.
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Article 68
Protection of the victims and witnesses and their 
participation in the proceedings
1. The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and 
witnesses. In so doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, 
including age, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and 
the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime 
involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. The 
Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and 
prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.
2. As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in 
article 67, the Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or 
an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the 
presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, 
such measures shall be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence 
or a child who is a victim or a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the 
Court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the 
victim or witness.
3. Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court 
shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages 
of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner 
which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and 
a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the 
legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
4. The Victims and Witnesses Unit may advise the Prosecutor and the Court 
on appropriate protective measures, security arrangements, counselling and 
assistance as referred to in article 43, paragraph 6.
5. Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Statute 
may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her 
family, the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted 
prior to the commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information 
and instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a 
manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused and a fair and impartial trial.
6. A state may make an application for necessary measures to be taken in 
respect of the protection of its servants or agents and the protection of 
confidential or sensitive information.
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Article 69 
Evidence
1. Before testifying, each witness shall, in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, give an undertaking as to the truthfulness of the
evidence to be given by that witness.
2. The testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person, except to
the extent provided by the measures set forth in article 68 or in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. The Court may also permit the giving of viva voce 
(oral) or recorded testimony of a witness by means of video or audio 
technology, as well as the introduction of documents or written transcripts, 
subject to this Statute and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused.
3. The parties may submit evidence relevant to the case, in accordance with' 
article 64. The Court shall have the authority to request the submission of 
all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth.
4. The Court may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, 
taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of the evidence and any 
prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation 
of the testimony of a witness, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
5. The Court shall respect and observe privileges on confidentiality as 
provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
6. The Court shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but may 
take judicial notice of them.
7. Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or 
internationally recognized human rights shall not be admissible if;
(a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the 
evidence; or
(b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would 
seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.
8. When deciding on the relevance or admissibility of evidence collected by 
a State, the Court shall not rule on the application of the State's national
l a w .
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Article 7 0
Offences against the administration of justice
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against 
its administration of justice when committed intentionally:
(a) Giving false testimony when under an obligation pursuant to 
article 69, paragraph 1, to tell the truth;
(b) Presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged;
(c) Corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the 
attendance or testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness for giving 
testimony or destroying, tampering with or interfering with the collection of 
evidence;
(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the 
Court for the purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or 
to perform improperly, his or her duties;
(e) Retaliating against an official of the Court on account of duties 
performed by that or another official;
(f) Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official of the Court in 
connection with his or her official duties.
2. The principles and procedures governing the Court's exercise of 
jurisdiction over offences under this article shall be those provided for in 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The conditions for providing 
international cooperation to the Court with respect to its proceedings under 
this article shall be governed by the domestic laws of the requested State.
3. In the event of conviction, the Court may impose a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding five years, or a fine in accordance with the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, or both.
4. (a) Each State Party shall extend its criminal laws penalizing offences 
against the integrity of its own investigative or judicial process to offences 
against the administration of justice referred to in this article, committed 
on its territory, or by one of its nationals;
(b) Upon request by the Court, whenever it deems it proper, the State 
Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution. Those authorities shall treat such cases with diligence and 
devote sufficient resources to enable them to be conducted effectively.
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Article 71
Sanctions for misconduct before the Court
1. The Court may sanction persons present before it who commit misconduct, 
including disruption of its proceedings or deliberate refusal to comply with 
its directions, by administrative measures other than imprisonment, such as 
temporary or permanent removal from the courtroom, a fine or other similar 
measures provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
2. The procedures governing the imposition of the measures set forth in 
paragraph 1 shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
Article 72
Protection of national security information
1. This article applies in any case where the disclosure of the information 
or documents of a State would, in the opinion of that State, prejudice its 
national security interests. Such cases include those falling within the 
scope of article 56, paragraphs 2 and 3, article 61, paragraph 3, article 64, 
paragraph 3, article 67, paragraph 2, article 68, paragraph 6, article 87, 
paragraph 6 and article 93, as well as cases arising at any other stage of the 
proceedings where such disclosure may be at issue.
2. This article shall also apply when a person who has been requested to
give information or evidence has refused to do so or has referred the matter
to the State on the ground that disclosure would prejudice the national 
security interests of a State and the State concerned confirms that it is of 
the opinion that disclosure would prejudice its national security interests.
3. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the requirements of 
confidentiality applicable under article 54, paragraph 3 (e) and (f), or the 
application of article 73.
4. If a State learns that information or documents of the State are being, 
or are likely to be, disclosed at any stage of the proceedings, and it is of 
the opinion that disclosure would prejudice its national security interests, 
that State shall have the right to intervene in order to obtain resolution of 
the issue in accordance with this article.
5. If, in the opinion of a State, disclosure of information would prejudice
its national security interests, all reasonable steps will be taken by  the 
State, acting in conjunction with the Prosecutor, the defence or the 
Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber, as the case may be, to seek to resolve the 
matter by cooperative means. Such steps may include:
(a) Modification or clarification of the request;
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(b) A determination by the Court regarding the relevance of the 
information or evidence sought, or a determination as to whether the evidence, 
though relevant, could be or has been obtained from a source other than the 
requested State;
(c) Obtaining the information or evidence from a different source or in 
a different form; or
(d) Agreement on conditions under which the assistance could be provided
including, among other things, providing summaries or redactions, limitations 
on disclosure, use of in camera or ex parte proceedings, or other protective 
measures permissible under the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
6. Once all reasonable steps have been taken to resolve the matter through 
cooperative means, and if the State considers that there are no means or 
conditions under which the information or documents could be provided or 
disclosed without prejudice to its national security interests, it shall so 
notify the Prosecutor or the Court of the specific reasons for its decision, 
unless a specific description of the reasons would itself necessarily result 
in such prejudice to the State's national security interests.
7. Thereafter, if the Court determines that the evidence is relevant and 
necessary for the establishment of the guilt or innocence of the accused, the
Court may undertake the following actions:
(a) Where disclosure of the information or document is sought pursuant
to a request for cooperation under Part 9 or the circumstances described in 
paragraph 2, and the State has invoked the ground for refusal referred to in 
article 93, paragraph 4:
(i) The Court may, before making any conclusion referred to in 
subparagraph 7 (a) (ii), request further consultations for the 
purpose of considering the State's representations, which may 
include, as appropriate, hearings in camera and ex parte ;
(ii) If the Court concludes that, by invoking the ground for refusal 
under article 93, paragraph 4, in the circumstances of the 
case, the requested State is not acting in accordance with its 
obligations under this Statute, the Court may refer the matter 
in accordance with article 87, paragraph 7, specifying the 
reasons for its conclusion; and
(iii) The Court may make such inference in the trial of the 
accused as to the existence or non-existence of a fact, as may 
be appropriate in the circumstances; or
(b) In all other circumstances:
(i) Order disclosure; or
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(ii) To the extent it does not order disclosure, make such inference 
in the trial of the accused as to the existence or 
non-existence of a fact, as may be appropriate in the 
circumstances.
Article 73
Third-party information or documents
If a State Party is requested by the Court to provide a document or 
information in its custody, possession or control, which was disclosed to it 
in confidence by a State, intergovernmental organization or international 
organization, it shall seek the consent of the originator to disclose that 
document or information. If the originator is a State Party, it shall either 
consent to disclosure of the information or document or undertake to resolve 
the issue of disclosure with the Court, subject to the provisions of 
article 72. If the originator is not a State Party and refuses to consent to 
disclosure, the requested State shall inform the Court that it is unable to 
provide the document or information because of a pre-existing obligation of 
confidentiality to the originator.
Article 74 
Requirements for the decision
1. All the judges of the Trial Chamber shall be present at each stage of 
the trial and throughout their deliberations. The Presidency may, on a 
case-by-case basis, designate, as available, one or more alternate judges to 
be present at each stage of the trial and to replace a member of the Trial 
Chamber if that member is unable to continue attending.
2. The Trial Chamber's decision shall be based on its evaluation of the 
evidence and the entire proceedings. The decision shall not exceed the facts 
and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges.
The Court may base its decision only on evidence submitted and discussed 
before it at the trial.
3. The judges shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decision, failing 
which the decision shall be taken by a majority of the judges.
4. The deliberations of the Trial Chamber shall remain secret.
5. The decision shall be in w r iti ng and shall contain a full and reasoned 
Statement of the Trial Chamber's findings on the evidence and conclusions.
The Trial Chamber shall issue one decision. When there is no unanimity, the 
Trial Chamber's decision shall contain the views of the majority and the 
minority. The decision or a summary thereof shall be delivered in open court.
-57-
Article 75 
Reparations to victims
1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in 
respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.
On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its 
own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any 
damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the 
principles on which it is acting.
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.
Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for reparations be 
made through the Trust Fund provided for in article 79.
3. Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and 
shall take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted 
person, victims, other interested persons or interested States.
4. In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a 
person is convicted of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, determine 
whether, in order to give effect to an order which it may make under this 
article, it is necessary to seek measures under article 93, paragraph 1;
5. A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this article as if 
the provisions of article 109 were applicable to this article.
6. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights 
of victims under national or international law.
Article 76 
Sentencing
1. In the event of a conviction, the Trial Chamber shall consider the 
appropriate sentence to be imposed and shall take into account the evidence 
presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant to the 
sentence.
2. Except where article 65 applies and before the completion of the trial,
the Trial Chamber ma y on its own moti on and shall, at the request of the 
Prosecutor or the accused, hold a further hearing to hear any additional 
evidence or submissions relevant to the sentence, in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.
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3. Where paragraph 2 applies, any representations under article 75 shall be 
heard during the further hearing referred to in paragraph 2 and, if necessary, 
during any additional hearing.
4. The sentence shall be pronounced in public and, wherever possible, in 
the presence of the accused.
PART 7. PENALTIES 
Article 77 
Applicable penalties
1. Subject to article 110, the Court may impose one of the following
penalties on a person convicted of a crime referred to in article 5 of this
Statute:
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a 
maximum of 30 years; or
(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.
2. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence ;
(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or 
indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third 
parties.
Article 78 
Determination of the sentence
1. In determining the sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account such factors as the gravity 
of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.
2. In imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the Court shall deduct the time, 
if any, previously spent in detention in accordance with an order of the 
Court. The Court m a y  deduct any time otherwise spent in detention in 
connection with conduct underlying the crime.
3. When a person has been convicted of more than one crime, the Court shall 
pronounce a sentence for each crime and a joint sentence specifying the total 
period of imprisonment. This period shall be no less than the highest
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individual sentence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprisonment or a 
sentence of life imprisonment in conformity with article 77, paragraph 1 (b).
Article 79 
Trust Fund
1. A Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of States 
Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and of the families of such victims.
2. The Court may order money and other property collected through fines or 
forfeiture to be transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund.
3. The Trust Fund shall be managed according to criteria to be determined 
by the Assembly of States Parties.
Article 80
Non-orejudice to national application of 
penalties and national laws
Nothing in this Part affects the application by States of penalties 
prescribed by their national law, nor the law of States which do not provide 
for penalties prescribed in this Part.
PART 8. APPEAL AND REVISION 
Article 81
Appeal against decision of acquittal or conviction 
or against sentence
1, A decision under article 74 may be appealed in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence as follows:
(a) The Prosecutor may make an appeal on any of the following grounds:
(i) Procedural error,
(ii) Error of fact, or
(iii) Error of law;
(b) The convicted person, or the Prosecutor on that person's behalf, may 
make an appeal on any of the following grounds:
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(i) Procedural error,
(ii) Error of fact,
(iii) Error of law, or
(iv) Any other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of 
the proceedings or decision.
2. (a) A sentence may be appealed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, by the Prosecutor or the convicted person on the 
ground of disproportion between the crime and the sentence;
(b) If on an appeal against sentence the Court considers that there are 
grounds on which the conviction might be set aside, wholly or in part, it may 
invite the Prosecutor and the convicted person to submit grounds under 
article 81, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), and may render a decision on conviction in 
accordance with article 83;
(c) The same procedure applies when the Court, on an appeal against 
conviction only, considers that there are grounds to reduce the sentence under 
paragraph 2 (a).
3. (a) Unless the Trial Chamber orders otherwise, a convicted person shall 
remain in custody pending an appeal;
(b) When a convicted person's time in custody exceeds the sentence of 
imprisonment imposed, that person shall be released, except that if the 
Prosecutor is also appealing, the release may be subject to the conditions 
under subparagraph (c) below;
(c) In case of an acquittal, the accused shall be released immediately, 
subject to the following:
(i) Under exceptional circumstances, and having regard, inter alia, 
to the concrete risk of flight, the seriousness of the offence 
charged and the probability of success on appeal, the Trial 
Chamber, at the request of the Prosecutor, may maintain the 
detention of the person pending appeal;
(ii) A decision by the Trial Chamber under subparagraph (c) (i) may
be appealed in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 (a) and (b), execution of the 
decision or sentence shall be suspended during the period allowed for appeal 
and for the duration of the appeal proceedings.
-61-
Article 82 
Appeal against other decisions
1. Either party may appeal any of the following decisions in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(a) A decision with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility;
(b) A decision granting or denying release of the person being 
investigated or prosecuted;
(c) A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative 
under article 56, paragraph 3;
(d) A decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect 
the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the 
trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an 
immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the 
proceedings.
2. A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 57, paragraph 3 (d), 
may be appealed against by the State concerned or by the Prosecutor, with the 
leave of the Pre-Trial Chamber. The appeal shall be heard on an expedited 
basis.
3. An appeal shall not of itself have suspensive effect unless the Appeals 
Chamber so orders, upon request, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
4. A legal representative of the victims, the convicted person or a 
bona fide owner of property adversely affected by an order under article 75 
may appeal against the order for reparations, as provided in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.
Article 83 
Proceedings on appeal
1. For the purposes of proceedings under article 81 and this article, the 
Appeals Chamber shall have all the powers of the Trial Chamber.
2. If the Appeals Chamber finds that the proceedings appealed from were 
unfair in a way that affected the reliability of the decision or sentence, or 
that the decision or sentence appealed from was materially affected by error 
of fact or law or procedural error, it may;
(a) Reverse or amend the decision or sentence; or
-62-
(b) Order a new trial before a different Trial Chamber.
For these purposes, the Appeals Chamber may remand a factual issue to 
the original Trial Chamber for it to determine the issue and to report back 
accordingly, or may itself call evidence to determine the issue. When the 
decision or sentence has been appealed only by the person convicted, or the 
Prosecutor on that person's behalf, it cannot be amended to his or her 
detriment.
3. If in an appeal against sentence the Appeals Chamber finds that the 
sentence is disproportionate to the crime, it may vary the sentence in 
accordance with Part 7.
4. The judgement of the Appeals Chamber shall be taken by a majority of the 
judges and shall be delivered in open court. The judgement shall state the 
reasons on which it is based. When there is no unanimity, the judgement of 
the Appeals Chamber shall contain the views of the majority and the minority, 
but a judge may deliver a separate or dissenting opinion on a question of law.
5. The Appeals Chamber may deliver its judgement in the absence of the 
person acquitted or convicted.
Article 84
Revision of conviction or sentence
1. The convicted person or, after death, spouses, children, parents or one 
person alive at the time of the accused's death who has been given express 
written instructions from the accused to bring such a claim, or the Prosecutor 
on the person's behalf, may apply to the Appeals Chamber to revise the final 
judgement of conviction or sentence on the grounds that:
(a) New evidence has been discovered that;
(i) Was not available at the time of trial, and such unavailability 
was not wholly or partially attributable to the party making 
application; and
(ii) Is sufficiently important that had it been proved at trial it 
would have been likely to have resulted in a different verdict;
(b) It has been newly discovered that decisive evidence, taken into 
account at trial and upon which the conviction depends, was false, forged or 
falsified;
(c) One or more of the judges who participated in conviction or 
confirmation of the charges has committed, in that case, an act of serious 
misconduct or serious breach of duty of sufficient gravity to justify the 
removal of that judge or those judges from office under article 46.
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2. The Appeals Chamber shall reject the application if it considers it to 
be unfounded. If it determines that the application is meritorious, it may, 
as appropriate:
(a) Reconvene the original Trial Chamber;
(b) Constitute a new Trial Chamber; or
(c) Retain jurisdiction over the matter,
with a view to, after hearing the parties in the manner set forth in the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, arriving at a determination on whether the 
judgement should be revised.
Article 85
Compensation to an arrested or convicted person
1. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.
2. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal
offence, and when subsequently his or her conviction has been reversed on the 
ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has 
been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a 
result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is 
proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly 
attributable to him or her.
3. In exceptional circumstances, where the Court finds conclusive facts
showing that there has been a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice, it 
may in its discretion award compensation, according to the criteria provided 
in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to a person who has been released from 
detention following a final decision of acquittal or a termination of the 
proceedings for that reason.
PART 9. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
Article 86
General obligation to cooperate
States Parties shall, in accordance with  the provisions of this Statute, 
cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
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Article 87
Recniests for cooperation: general provisions
1. (a) The Court shall have the authority to make requests to States 
Parties for cooperation. The requests shall be transmitted through the 
diplomatic channel or any other appropriate channel as may be designated by 
each State Party upon ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Subsequent changes to the designation shall be made by each State Party 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
(b) When appropriate, without prejudice to the provisions of 
subparagraph (a), requests may also be transmitted through the International 
Criminal Police Organization or any appropriate regional organization.
2. Requests for cooperation and any documents supporting the request shall 
either be in or be accompanied by a translation into an official language of 
the requested State or one of the working languages of the Court, in 
accordance with the choice made by that State upon ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.
Subsequent changes to this choice shall be made in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
3. The requested State shall keep confidential a request for cooperation 
and any documents supporting the request, except to the extent that the 
disclosure is necessary for execution of the request.
4. In relation to any request for assistance presented under this Part, the 
Court may take such measures, including measures related to the protection of 
information, as may be necessary to ensure the safety or physical or 
psychological well-being of any victims, potential witnesses and their 
families. The Court may request that any information that is made available 
under this Part shall be provided and handled in a manner that protects the 
safety and physical or psychological well-being of any victims, potential 
witnesses and their families.
5. (a) The Court may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide 
assistance under this Part on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement 
with such State or any other appropriate basis.
(b) Where a State not party to this Statute, which has entered into an 
ad hoc arrangement or an agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate with 
requests pursuant to a ny such arrangement or agreement, the Court may so 
inform the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred 
the matter to the Court, the Security Council.
6. The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide 
information or documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of
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cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon with such an organization 
and which are in accordance with its competence or mandate.
7. Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the 
Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court 
from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may 
make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States 
Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to 
the Security Council.
Article 88
Availabilitv of procedures under national law
States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under 
their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified 
under this Part.
Article 89 
Surrender of persons to the Court
1. The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a 
person, together with the material supporting the request outlined in 
article 91, to any State on the territory of which that person may be found 
and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender of 
such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Part and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests for 
arrest and surrender.
2. Where the person sought for surrender brings a challenge before a 
national court on the basis of the principle of ne bis in idem as provided in 
article 20, the requested State shall immediately consult with the Court to 
determine if there has been a relevant ruling on admissibility. If the case
is admissible, the requested State shall proceed with the execution of the
request. If an admissibility ruling is pending, the requested State may 
postpone the execution of the request for surrender of the person until the 
Court makes a determination on admissibility.
3. (a) A State Party shall authorize, in accordance with its national
procedural law, transportation through its territory of a person being 
surrendered to the Court by another State, except where transit through that
State would impede or delay the surrender.
(b) A request by the Court for transit shall be transmitted in 
accordance with article 87. The request for transit shall contain:
(i) A description of the person being transported;
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(ii) A brief statement of the facts of the case and their legal 
characterization; and
(iii) The warrant for arrest and surrender;
(c) A person being transported shall be detained in custody during the 
period of transit;
(d) No authorization is required if the person is transported by air and 
no landing is scheduled on the territory of the transit State;
(e) If an unscheduled landing occurs on the territory of the transit 
State, that State may require a request for transit from the Court as provided 
for in subparagraph (b). The transit State shall detain the person being 
transported until the request for transit is received and the transit is 
effected, provided that detention for purposes of this subparagraph may not be 
extended beyond 96 hours from the unscheduled landing unless the request is 
received within that time.
4. If the person sought is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence 
in the requested State for a crime different from that for which surrender to 
the Court is sought, the requested State, after making its decision to grant 
the request, shall consult with the Court.
Article 90 
Competing requests
1. A State Party which receives a request from the Court for the surrender 
of a person under article 89 shall, if it also receives a request from any 
other State for the extradition of the same person for the same conduct which 
forms the basis of the crime for which the Court seeks the person's surrender, 
notify the Court and the requesting State of that fact.
2. Where the requesting State is a State Party, the requested State shall 
give priority to the request from the Court if:
(a) The Court has, pursuant to article 18 or 19, made a determination 
that the case in respect of which surrender is sought is admissible and that 
determination takes into account the investigation or prosecution conducted by 
the requesting State in respect of its request for extradition; or
(b) The Court makes the determination described in subparagraph (a) 
pursuant to the requested State's not ification under pa ragraph 1.
3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 (a) has not been made, the
requested State may, at its discretion, pending the determination of the Court 
under paragraph 2 (b), proceed to deal with the request for extradition from 
the requesting State but shall not extradite the person until the Court has
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determined that the case is inadmissible. The Court's determination shall be 
made on an expedited basis.
4. If the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the 
requested State, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite 
the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the request for
surrender from the Court, if the Court has determined that the case is
admissible.
5. Where a case under paragraph 4 has not been determined to be admissible 
by the Court, the requested State may, at its discretion, proceed to deal with 
the request for extradition from the requesting State.
6. In cases where paragraph 4 applies except that the requested State is 
under an existing international obligation to extradite the person to the 
requesting State not Party to this Statute, the requested State shall 
determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or extradite the person 
to the requesting State. In making its decision, the requested State shall 
consider all the relevant factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The respective dates of the requests;
(b) The interests of the requesting State including, where relevant,
whether the crime was committed in its territory and the nationality of the 
victims and of the person sought; and
(c) The possibility of subsequent surrender between the Court and the 
requesting State.
7. Where a State Party which receives a request from the Court for the 
surrender of a person also receives a request from any State for the 
extradition of the same person for conduct other than that which constitutes 
the crime for which the Court seeks the person's surrender:
(a) The requested State shall, if it is not under an existing
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, give 
priority to the request from the Court;
(b) The requested State shall, if it is under an existing international
obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, determine whether
to surrender the person to the Court or to extradite the person to the 
requesting State. In making its decision, the requested State shall consider 
all the relevant factors, including but not limited to those set out in 
paragraph 6, but shall give special consideration to the relative nature and 
gravity of the conduct in question.
8. Where pursuant to a notification under this article, the Court has 
determined a case to be inadmissible, and subsequently extradition to the 
requesting State is refused, the requested State shall notify the Court of 
this decision.
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Article 91
Contents of request for arrest and surrender
1. A request for arrest and surrender shall be made in writing. In urgent 
cases, a request may be made by any medium capable of delivering a written 
record, provided that the request shall be confirmed through the channel 
provided for in article 87, paragraph 1 (a).
2. In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person for 
whom a warrant of arrest has been issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber under 
article 58, the request shall contain or be supported by:
(a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the 
person, and information as to that person's probable location;
(b) A copy of the warrant of arrest; and
(c) Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to 
meet the requirements for the surrender process in the requested State, except 
that those requirements should not be more burdensome than those applicable to 
requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or arrangements between the 
requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less burdensome, 
taking into account the distinct nature of the Court.
3. In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person 
already convicted, the request shall contain or be supported by:
(a) A copy of any warrant of arrest for that person;
(b) A copy of the judgement of conviction;
(c) Information to demonstrate that the person sought is the one 
referred to in the judgement of conviction; and
(d) If the person sought has been sentenced, a copy of the sentence 
imposed and, in the case of a sentence for imprisonment, a statement of any 
time already served and the time remaining to be served.
4. Upon the request of the Court, a State Party shall consult with the 
Court, either generally or with respect to a specific matter, regarding any 
requirements under its national law that may apply under paragraph 2 (c). 
During the consultations, the State Party shall advise the Court of the 
specific requirements of its national law.
- 6 9 -
Article 92 
Provisional arrest
1. In urgent cases, the Court may request the provisional arrest of the 
person sought, pending presentation of the request for surrender and the 
documents supporting the request as specified in article 91.
2. The request for provisional arrest shall be made by any medium capable 
of delivering a written record and shall contain:
(a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the 
person, and information as to that person's probable location;
(b) A concise statement of the crimes for which the person's arrest is 
sought and of the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes, 
including, where possible, the date and location of the crime;
(c) A statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a judgement 
of conviction against the person sought; and
(d) A statement that a request for surrender of the person sought will 
follow.
3. A person who is provisionally arrested may be released from custody if 
the requested State has not received the request for surrender and the 
documents supporting the request as specified in article 91 within the time 
limits specified in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. However, the person 
may consent to surrender before the expiration of this period if permitted by 
the law of the requested State. In such a case, the requested State shall 
proceed to surrender the person to the Court as soon as possible.
4. The fact that the person sought has been released from custody pursuant 
to paragraph 3 shall not prejudice the subsequent arrest and surrender of that 
person if the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request 
are delivered at a later date.
Article 93
Other forms of cooperation
1. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and 
under procedures of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide 
the following assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions:
(a) The identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of 
items ;
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(b) The taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the
production of evidence, including expert opinions and reports necessary to the
Court ;
(c) The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted;
(d) The service of documents, including judicial documents;
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or 
experts before the Court;
(f) The temporary transfer of persons as provided in paragraph 7;
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and
examination of grave sites;
(h) The execution of searches and seizures;
(i) The provision of records and documents, including official records
and documents;
(j) The protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of 
evidence ;
(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, 
property and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of 
eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide 
third parties; and
(1) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of 
the requested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The Court shall have the authority to provide an assurance to a witness 
or an expert appearing before the Court that he or she will not be prosecuted, 
detained or subjected to any restriction of personal freedom by the Court in 
respect of any act or omission that preceded the departure of that person from 
the requested State.
3. Where execution of a particular measure of assistance detailed in a 
request presented under paragraph 1, is prohibited in the requested State on 
the basis of an existing fundamental legal principle of general application, 
the requested State shall promptly consult with the Court to try to resolve 
the matter. In the consultations, consideration should be given to whether 
the assistance can be rendere d in another manner or subject to conditions. If 
after consultations the matter cannot be resolved, the Court shall modify the 
request as necessary.
4. In accordance with article 72, a State Party may deny a request for 
assistance, in whole or in part, only if the request concerns the production
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of any documents or disclosure of evidence which relates to its national 
security.
5. Before denying a request for assistance under paragraph 1 (1), the 
requested State shall consider whether the assistance can be provided subject 
to specified conditions, or whether the assistance can be provided at a later 
date or in an alternative manner, provided that if the Court or the Prosecutor 
accepts the assistance subject to conditions, the Court or the Prosecutor 
shall abide by them.
6. If a request for assistance is denied, the requested State Party shall 
promptly inform the Court or the Prosecutor of the reasons for such denial.
7. (a) The Court may request the temporary transfer of a person in custody
for purposes of identification or for obtaining testimony or other assistance.
The person may be transferred if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) The person freely gives his or her informed consent to the 
transfer; and
(ii) The requested State agrees to the transfer, subject to such 
conditions as that State and the Court may agree.
(b) The person being transferred shall remain in custody. When the 
purposes of the transfer have been fulfilled, the Court shall return the 
person without delay to the requested State.
8. (a) The Court shall ensure the confidentiality of documents and
information, except as required for the investigation and proceedings 
described in the request.
(b) The requested State may, when necessary, transmit documents or 
information to the Prosecutor on a confidential basis. The Prosecutor may 
then use them solely for the purpose of generating new evidence.
(c) The requested State may, on its own motion or at the request of the 
Prosecutor, subsequently consent to the disclosure of such documents or 
information. They may then be used as evidence pursuant to the provisions of 
Parts 5 and 6 and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
9. (a) (i) In the event that a State Party receives competing requests,
other than for surrender or extradition, from the Court and 
from another State pursuant to an international obligation, the 
State Party shall endeavour, in consultation with the Court and 
the other State, to meet bot h requests, if n ecessary by 
postponing or attaching conditions to one or the other request.
(ii) Failing that, competing requests shall be resolved in
accordance with the principles established in article 90.
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(b) Where, however, the request from the Court concerns information, 
property or persons which are subject to the control of a third State or an 
international organization by virtue of an international agreement, the 
requested States shall so inform the Court and the Court shall direct its 
request to the third State or international organization.
10. (a) The Court may, upon request, cooperate with and provide assistance
to a State Party conducting an investigation into or trial in respect of 
conduct which constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or 
which constitutes a serious crime under the national law of the requesting 
State.
(b) (i) The assistance provided under subparagraph (a) shall include,
inter alia:
a. The transmission of statements, documents or other types 
of evidence obtained in the course of an investigation or 
a trial conducted by the Court; and
b. The questioning of any person detained by order of the 
Court ;
(ii) In the case of assistance under subparagraph (b) (i) a;
a. If the documents or other types of evidence have been 
obtained with the assistance of a State, such 
transmission shall require the consent of that State;
b. If the statements, documents or other types of evidence 
have been provided by a witness or expert, such 
transmission shall be subject to the provisions of 
article 68.
(c) The Court may, under the conditions set out in this paragraph, grant 
a request for assistance under this paragraph from a State which is not a 
Party to this Statute.
Article 94
Postponement of execution of a request in respect 
of ongoing investigation or prosecution
1. If the immediate execution of a request would interfere with an ongoing 
investigation or prosecution of a case different from that to which the 
request relates, the requested State may postpone the execution of the request 
for a period of time agreed upon with the Court. However, the postponement 
shall be no longer than is necessary to complete the relevant investigation or 
prosecution in the requested State. Before making a decision to postpone, the
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requested State should consider whether the assistance may be immediately 
provided subject to certain conditions.
2. If a decision to postpone is taken pursuant to paragraph 1, the 
Prosecutor may, however, seek measures to preserve evidence, pursuant to 
article 93, paragraph 1 (j).
Article 95
Postponement of execution of a request in 
respect of an admissibilitv challenge
Where there is an admissibility challenge under consideration by the 
Court pursuant to article 18 or 19, the requested State may postpone the 
execution of a request under this Part pending a determination by the Court, 
unless the Court has specifically ordered that the Prosecutor may pursue the 
collection of such evidence pursuant to article 18 or 19.
Article 96
Contents of recmest for other forms of 
assistance under article 93
1. A request for other forms of assistance referred to in article 93 shall
be made in writing. In urgent cases, a request may be made by any medium
capable of delivering a written record, provided that the request shall be 
confirmed through the channel provided for in article 87, paragraph 1 (a).
2. The request shall, as applicable, contain or be supported by the 
following :
(a) A concise statement of the purpose of the request and the assistance 
sought, including the legal basis and the grounds for the request;
(b) As much detailed information as possible about the location or 
identification of any person or place that must be found or identified in 
order for the assistance sought to be provided;
(c) A concise statement of the essential facts underlying the request;
(d) The reasons for and details of any procedure or requirement to be 
followed;
(e) Such information as may be required under the law of the requested 
State in order to execute the request; and
(f) Any other information relevant in order for the assistance sought to 
be provided.
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3. Upon the request of the Court, a State Party shall consult with the 
Court, either generally or with respect to a specific matter, regarding any 
requirements under its national law that may apply under paragraph 2 (e). 
During the consultations, the State Party shall advise the Court of the 
specific requirements of its national law.
4. The provisions of this article shall, where applicable, also apply in 
respect of a request for assistance made to the Court.
Article 97 
Consultations
Where a State Party receives a request under this Part in relation to 
which it identifies problems which may impede or prevent the execution of the 
request, that State shall consult with the Court without delay in order to 
resolve the matter. Such problems may include, inter alia:
(a) Insufficient information to execute the request;
(b) In the case of a request for surrender, the fact that despite best 
efforts, the person sought cannot be located or that the investigation 
conducted has determined that the person in the requested State is clearly not 
the person named in the warrant; or
(c) The fact that execution of the request in its current form would 
require the requested State to breach a pre-existing treaty obligation 
undertaken with respect to another State.
Article 98
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunitv 
and consent to surrender
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic 
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first 
obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is 
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court 
can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of 
consent for the surrender.
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Article 99
Execution of requests under articles 93 and 96
1. Requests for assistance shall be executed in accordance with the 
relevant procedure under the law of the requested State and, unless prohibited 
by such law, in the manner specified in the request, including following any 
procedure outlined therein or permitting persons specified in the request to 
be present at and assist in the execution process.
2. In the case of an urgent request, the documents or evidence produced in 
response shall, at the request of the Court, be sent urgently.
3. Replies from the requested State shall be transmitted in their original 
language and form.
4. Without prejudice to other articles in this Part, where it is necessary 
for the successful execution of a request which can be executed without any 
compulsory measures, including specifically the interview of or taking 
evidence from a person on a voluntary basis, including doing so without the 
presence of the authorities of the requested State Party if it is essential 
for the request to be executed, and the examination without modification of a 
public site or other public place, the Prosecutor may execute such request 
directly on the territory of a State as follows:
(a) When the State Party requested is a State on the territory of which 
the crime is alleged to have been committed, and there has been a 
determination of admissibility pursuant to article 18 or 19, the Prosecutor 
may directly execute such request following all possible consultations with 
the requested State Party;
(b) In other cases, the Prosecutor may execute such request following 
consultations with the requested State Party and subject to any reasonable 
conditions or concerns raised by that State Party. Where the requested State 
Party identifies problems with the execution of a request pursuant to this 
subparagraph it shall, without delay, consult with the Court to resolve the 
matter.
5. Provisions allowing a person heard or examined by the Court under 
article 72 to invoke restrictions designed to prevent disclosure of 
confidential information connected with national security shall also apply to 
the execution of requests for assistance under this article.
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Article 100 
Costs
1. The ordinary costs for execution of requests in the territory of the 
requested State shall be borne by that State, except for the following, which 
shall be borne by the Court:
(a) Costs associated with the travel and security of witnesses and 
experts or the transfer under article 93 of persons in custody;
(b) Costs of translation, interpretation and transcription;
(c) Travel and subsistence costs of the judges, the Prosecutor, the 
Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar, the Deputy Registrar and staff of any organ 
of the Court;
(d) Costs of any expert opinion or report requested by the Court;
(e) Costs associated with the transport of a person being surrendered to
the Court by a custodial State; and
(f) Following consultations, any extraordinary costs that may result 
from the execution of a request.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall, as appropriate, apply to requests 
from States Parties to the Court. In that case, the Court shall bear the 
ordinary costs of execution.
Article 101 
Rule of speciality
1. A person surrendered to the Court under this Statute shall not be 
proceeded against, punished or detained for any conduct committed prior to 
surrender, other than the conduct or course of conduct which forms the basis 
of the crimes for which that person has been surrendered.
2. The Court may request a waiver of the requirements of paragraph 1 from 
the State which surrendered the person to the Court and, if necessary, the 
Court shall provide additional information in accordance with article 91. 
States Parties shall have the authority to provide a waiver to the Court and 
should endeavour to do so.
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Article 102 
Use of terms 
For the purposes of this Statute:
(a) "surrender" means the delivering up of a person by a State to the 
Court, pursuant to this Statute.
(b) "extradition" means the delivering up of a person by one State to
another as provided by treaty, convention or national legislation.
PART 10. ENFORCEMENT
Article 103
Role of States in enforcement of 
sentences of imprisonment
1. (a) A sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by
the Court from a list of States which have indicated to the Court their
willingness to accept sentenced persons.
(b) At the time of declaring its willingness to accept sentenced 
persons, a State may attach conditions to its acceptance as agreed by the 
Court and in accordance with this Part.
(c) A State designated in a particular case shall promptly inform the
Court whether it accepts the Court's designation,
2. (a) The State of enforcement shall notify the Court of any
circumstances, including the exercise of any conditions agreed under 
paragraph 1, which could materially affect the terms or extent of the
imprisonment. The Court shall be given at least 45 days' notice of any such
known or foreseeable circumstances. During this period, the State of 
enforcement shall take no action that might prejudice its obligations under 
article 110.
(b) Where the Court cannot agree to the circumstances referred to in 
subparagraph (a), it shall notify the State of enforcement and proceed in 
accordance with article 104, paragraph 1.
3. In exercising its discretion to make a designation under paragraph 1,
the Court shall take into account the following:
(a) The principle that States Parties should share the responsibility 
for enforcing sentences of imprisonment, in accordance with principles of 
equitable distribution, as provided in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
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(b) The application of widely accepted international treaty standards
governing the treatment of prisoners;
(c) The views of the sentenced person;
(d) The nationality of the sentenced person;
(e) Such other factors regarding the circumstances of the crime or
the person sentenced, or the effective enforcement of the sentence, as may 
be appropriate in designating the State of enforcement.
4. If no State is designated under paragraph 1, the sentence of 
imprisonment shall be served in a prison facility made available by the host 
State, in accordance with the conditions set out in the headquarters agreement 
referred to in article 3, paragraph 2. In such a case, the costs arising out 
of the enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment shall be borne by the Court.
Article 104
Change in designation of State of enforcement
1. The Court may, at any time, decide to transfer a sentenced person to a 
prison of another State.
2. A sentenced person may, at any time, apply to the Court to be 
transferred from the State of enforcement.
Article 105 
Enforcement of the sentence
1. Subject to conditions which a State may have specified in accordance 
with article 103, paragraph 1 (b), the sentence of imprisonment shall be 
binding on the States Parties, which shall in no case modify it.
2. The Court alone shall have the right to decide any application for 
appeal and revision. The State of enforcement shall not impede the making of 
any such application by a sentenced person.
Article 106
Supervision of enforcement o£ sentences and
conditions of imprisonment
1. The enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the 
supervision of the Court and shall be consistent with widely accepted 
international treaty standards governing treatment of prisoners.
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2. The conditions of imprisonment shall be governed by the law of the State 
of enforcement and shall be consistent with widely accepted international 
treaty standards governing treatment of prisoners; in no case shall such 
conditions be more or less favourable than those available to prisoners 
convicted of similar offences in the State of enforcement.
3. Communications between a sentenced person and the Court shall be 
unimpeded and confidential.
Article 107
Transfer of the person upon completion of sentence
1. Following completion of the sentence, a person who is not a national of 
the State of enforcement may, in accordance with the law of the State of 
enforcement, be transferred to a State which is obliged to receive him or her, 
or to another State which agrees to receive him or her, taking into account 
any wishes of the person to be transferred to that State, unless the State of 
enforcement authorizes the person to remain in its territory.
2. If no State bears the costs arising out of transferring the person to 
another State pursuant to paragraph 1, such costs shall be borne by the Court.
3. Subject to the provisions of article 108, the State of enforcement may 
also, in accordance with its national law, extradite or otherwise surrender 
the person to a State which has requested the extradition or surrender of the
person for purposes of trial or enforcement of a sentence.
Article 108
Limitation on the prosecution or punishment of other offences
1. A sentenced person in the custody of the State of enforcement shall not 
be subject to prosecution or punishment or to extradition to a third State for 
any conduct engaged in prior to that person's delivery to the State of 
enforcement, unless such prosecution, punishment or extradition has been 
approved by the Court at the request of the State of enforcement.
2. The Court shall decide the matter after having heard the views of the 
sentenced person.
3. Paragraph 1 shall cease to apply if the sentenced person remains 
vo lun tarily for more than 30 days in the territory of the State of enforcement 
after having served the full sentence imposed by the Court, or returns to the
territory of that State after having left it.
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Article 109
Enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures
1. States Parties shall give effect to fines or forfeitures ordered by the 
Court under Part 7, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third 
parties, and in accordance with the procedure of their national law.
2. If a State Party is unable to give effect to an order for forfeiture, it 
shall take measures to recover the value of the proceeds, property or assets 
ordered by the Court to be forfeited, without prejudice to the rights of 
bona fide third parties.
3. Property, or the proceeds of the sale of real property or, where 
appropriate, the sale of other property, which is obtained by a State Party as 
a result of its enforcement of a judgement of the Court shall be transferred 
to the Court.
Article 110
Review bv the Court concerning reduction of sentence
1. The State of enforcement shall not release the person before expiry of 
the sentence pronounced by the Court.
2. The Court alone shall have the right to decide any reduction of 
sentence, and shall rule on the matter after having heard the person.
3. When the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or 25 years 
in the case of life imprisonment, the Court shall review the sentence to 
determine whether it should be reduced. Such a review shall not be conducted 
before that time.
4. In its review under paragraph 3, the Court may reduce the sentence if it 
finds that one or more of the following factors are present:
(a) The early and continuing willingness of the person to cooperate with 
the Court in its investigations and prosecutions;
(b) The voluntary assistance of the person in enabling the enforcement 
of the judgements and orders of the Court in other cases, and in particular 
providing assistance in locating assets subject to orders of fine, forfeiture 
or reparation which may be used for the benefit of victims; or
(c) Other factors establishing a clear and significant change of 
circumstances sufficient to justify the reduction of sentence, as provided in 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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5. If the Court determines in its initial review under paragraph 3 that it 
is not appropriate to reduce the sentence, it shall thereafter review the 
question of reduction of sentence at such intervals and applying such criteria 
as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Article 111 
Escape
If a convicted person escapes from custody and flees the State of 
enforcement, that State may, after consultation with the Court, request the 
person's surrender from the State in which the person is located pursuant to 
existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or may request that the Court 
seek the person's surrender, in accordance with Part 9. It may direct that 
the person be delivered to the State in which he or she was serving the 
sentence or to another State designated by the Court.
PART 11. ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES 
Article 112 
Assembly of States Parties
1. An Assembly of States Parties to this Statute is hereby established.
Each State Party shall have one representative in the Assembly who may be 
accompanied by alternates and advisers. Other States which have signed this 
Statute or the Final Act may be observers in the Assembly.
2. The Assembly shall:
(a) Consider and adopt, as appropriate, recommendations of the 
Preparatory Commission;
(b) Provide management oversight to the Presidency, the Prosecutor and 
the Registrar regarding the administration of the Court;
(c) Consider the reports and activities of the Bureau established under 
paragraph 3 and take appropriate action in regard thereto;
(d) Consider and decide the budget for the Court;
(e) Decide whether to alter, in accordance with article 36, the number 
of judges;
(f) Consider pursuant to article 87, paragraphs 5 and 7, any question 
relating to non-cooperation;
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(g) Perform any other function consistent with this Statute or the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.
3. (a) The Assembly shall have a Bureau consisting of a President,
two Vice-Presidents and 18 members elected by the Assembly for three-year 
terms.
(b) The Bureau shall have a representative character, taking into 
account, in particular, equitable geographical distribution and the adequate 
representation of the principal legal systems of the world.
(c) The Bureau shall meet as often as necessary, but at least once a 
year. It shall assist the Assembly in the discharge of its responsibilities.
4. The Assembly may establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, 
including an independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and 
investigation of the Court, in order to enhance its efficiency and economy.
5. The President of the Court, the Prosecutor and the Registrar or their 
representatives may participate, as appropriate, in meetings of the Assembly 
and of the Bureau.
6. The Assembly shall meet at the seat of the Court or at the Headquarters 
of the United Nations once a year and, when circumstances so require, hold 
special sessions. Except as otherwise specified in this Statute, special 
sessions shall be convened by the Bureau on its own initiative or at the 
request of one third of the States Parties.
7. Each State Party shall have one vote. Every effort shall be made to 
reach decisions by consensus in the Assembly and in the Bureau. If consensus 
cannot be reached, except as otherwise provided in the Statute:
(a) Decisions on matters of substance must be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of those present and voting provided that an absolute majority of 
States Parties constitutes the quorum for voting;
(b) Decisions on matters of procedure shall be taken by a simple 
majority of States Parties present and voting.
8. A State Party which is in arrears in the payment of its financial
contributions towards the costs of the Court shall have no vote in the 
Assembly and in the Bureau if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the 
amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The 
Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a State Party to vote in the Assembly 
and in the Bureau if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to
conditions beyond the control of the State Party.
9. The Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
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10. The official and working languages of the Assembly shall be those of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.
PART 12. FINANCING
Article 113 
Financial Regulations
Except as otherwise specifically provided, all financial matters related 
to the Court and the meetings of the Assembly of States Parties, including its 
Bureau and subsidiary bodies, shall be governed by this Statute and the 
Financial Regulations and Rules adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.
Article 114 
Pavment of expenses
Expenses of the Court and the Assembly of States Parties, including its 
Bureau and subsidiary bodies, shall be paid from the funds of the Court.
Article 115
Funds of the Court and of the Assembly of States Parties
The expenses of the Court and the Assembly of States Parties, including 
its Bureau and subsidiary bodies, as provided for in the budget decided by the 
Assembly of States Parties, shall be provided by the following sources:
(a) Assessed contributions made by States Parties;
(b) Funds provided by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the 
General Assembly, in particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to 
referrals by the Security Council.
Article 116 
Voluntary contributions
Without prejudice to article 115, the Court may receive and utilize, as 
additional funds, vo luntary contributions from Governments, international 
organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities, in accordance 
with relevant criteria adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.
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Article 117 
Assessment of contributions
The contributions of States Parties shall be assessed in accordance with 
an agreed scale of assessment, based on the scale adopted by the 
United Nations for its regular budget and adjusted in accordance with the 
principles on which that scale is based.
Article 118 
Annual audit
The records, books and accounts of the Court, including its annual 
financial statements, shall be audited annually by an independent auditor.
PART 13. FINAL CLAUSES 
Article 119 
Settlement of disputes
1. Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be 
settled by the decision of the Court.
2. Any other dispute between two or more States Parties relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled through 
negotiations within three months of their commencement shall be referred to 
the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly may itself seek to settle the 
dispute or may make recommendations on further means of settlement of the 
dispute, including referral to the International Court of Justice in 
conformity with the Statute of that Court.
Article 120 
Reservations 
No reservations may be made to this Statute.
Article 121 
Amendments
1. After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this 
Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto. The text of any
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proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.
2. No sooner than three months from the date of notification, the Assembly 
of States Parties, at its next meeting, shall, by a majority of those present 
and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal. The Assembly may deal 
with the proposal directly or convene a Review Conference if the issue 
involved so warrants.
3. The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States 
Parties or at a Review Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall 
require a two-thirds majority of States Parties.
4. Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into 
force for all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification 
or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations by seven-eighths of them.
5. Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into 
force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year 
after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In 
respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall 
not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when 
committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory.
6. If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths of States Parties in 
accordance with paragraph 4, any State Party which has not accepted the 
amendment may withdraw from this Statute with immediate effect, 
notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, 
paragraph 2, by giving notice no later than one year after the entry into 
force of such amendment.
7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to all 
States Parties any amendment adopted at a meeting of the Assembly of States 
Parties or at a Review Conference.
Article 122
Amendments to provisions of an institutional nature
1. Amendments to provisions of this Statute which are of an exclusively 
institutional nature, namely, article 35, article 36, paragraphs 8 and 9, 
article 37, article 38, article 39, paragraphs 1 (first two sentences),
2 and 4, article 42, paragraphs 4 to 9, article 43, paragraphs 2 and 3, and 
articles 44, 46, 47 and 49, may be proposed at any time, notwithstanding 
article 121, paragraph 1, by any State Party. The text of any proposed 
amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations or 
such other person designated by the Assembly of States Parties who shall
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promptly circulate it to all States Parties and to others participating in the 
Assembly.
2. Amendments under this article on which consensus cannot be reached shall 
be adopted by the Assembly of States Parties or by a Review Conference, by a 
two-thirds majority of States Parties. Such amendments shall enter into force 
for all States Parties six months after their adoption by the Assembly or, as 
the case may be, by the Conference.
Article 123 
Review of the Statute
1. Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider 
any amendments to this Statute. Such review may include, but is not limited 
to, the list of crimes contained in article 5. The Conference shall be open 
to those participating in the Assembly of States Parties and on the same 
conditions.
2. At any time thereafter, at the request of a State Party and for the 
purposes set out in paragraph 1, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall, upon approval by a majority of States Parties, convene a Review 
Conference.
3. The provisions of article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the 
adoption and entry into force of any amendment to the Statute considered at a 
Review Conference.
Article 124 
Transitional Provision
Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a 
party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after the 
entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept 
the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred 
to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its 
nationals or on its territory. A declaration under this article may be 
withdrawn at any time. The provisions of this article shall be reviewed at 
the Review Conference convened in accordance with article 123, paragraph 1.
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Article 125
Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Statute shall be open for signature by all States in Rome, at the 
headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
on 17 July 1998. Thereafter, it shall remain open for signature in Rome at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy until 17 October 1998. After that 
date, the Statute shall remain open for signature in New York, at
United Nations Headquarters, until 31 December 2000.
2. This Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall 
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Statute shall be open to accession by all States. Instruments of 
accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 126 
Entrv into force
1. This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after 
the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this 
Statute after the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, the Statute shall enter into force on the first day of 
the month after the 60th day following the deposit by such State of its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Article 127 
Withdrawal
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal 
shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, 
unless the notification specifies a later date.
2. A  state shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the 
obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, 
including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal 
shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal 
investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had 
a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the
withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued 
consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court 
prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective.
Article 128 
Authentic texts
The original of this Statute, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified 
copies thereof to all States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by 
their respective Governments, have signed this Statute.
DONE at Rome, this 17th day of July 1998.
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